The St Andrews Law Journal is a student led publication, our work comprising a variety of investigations into historic and contemporary matters within law and legal culture. We operate an editorial double-blind peer-review, and our published by the Institute of Legal and Constitutional Research, University of St Andrews. The Law Journal asks contributors to write an investigation of something they are genuinely interested in exploring, whether it be of academic or more casual focus, and placing that topic within a legal context: what are the laws governing the issue?; how has the evolution - or degradation - of this interest impacted the wider world, or demographics, specifically? Our editors are here to help guide contributors on elaborating on the pressing and passive legal considerations, doing so - we hope - will make law a more interesting and accessible subject for both our writers and readers.
University of St Andrews Institute of Legal & Constitutional Research (ILCR)
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Dobbs, Jaffee, HIPAA and Reproductive Privacy Protections
This Article argues that the post-Roe legal landscape reveals concerning gaps in the regulatory privacy framework. Drawing on Jaffee v. Redmond, which recognized a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, this Article maintains that reproductive health communications warrant comparable protection in federal proceedings.61 This privilege would not constitutionalize abortion or eliminate mandatory reporting obligations. Instead, it would regulate admissibility in court and preserve the confidentiality necessary for effective medical care. It would also reaffirm confidentiality as an ethical norm.
Copyright (c) 2026 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
UNCLOS as Customary Law: Legal Constraint and Strategic Instrument in U.S. Maritime Policy
It is imperative to ensure stability and security within maritime matters. Further, it is imperative that the United States embrace the tenets of UNCLOS. Although it has not ratified it, the United States of America has observed UNCLOS’ legal framework, relying on its principles to ensure its Indo-Pacific alliance network (i.e., the QUAD and AUKUS agreements) and to conduct FONOPs, such as the annual military exercise Talisman Sabre. This essay argues that the United States treats the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as binding customary law: a benchmark to legally structure FONOPs and alliance-based maritime security. The adherence to UNCLOS illustrates international law to be a strategic instrument and a constraining framework in the United States’ deterrence strategy, such as with U.S.-China great-power competition. In doing so, the United States would be a stronger ally in the Indo-Pacific, assuaging the fears of allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Furthermore, UNCLOS represents a key component of American deterrence: by upholding freedom of navigation and sovereignty, China would be deterred from becoming more aggressive towards Taiwan, preventing a potential military invasion or blockade.
Conventions, Disagreements, and (Hart’s) Inclusive Legal Positivism
In H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism, the rule of recognition is a rule that serves as an institutional check to identify the various sources of law and to ensure that laws are legally valid and binding. This rule provides us with a substantive understanding of two general theses that legal positivism commits to: the Social Fact Thesis and the Conventionality Thesis. The former claims that law originates from and is essentially a social fact. The latter states that the criteria for the legal validity of a legal system are settled by conventions held by legal officials, understood as the convergence of their beliefs and behaviours. According to Hart, the rule of recognition is both the basic social fact that makes certain rules part of the law and the very convention adopted by officials. One of the most prestigious critics of Hart (and thus of legal positivism), Ronald Dworkin, however, argues that the rule of recognition (hereinafter RoR) must be rejected because there are valid legal principles that it fails to recognize as part of the law. Furthermore, he argues that there are theoretical disagreements over ‘grounds of law’, which would undermine the social convention that officials are subject to and thus destroy RoR itself. In response, in the postscript of his The Concept of Law, Hart describes his positivism as ‘soft positivism’ (i.e., inclusive positivism), according to which, in every conceptually possible legal system, there could be norms that are ascribed legal validity solely because of their moral content, rather than through the institutional check sustained by RoR. Specifically, legal principles can be incorporated into the rule of recognition and thus become part of the law without compromising its social nature. This statement is deemed the Incorporation Thesis, and inclusive positivism is the view that adopts this thesis. To what extent Hart’s inclusive positivism successfully responds to Dworkin’s criticism remains a question often disputed within the philosophy of law. In this article, I will defend Hart against Dworkin’s objections and answer this question by proposing a specific reading of the Incorporation Thesis, namely that the incorporation of moral norms is a necessary but not sufficient condition for legal validity.
Historical Analysis of Disease Prevention in Colonial India: A Medico-Legal Perspective
Modern public health in India evolved drastically during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under colonial rule. The colonial authorities implemented and enforced various sanitary measures for the army in 1863 and civilians in 1912 through the appointment of Deputy Sanitary Commissioners and Health Officers. However, widespread public resistance broke out against cities planned according to imperial interests, instead of Indigenous welfare. Through studying Reports on Sanitary Measures in India and Gazettes, legal instruments, such as the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897, are critically assessed with their implications for both public health outcomes and civil liberties. By situating colonial disease prevention within broader frameworks of surveillance, control, and racial hierarchies, this paper contributes to understanding the complex legacies of colonial health policies and their lasting impact on postcolonial public health infrastructure. A comprehensive historical analysis of disease prevention efforts in colonial India, focusing on the intersection between medical policies and legal frameworks enforced by the British colonial administration in their regulation of epidemic diseases like cholera, the plague, and smallpox, can be understood through a medico-legal lens. This period is studied in the paper to explore how the socio-political needs of colonial rule shaped public health strategies. The findings underscore the need to reflect on how historical approaches to epidemic control inform contemporary public health practices and legal frameworks in South Asia.
Copyright (c) 2025 Aradhya Singh, Nirupama Singh http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Nordic Theory of Constitutionalism: The Origins of the Nordic Social Contract
Scandinavia is one of the happiest regions in the world thanks in part to its generous welfare systems. Alongside public policy, Finnish journalist Anu Partanen, together with Swedish historians Henrik Berggren & Lars Trägårdh, argue that this success is due to the unique Nordic Theory of Love: that crafting an autonomous citizen shapes a much happier society. This short article analyses the historical development of the Nordic Theory of Love; introducing the concept to the sphere of legal studies to further understand the social contract theory. The article finds that the constitutional relationship between the individual and the State developed much stronger in Scandinavia than in other Western societies enabling the success of the Nordic model.
Copyright (c) 2025 Nathan Beck-Samuels http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Top-Down to Bottom-Up: A Critical Analysis of the Approach to the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities under the Paris Agreement
Considered to pose the “biggest threat modern humans have ever faced”, climate change is endangering the livelihoods of humans and global ecosystems on an unprecedented scale. The systemically unjust nature of the climate crisis is widely acknowledged, as developing countries often face the most threatening consequences of climate change, while, owing to the deep-rooted effects of the colonial period, they have often contributed the least to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, both historically and in the present day. International climate law seeks to address this structural inequality through incorporating differential treatment into its provisions, primarily through the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Formally introduced through the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which continues to shape the foundations of international climate law, CBDR-RC is considered to be “the most significant guiding principle in the international climate change regime”, and has undergone significant evolution in its application since the enactment of the Paris Agreement in 2016. As such, the principle has shifted in approach from strict top-down differentiation to a flexible bottom-up process of self-differentiation, guided by the publication of individual Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) documents by each Party. The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of the bottom-up approach to CBDR-RC under the Paris Agreement, determining the extent to which such an approach weakens the normative status of the principle under international law. To this end, it will begin by exploring the role of differentiation and the evolution of CBDR-RC in international climate law, discussing its application under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which was adopted in 1997. The article will then present CBDR-RC under the Paris Agreement, analysing select NDC publications to determine the efficacy of its application, before critically analysing this evidence. In doing so, it argues that the bottom-up approach to CBDR-RC under the Paris Agreement has diluted the normative force of the principle, creating a fragmented system that relies heavily on political peer pressure rather than legal accountability. The article further argues that this undermines the status of CBDR-RC as a foundational principle of international climate law, presenting serious challenges for equity, transparency, and ambition under the regime. In light of such analysis, the article will then present recommendations for reform to strengthen CBDR-RC under the Agreement, through enforcing a clearer common structure for NDCs and enhanced oversight mechanisms, before making concluding remarks.
Copyright (c) 2025 Aileen Brechin http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Death, Blood, and Succession: Justinian’s Novel 158 and the relationship between inheritance law and imperial power in late Roman law
Romanist historians have consistently argued that Justinian’s revision to the agnatic line of succession in Novel 118 signifies an increased recognition of the blood principle. This paper takes a corrective approach to the place of blood in late Roman inheritance patterns and argues that the exchange of agnatic for general blood principle was not a policy change insofar that the imperial state had always dealt with a kind of blood. Thus, the change in succession law from agnatic line to general blood line should be viewed as a development within the principle of blood. Within this paper, ‘blood’ and ‘blood relationship’ refer to those in kinship, for example, mothers, fathers, children and so on. I will use this definition to explain how blood connections were endowed with proprietorial value through the imperial state’s developments in inheritance law. Power refers to imperial state’s ability to influence family hierarchy and Empire. Thus, the concept of blood was malleable because it’s cultural value and it legal value could be altered through imperial power. The approach of this paper is guided by David Miller and Peter Sarris’ annotated translations of Justinian’s Novels which treats the sources as self-conscious literary constructions. The analysis emphasises how juristic science itself functioned as part of imperial power. Ultimately, this paper argues that Justinian's Novel 158 exemplifies how the imperial state manipulated legal definitions of 'blood' to consolidate its control over family structures and inheritance.
Blood Succession Inheritance Power Property
Copyright (c) 2025 Flora MacKechnie http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Evaluating the Role of International Humanitarian Law in Protecting Women and Girls from Sexual Violence in the Boko Haram Conflict in Northeast Nigeria
The Boko Haram conflict in Northeast Nigeria has caused widespread devastation, with women and girls disproportionately affected by sexual violence. This violence—including abductions, forced marriages, and sexual enslavement—has been well-documented as part of Boko Haram’s strategy to destabilize communities and instil fear according to Amnesty International, 2015. International Humanitarian Law establishes protections for civilians and vulnerable groups during armed conflicts. However, its enforcement in the Boko Haram insurgency, remains limited. Traditional international law frameworks have often been critiqued for their failure to fully account for the lived experiences of marginalized groups, particularly women, in conflict. A feminist approach challenges these traditional priorities by highlighting how gendered harms—are often inadequately addressed in legal discourse. I adopt a critical feminist methodology to critique the gendered dimensions of violence in the Boko Haram conflict and the limitations of IHL in addressing these harms. The feminist perspective argue that traditional legal frameworks often reinforce patriarchal structures, whereas feminist approaches seek to ensure that legal protections reflect the realities of women’s experiences in conflict. Furthermore, while feminist approaches to human rights advocate for more inclusive framework, they may also face challenges when engaging with deeply rooted cultural norms that resist interventions. I structure the paper in three key sections. The first section provides an overview of the Boko Haram insurgency and the forms of gender-based violence used as a weapon of war. The second section critically examines provisions of IHL and traditional human rights framework and evaluates their effectiveness in protecting women and girls in conflict zones through a feminist lens, it highlights the limitations of IHL and human rights in cultural contexts. The last section proposes solutions based on successful strategies implemented in similar conflict-affected regions. This paper will contribute to feminist approaches to international law to provide a more nuanced understanding of gendered harms in conflict and show that addressing sexual violence in conflict requires a gender-sensitive localized approach while navigating the cultural and legal complexities of conflict zones like Northeast Nigeria.
Gender-Based Violence, Feminist Methodology, International Humanitarian Law, Cultural Contexts
Copyright (c) 2025 Adebola Adeoti http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights provides Americans with the right to be free from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ as well as being protected from unwarranted collection of certain information. This right has been significantly qualified over the centuries since the nation’s founding, with the Supreme Court and the legislature finding significant exceptions to the warrant requirement in the 20th and 21st centuries. This article provides an overview of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States, outlining how perceived ‘national threats’ have contributed to increasing surveillance not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Viewing these increasing exceptions through the lens of various ‘national threats’ from the ‘war on drugs’ in the late 20th century to the ‘war on terror’ and public fears about civil unrest in the 21st century, this article argues that there is no significant link between different modes of constitutional interpretation or political affiliation and the erosion of Fourth Amendment Privacy protections. Rather, this article argues that ‘national threats’ have placed more power into the hands of law enforcement over time, and that new technologies have increased the amount of information that can be collected without a warrant as the courts and the legislature fail to protect against warrantless surveillance.
Copyright (c) 2025 Greta Shope http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
“Ransom Payments, Maritime Insurance, and English Common Law: A Legal and Economic Dilemma”
This article explores the complex interplay between maritime piracy, ransom payments, and UK legal frameworks, focusing on the impact of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) on the shipping and insurance sectors. Modern piracy has transitioned into a systematic hijack-for-ransom model, creating high-stakes legal, economic, and humanitarian challenges for stakeholders. The CTSA 2015, while aimed at preventing the financing of terrorism, complicates the private sector's ability to navigate ransom demands, as it imposes stricter regulatory burdens and criminal liabilities on insurers and shipowners. Despite the UK government’s official policy discouraging ransom payments, these transactions remain legal under specific circumstances, as clarified by key legal precedents such as Westminster N.V. and Masefield. These cases highlighted the courts' recognition of ransom payments as a necessary practice in mitigating harm to hostages and ensuring the safe recovery of vessels and cargo. The article also examines the broader economic implications of the UK’s stance, noting London's central role in global maritime insurance and legal services. It argues that while the government’s counterterrorism priorities seek to address the long-term risks of piracy, such policies often leave the shipping industry and seafarers vulnerable. Industry perspectives highlight the potential consequences of an outright ban on ransom payments, including increased danger to crew members, adverse impacts on seafarer recruitment, and significant environmental risks in cases of abandoned cargo. Moreover, the article critiques the lack of international cooperation on counter-piracy strategies, which exacerbates the challenges faced by UK stakeholders. Ultimately, the article underscores the need for a balanced approach that considers both security objectives and the practical realities of maritime operations. It concludes that an overly rigid anti-ransom framework risks undermining the safety of maritime workers, the economic stability of the shipping industry, and the UK's prominence as a global maritime hub, calling for nuanced policy reform to address these multifaceted challenges effectively.
Maritime Piracy, Ransom Payments, Maritime Insurance, English Common Law, Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
Copyright (c) 2025 Archie Popham http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
A Consideration of the Legality of U.S. Targeted Killings in Pakistan Under International Human Rights Law
In the wake of atrocities, the international system has forged legal frameworks that regulate state action, however, the ever-evolving nuances of the framework make prosecuting difficult. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) protects civilians during an “armed conflict”.[1] If a conflict does not meet IHL’s legal threshold for an “armed conflict”, it is governed by International Human Rights Law (IHRL).[2] State actions to combat terrorism threats, especially in a military counterterrorism model, have more protections under IHRL than IHL.[3] The United State’s justifications for the War on Terror (WOT) challenge the current legal system by arguing that IHL should adapt to allow states to address “new” transnational terrorism threats.[4] When discussing legality, it is important to note that the law is not always moral or effective. This article limits its scope to the execution of the WOT in Pakistan through a legal perspective and highlights the use of drone strikes. I will argue that the use of drone strikes for targeted killings in Pakistan is illegal under IHRL because it does not meet the necessary legal criteria. First, I will illustrate that conflict within Pakistan does not meet the minimum organizational and intensity requirements to be classified as an “armed conflict” and is, therefore, governed by IHRL rather than IHL. Secondly, I will demonstrate that U.S. drone strikes within Pakistan were not legal under IHRL because they have become the default policy, violate Just War principles, and do not seek less lethal means. [1] International Committee of the Red Cross, “ICRC, IHL and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” accessed December 16, 2024, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/icrc-ihl-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts. [2] Eric Heinze, “The Evolution of International Law in Light of the ‘Global War on Terror,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2011): 1069, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001014. [3] Yolandi Meyer, “The Legality of Targeted-Killing Operations in Pakistan,” The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 47, no. 2 (2014): 234, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24585870. [4] “ICRC, IHL and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,” International Committee of the Red Cross.
International Law, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), Counterterrorism, War on Terror (WOT)
Copyright (c) 2025 Catherine Zortman http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Achieving Environmental Justice: The Role of Climate Finance and International Cooperation between Developed and Developing Countries
As climate change continues to exert systemic impacts worldwide through physical and transitional risks, the environmental justice gap between developed and developing countries is becoming increasingly pronounced. Addressing the complex challenge of balancing economic development with the demands of climate change adaptation and mitigation requires in-depth exploration. This paper aims to propose solutions better suited to resolving environmental justice issues arising from climate change. The paper begins by examining the impacts of climate-related risks on both developed and developing countries, analyzing how these risks contribute to environmental justice challenges. It then provides a detailed overview of the historical cooperation between developed and developing nations through a series of international treaties to advance climate finance. Furthermore, it critically evaluates how the failures of these treaties and cooperative efforts have exacerbated environmental justice issues. Finally, the paper highlights the advantages of green bonds in achieving distributive, intergenerational, and procedural justice, demonstrating the potential of this financial tool to promote environmental justice.
Copyright (c) 2025 Chenghuai Xu http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Post-Brexit Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements: Problems and Solutions
The reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments is key for the globalised economy in which we live. Post-Brexit, there has been a significant change in the legal infrastructure that formerly allowed for the recognition and enforcement of judgments between the EU Member States with the removal of the United Kingdom from the Brussels regime. The article assesses the implications of the loss of the Brussels I Recast Regulation (BIRR) for the recognition and enforcement between Scottish and EU Member State courts and critically analyse the potential post-Brexit replacements for cooperation. To reach a conclusion, Part I compares the BIRR to the existing Scots law, Part II analyses whether the Lugano II Convention would have satisfactorily replaced the BIRR and Part III determines the potential of the Hague Conventions as a way forward. Reference is made to conventions and Regulations, case law, academic commentary and other reports on this area of law. The article concludes by proposing the best option going forward for the recognition and enforcement of judgments between the UK and EU as being a bespoke UK-EU treaty, with the 2019 Hague Convention providing a temporary solution.
Copyright (c) 2023 Matthew G T Bruce https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Why Rape Law Revisions should be Consistent with Anderson’s Negotiation Model
In this essay I argue that the current law structure unobjectionably fails to protect women against cases of rape and needs reform. I further maintain that Anderson’s suggestion of ‘negotiation consent’ is the most appropriate line of reform, and I will defend her proposal in the face of potential objections. The current rape law in the UK was implemented in 2003, which revised previous laws firstly defined in the Sexual Offenses Act of 1953. Despite the ostensibly ‘objective’ nature of this law, which will be further examined in this essay, many feminist philosophers have noted the biases within the law which favour male interests. This essay explores the present issues within UK law, as well as our current understandings of what constitutes ‘a reasonable belief of consent’, that fail to protect women in instances of rape. This foundational attitude towards such matters influence performative revision models, such as the No Model and the Yes model, which I consider within this essay. Yet the inadequacies of such approaches, as I demonstrate, mirror some of the current issues with rape law in the UK today; such as the lack of recognition of men’s frequent inability to interpret women’s nonverbal behaviour and disregard for instances where one person changes their mind. Furthermore, I advocate for Anderson’s proposal of the negotiation model as an alternative reform of the law as well as society’s attitude towards sex and how consent can be clearly obtained. This model, when legally applied, will not only legally protect women in cases of rape, but eventually protect them from the present societal norms that perpetuate the imminent risk of rape and sexual exploitation. Through making the act of negotiation a legal requirement, I maintain that there would be a ‘ripple effect’ throughout society that would, eventually, lead to a change in public expectations of men and women. Anderson’s emphasis on either party being able to initiate the negotiation establishes a much more open-minded attitude towards gender roles and expectations of individuals based on their gender. This is the greatest strength of Anderson’s argument, as this equality-driven initiative would eventually seep into society’s wider expectations of individuals when initiating sex, and create a world where understanding what the other person is anticipating in a sexual situation is the norm.
Copyright (c) 2023 Emma Jervis https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
State Prevention Targeting Persons Attracted to Minors in Europe
More than a decade ago, innovative legal obligations were created in Europe to provide persons who fear that they might commit child sexual offences with access, where appropriate, to effective intervention programmes or measures designed to evaluate and prevent the risk of such offences. These supranational obligations were included in Article 7 of the Council of Europe’s Lanzarote Convention (2010) and the near-identical Article 22 of the European Union’s Directive 2011/93 (2011). These provisions have the potential to prevent damaging children’s health, to help persons attracted to minors to lead more productive and fulfilling lives, and to save society substantial resources. The European Commission noted, however, in 2020 that out of all of the state action that needs to be undertaken to implement Directive 2011/93, the least progress has to date been made in relation to prevention programmes for persons attracted to minors who fear that they might offend or have offended. This article aims to review the supranational obligations and their implementation. It finds that the stigma around pedophilia hampers progress at individual, inter-personal, and structural levels. There is room for improvement in the cooperation between the European Union and the Council of Europe. In addition, specific programmes and measures for specific target groups, such as women or people with disabilities, are identified as a blind spot.
Copyright (c) 2023 Aleydis Nissen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Post-Brexit Need for a Data Adequacy Decision to Engage in Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with the EU
There is a need for the UK and EU to continue mutual assistance in criminal matters. As a Member State, Mutual assistance in criminal matters between was primarily governed by an EU convention. This convention builds on existing Council of Europe (CoE) conventions on mutual criminal assistance. The EU convention states that mutual assistance shall be afforded in proceedings brought by member states’ authorities, or in connection with proceedings where a person may be liable in the requesting member state. Title II provides a framework for specific forms of assistance including restitution, hearings via videoconference and covert investigations. Member states are free to conclude further bilateral arrangements. A key element of this mutual assistance is harmonised EU data protection laws. With the UK now outside the EU’s data protection architecture, this may pose a significant hurdle for future cooperation. This article critically analyses the need for a data adequacy decision from the EU for the UK to engage in mutual assistance in criminal matters post-Brexit. To reach a conclusion, the article is set out over three substantive areas considering: mutual assistance and data protection law as it applies to EU member states; the law underpinning adequacy decisions; and future legal developments post-Brexit. Specific examples of data transfers and the effect of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) are compared and contrasted to adequacy decisions. While provisions of the TCA and EU Law Enforcement Directive (LED) provide some assurances, the article recommends that a data adequacy decision made under the LED is pursued.
Copyright (c) 2023 Matthew Bruce https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
AI Systems and Liability: An Assessment of the Applicability of Strict Liability & A Case for Limited Legal Personhood for AI
Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning have prompted discussion about whether conventional liability laws can be applicable to AI systems which manifest a high degree of autonomy. Users and developers of such AI systems may meet neither the epistemic (sufficient degree of awareness of what is happening) nor control (control over the actions performed) conditions of personal responsibility for the actions of the system at hand, and therefore, conventional liability schemes may seem to be inapplicable[1]. The recently adopted AI Liability Directive [2022] has sought to adapt EU law to the challenges to conventional liability schemes posed by AI systems by imposing a system of strict, rather than fault-based liability, for AI systems. The goal of this is to be able to more easily hold developers, producers, and users of AI technologies accountable, requiring them to explain how AI systems were built and trained. The Directive aims to make it easier for people and companies harmed by AI systems to sue those responsible for the AI systems for damages. However, the Directive seems to ignore the potential injustice that could result from producers and developers being held accountable for actions caused by AI systems which they are neither aware of nor have sufficient control over. In this essay, I will critically assess the Directive’s system of fault-based liability for AI systems and argue that, whilst such a system may confer some instrumental advantages on behalf of those suing for damages caused by AI systems, it risks causing injustice on the part of developers and producers by making them liable for events they could neither control nor predict. This is likely to risk both producing unjust outcomes and hindering progress in AI development. Instead, following Visa Kurki’s analysis of legal personhood as a cluster concept divided into passive and active incidents, I will argue that some AI systems ought to be granted a limited form of legal personhood, because they meet some of the relevant criteria for active legal personhood, such as the capacity to perform acts-in-the-law. The legal personhood I propose for AI systems is a kind of dependent legal personhood analogous to that granted to corporations. Such a form of legal personhood would not absolve developers and producers from liability for damages (where such liability is applicable), but at the same time, it would not risk unjustly holding producers and developers liable for actions of an AI system. [1] Mark Coeckelbergh, "Artificial Intelligence, Responsibility Attribution, and a Relational Justification of Explainability." Science and Engineering Ethics, (2020): 2054
Copyright (c) 2023 Louisa McDonald https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Understanding the Relationship between Canadian Law and Settler-Colonial Land Ontologies for Contemporary Decolonisation Movements
This article uses a decolonial framework to reveal the power of legality in the settler-colonial states’ legitimation of ontological occupation. Using the 1997 Delgamuukw decision and the Coastal GasLink Pipeline as central case studies, this paper reveals that the historical interrelationship between settler-colonial land ontologies and Canadian law during the process of colonisation has influenced the Canadian court system in ways that limit possibilities for decolonisation, and recognition of Indigenous sovereignty.
Copyright (c) 2022 Marisa Turner https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This article considers the delicate circumstances arising from the outbreak of the Great War and existing trade at the immediate date of the declaration of war. The decision to prosecute, or not to prosecute, for criminal charges is never easy but it is all the more problematic and sensitive when the immediate context is national high politics.
Copyright (c) 2022 Robert S. Shiels https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
There are five extant English law codes from the sixth to the ninth century but, despite Mercia's having been an independent polity in the period, none are Mercian. Three seventh century Kentish royal law codes survive in a single twelfth century manuscript and two West-Saxon law codes survive elsewhere. The early English legal record is, therefore, thin and there are no extant law codes from the major Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of Northumbria, East Anglia, or Mercia. As such, this article discusses possible answers to two questions: what Mercian law was and whether a Mercian law code ever existed.
Copyright (c) 2022 Thomas Vare https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Following the deposition of Mary, Queen of Scots in 1567, she fled first to Lochleven and, following defeat by supporters of James VI, she fled south to England seeking refuge. In England, Queen Elizabeth I allowed for conferences at York and Westminster to consider Mary's involvement in the murder of her husband Henry Darnley. This article explores the contemporary legality of such conferences, and whether they might be regarded as trials.
Copyright (c) 2022 Katherine Montana https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Law of Treasure in England and Scotland
This article explores the development of treasure law in England and Scotland, tracing its evolution since the time of Edward the Confessor to contemporary legislation and recent revisions. Literature on the subject is not extensive and treasure law has, at times, been ridiculed; as such, this article seeks to properly chronicle the development of this unique and intriguing area of both historic and contemporary law in England and Scotland.
Copyright (c) 2022 Zeb Micic https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
This paper, “Bilateral Investment Treaties: Liberal Tools Encouraging Greater Financial Direct Investment or Economic Nationalist Instruments?” will examine the legal arguments on how best to regulate Foreign Direct Investment, especially exploring the ramifications of the widespread use of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BTIs).
Copyright (c) 2021 Eamon Macdonald https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Does the insanity plea allow the infringement of the public’s right to security or is taking away the plea an infringement of yours?
This paper will focus on an assessment of the plea ‘not guilty by reason of insanity.’ The piece will seek to interrogate how the mentally ill are treated by the judicial system, whether the NGRI plea is reasonable, and the ways in which the legislative system must adapt to ensure that mental health is prioritised.
Copyright (c) 2021 Nikita A Khandheria https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Law and the Quest for Autonomy in the Western Tradition
This paper shall focus on the evolving features of autonomy and normativity in Western societies. The autonomy of Law as a product of deliberate will, regardless of other metaphysical or scientific considerations, is perpetually questioned in modern discussions of legality.
Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Bernier https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Gender Recognition Act: Past, Present and Future
This article shall focus on the landmark 2004 Gender Recognition Act and associated legal cases. It will explore the legal rulings that lead to the Act being passed, the content of the Act and the impact this had on the transgender community in the UK, including subsequent legal issues.
Copyright (c) 2021 Lauren Pursey https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Legal Rigidity and Digital Fluidity: Relationships between the State and the Internet
This paper shall focus on the transformative nature of technology, namely in facilitating criminal and terrorist activity and the unique challenges to regulation. The Internet requires a re-examination of static concepts of territorial boundaries and legal jurisdictions which contribute to uncertainty in regulation.
Copyright (c) 2021 Sarah Graham https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Is Innovation a sound justification for Medical Patents?
This essay will interrogate the legality of medical patents, arguing that one ought to reject the traditional utilitarian framework often used to justify IP law. Instead, this essay will turn to a more deontological justification for IP rights in UK law.
Copyright (c) 2021 Dara Tuncel https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
The Case Against Rudolf Nureyev: A Legal Case Study of the KGB’s Pursuits against Defectors
This article will investigate the legal investigation against Rudolf Nureyev that led to his defection, as well as the legal limitations placed upon him by the USSR after permanently settling in the West. It will also track the legal pursuit of restrictions against the dancer by the KGB that lasted for almost his entire life.
Copyright (c) 2021 Katherine Montana https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Detention of Private Persons by Private Persons as a Delictual Wrong: Liability for Deprivation of Liberty in Scots Private Law
Jonathan Brown is a lecturer in Scots Private Law at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow. Previously he was a lecturer in law at Aberdeen’s Robert Gordon University. Jonathan considers himself to be a private law generalist and dabbling legal historian. His recent publications include work on medical jurisprudence, the law of defamation and the relation between the Roman law of slavery and modern Scottish human trafficking legislation. The present essay is intended to provide a modern account which places acts amounting to wrongful detention effected by private persons within the taxonomy of iniuria.
Copyright (c) 2021 Jonathan Brown https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0