



The nature and purpose of reason in Christian theology: The 1952 exchange between Thomas F. Torrance and Brand Blanshard

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In his work, T. F. Torrance (1913–2007) formulated an intellectually robust and Christologically-grounded account of the relationship between divine self-revelation and human reason.¹ An important but under-utilized resource for understanding what would become Torrance’s mature view of the nature and purpose of reason in Christian theology is the correspondence between Torrance and the American idealist and rationalist Brand Blanshard (1892–1987) published in *The Scotsman* daily newspaper throughout April 1952. In these letters, Torrance and Blanshard clash over (i) the nature of reason and (ii) the purpose of reason in Christian theology. To date, these letters have largely been neglected in the secondary literature.² However, the letters are deeply significant as a point of convergence of the emphases in Torrance’s earlier thought over what reason *is* and what reason is *for*, and the themes raised are in continuity with Torrance’s mature contribution, indicating a fundamental continuity across the whole of Torrance’s corpus regarding the nature and function of reason.

This essay argues that in these exchanges, Torrance displays a commitment to two principles that would become determinative aspects of his mature approach to the nature and function of reason in Christian theology. First, Torrance makes clear his opposition to the autonomy of reason, exercised in self-sufficient abstraction from the subject-matter under inquiry. Second, Torrance affirms the necessity of reason in Christian theology, arguing that its proper function is to enable the conforming of our thought to reality. These early views would come to fruition in Torrance’s mature thought through (i) the contrast between object-making thought and objective thought; (ii) the attenuated function he attributed to formal logic; and (iii) for his

elaboration on the distinctive function of human reason in theology through his reconstruction of natural theology.

The occasion for the exchange between Blanshard and Torrance was Blanshard's Gifford Lectures (1952–53). During a lecture delivered on April 10, 1952, Blanshard criticised what he called the 'theology of crisis', focussing particularly on the thought of Karl Barth. Blanshard castigated what he perceived to be the supremacy Barth gave to faith and revelation over and above the laws of reason. For Blanshard, Barth's prioritization of God's self-revelation and human faith is nothing short of the derogation of reason, and the exclusion of rational thinking from the theological enterprise.³ For Torrance, who had just set out on the project of providing a new translation of Barth's *Church Dogmatics* into the English language, and who had founded the *Scottish Journal of Theology* (a journal sympathetic to Barth's theology) just four years previously, the provocation was too much. Torrance responded with a terse open letter in *The Scotsman* on April 14, 1952, which led to an exchange that extended through the following fortnight. In this connection, these letters are worthy of study for their function in the reception of Barth's thought in Scotland.



Torrance and Blanshard

At the time of the exchange, Torrance and Blanshard were at different points in their respective academic careers and their respective patterns of thought were following *very* different trajectories.

In April 1952, Torrance was early in his academic career. He still held the post of Professor of Church History in New College with his transfer to the Chair of Christian Dogmatics some months away (on 1 October, 1952).⁴ The previous decade of Torrance's life had been devoted, in the main part, to pastoral responsibilities, first in Alyth (1940–43) and then in Beechgrove (1945–50), including a period of war-time service (1943–45). This decade of parish ministry was not a period of academic stasis for Torrance, with some thirty-six publications to his credit by the end of it, including the publication of his doctoral thesis in 1946 and his landmark study *Calvin's Doctrine of Man* (1949). Moreover, in a subsequent interview, Torrance reflected that his ten years in pastoral ministry 'enabled [him] to

think theologically’,⁵ as he learnt to bring his academic learning into correspondence with the lived reality of those under his pastoral care.

Torrance’s theological influences through his time in Edinburgh (1931–37) are of significance to understanding his early thought. From A. E. Taylor, Torrance learnt of the trans-subjective criterion of ‘good’ that takes priority over personal judgement.⁶ It was from Taylor, McGrath notes, that Torrance took his view of the ontological ground of moral obligations as the criterion of right action in a centre beyond the human self.⁷ Daniel Lamont insisted in his 1934 text, *Christ and the World of Thought* (1934), that the early twentieth century was ‘in the midst of a revolution in every domain of knowledge’ characterised by a reaction against the imposition of human rational structures upon reality.⁸ The impact of this upon Torrance is demonstrated by his reaction to John Baillie’s *The Interpretation of Religion* (1928):

[...] in Kantian fashion he [Baillie] sought first to establish a method of inquiry apart from the subject-matter of his inquiry [...]. I found this epistemology untenable, not least in the light of the overthrow by general relativity of a dualist Kantian approach to knowledge, of which we learnt from Lamont [...]⁹

From Lamont, Torrance learnt that logical method must not be separated from subject-matter.¹⁰ H. R. Mackintosh impressed upon Torrance the conviction that God is known only through God’s self-disclosure through the Son,¹¹ whereby theology is envisioned as an open engagement with God who personally shapes our thought concerning him.¹² On this basis, Torrance learnt from Mackintosh the necessity of the conjunction of faith and reason, through which humans do not abandon logic, but rather exercise their rationality in an orientation of openness to that which cannot be known through human reason alone.¹³ Beyond Edinburgh, Torrance studied under Karl Barth from 1937 to 1938. Torrance later wrote that he learnt from Barth the epistemological significance of the unity of the being and act of God: to know God through the Son, is to know God as he is in himself such that God himself controls our knowing of him.¹⁴ With human thought thus ontologically controlled, Torrance held that Barth insulated theology from any appeal to an ‘independent conceptual

system reached before and apart from the actual knowledge of God'.¹⁵

In his early writings (1938–49), Torrance recognises the validity of reason in Christian thought but insists that reason is to behave in accordance with reality. Torrance's Auburn Lectures (1938–39) demonstrate some awareness of the 'belief in the ultimate consistency of things as they are in themselves' to determine human thought of reality.¹⁶ Within Christian theology, Torrance argues for Christological exclusivity in which (on account of the identity of nature between the Father and the Son) God's revelation is a self-revelation such that 'We must learn *to think of God exclusively in terms of Christ*'.¹⁷ The priority of God's grace in human knowledge of God 'means a disqualification of human capabilities and powers as rendering possible an approach of [humanity] to God'.¹⁸ In this early work, Torrance set aside any claim to the knowledge of God which is not entirely *a posteriori*, dependent on God's self-revelation.

In an unpublished paper of 1940, "Christian Thinking Today", Torrance argues that knowledge of God was not 'something that we already have' but something which 'must be brought TO our thinking'.¹⁹ Therefore, to think in a 'Christian' way could not be by the application of the norms and innate functions of the human mind: Christianity must not be forced 'into the framework of the modern system of ideas'.²⁰ It is in his 1942 article "The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology" that the young Torrance's antipathy to the autonomy of reason is most clearly expressed. For Torrance, the autonomy of reason 'belongs to the very essence of sin' and should be viewed as humanity's self-emancipation from faithful obedience.²¹ From this basis, Torrance insists upon the heteronomy of reason: 'reason is not a law unto itself, but submits itself to the rule of God'.²² The form of reason applicable to theology is a 'filled reason',²³ by which Torrance means it is open to determination from beyond itself. Very importantly, Torrance identifies the need to integrate intuitive and discursive reason in which the inferential activity of the human mind is affirmed, but only under the direct determination of the reality encountered.²⁴

Blanshard, on the other hand, was at the peak of a distinguished career, serving as the Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Yale University, still some ten years away from retirement in 1961.

Quite unlike Torrance, Blanshard was an idealist and a rationalist.²⁵ His two-volume work *The Nature of Thought* has been described as the most accomplished contribution to idealist epistemology of the twentieth century.²⁶ In it Blanshard contended that while there is something external to the observer that provokes the disturbance of his or her sensibility (i.e. Blanshard is not a metaphysical idealist after the tradition of George Berkeley), the affected sensibility is prepared for cognition through the forms of intuition,²⁷ which are subsequently rendered intelligible through the categories of understanding.²⁸ Therefore, for Blanshard, *truth* is delimited by the judgement of the transcendental ego.²⁹ With such an epistemic (as opposed to ontological) conception of truth, it follows that, so far as Blanshard was concerned, the internal coherence (‘knowledge in which every judgement entailed, and was entailed by, the rest of the system’³⁰) of statements is presented as the criterion of truth.³¹

Blanshard’s rationalism is demonstrated by his view of rational thought as the capacity to develop rational systems of necessary knowledge conceived discursively by the application of human reason, free from the constraint and direction of ontological correlates.³² Reason, Blanshard contended, proceeded in accordance with its own established laws and norms via deduction from fixed axioms to logically necessary conclusions.³³ For example, Blanshard considered Euclidean geometry, with its discursive movement from five foundational axioms, to constitute a perfect rational system.³⁴ Blanshard argues that reason must be identified as the intellectual grasp of principles that order knowledge that are *independent of experience*, and as such constitutes a closed set of principles.³⁵ Logical coherence is, therefore, an excluding principle in Blanshard’s thought: a fully coherent system is closed to anything which contradicts the unfolding of human reason.

Clearly, Torrance and Blanshard were never going to see eye-to-eye, especially when it came to Karl Barth.

Blanshard’s criticism of Barth

In his Gifford Lectures, Blanshard was asked to address the place of reason and the theory of knowledge in theology and ethics.³⁶



Blanshard delivered the first set of lectures “Reason and Its Critics” between February and May 1952.³⁷ In this set, Blanshard subjected the ‘theology of crisis’ to fierce criticism for its refusal to identify human reason alone as the criterion of truth. The substance of Blanshard’s critique is that Barth’s theology is unacceptable on account of the fact that it is a species of irrationalism – an irrationalism, furthermore, which apparently denied the independent status of human reason in determining what it regarded as true.³⁸ For example, Blanshard argues that Barth’s thought allows for paradox, which is unacceptable to reason as it violates principles of natural logic, specifically the law of non-contradiction.³⁹ As such, Blanshard argues that Barth’s thought constitutes a revolt against reason,⁴⁰ because (i) it does not function via the laws of logical inference from axioms and so (ii) challenges the idea that theological knowledge may develop independent from God’s self-revelation.⁴¹ In this, the themes of Blanshard’s critique of Barth are continuous with those of the Barth-Scholz dispute of 1932.⁴² Interestingly, a very similar critique was to be made of Torrance from the perspective of the analytic theology of religion by Donald Klinefelter in 1972.⁴³



The exchange

In a terse letter of April 14, 1952, Torrance rejects Blanshard’s identification of Barth’s theology as the dissolution of reason in Christian theology. Pointing to Barth’s study of Anselm’s *Fides quaerens intellectum* (1931), Torrance argues that ‘Barth holds to the basic point that reason is unconditionally bound to its object and determined by it, and that the nature of the object must prescribe the specific mode of activity of reason.’⁴⁴ Far from being a *volte face* from rational thought, Torrance contends that this is a clear example of reason conceived of as conforming the mind to reality. The object of theology (God in his self-revelation) is a unique object and so theological thought must, by derivation, be unique. Therefore the rationality of theology is no more than thought that ‘corresponds with this unique object of thought’.⁴⁵ In such a context, faith is not irrationalism but rather is ‘reason directed to the knowledge of God, and involves a rational apprehension which answers appropriately the

object given'.⁴⁶ Torrance's view of reason, in contrast to Blanshard's, is striking for its minimalism. There are no innate functions codified in logic but only the capacity to think in accordance with the reality in question.

In Blanshard's response (April 16, 1952), it becomes clear that Torrance and Blanshard are operating with two very different understandings of reason.⁴⁷ Blanshard reaffirms his insistence upon the irrational status of the theology of Barth, identifying Barth's rejection of natural theology as evidence of this. Theology, Blanshard implies, is rational when it operates in accordance with the laws that are innate to the intelligent mind. Barth's rejection of natural theology as the 'herald' of autonomous humanity,⁴⁸ and the associated insistence upon the absolute priority of God establishing proportionality between himself and human thought only through his self-revelation is clearly discontinuous with Blanshard's view of the place of reason in Christian theology. Torrance, Blanshard continues, can only defend Barth's notion of reason by operating 'with a special meaning' of reason, which is a 'very different meaning from that of the philosophers.'⁴⁹

Undeterred, in his next letter (April 19, 1952) Torrance insists that Blanshard's analysis of Barth has been skewed by his failure to recognise that Barth inhabited a different tradition from Blanshard's own. Torrance distinguishes between different forms of reason, noting that Barth's understanding of reason must be understood within the frame of a realist and critical view of reason. Within this tradition, Torrance explains, reason does not proceed in accordance with its own laws and norms but must rather submit itself to those logical patterns of inquiry which are determined from the side of the object.⁵⁰ Torrance refers to John Macmurray as an exponent of this tradition:

John Macmurray, like Heinrich and Karl Barth, is concerned to point philosophy and theology away from a substantial to a functional view of reason, and when [Macmurray] says that "reason is the capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object [...]," he is using language almost identical with that of Karl Barth [...].⁵¹

Torrance contends that ‘Professor Blanshard appears to think of reason as *behaving in terms of its own nature, in terms of its own categories of understanding*’.⁵² From within the perspective of this philosophical tradition, Torrance contends that what Blanshard thinks of as ‘reason’ is not reason at all, but rather of a ‘diseased “rationalism”’, characterized by the compulsion to ‘go its own way [refusing] to be determined by its object’.⁵³

Moreover, Torrance argues that Blanshard’s own view of reason was illegitimate on scientific and religious grounds. Torrance argues that Blanshard’s view of reason is antithetical to the basic scientific principle that ‘the nature of the object must prescribe the specific mode of the activity of reason’.⁵⁴ Within such a frame of thought, Torrance concludes that reason must be used critically as opposed to the untrammelled freedom given to it by Blanshard:

What theology demands, therefore, declares Karl Barth, is a ruthless scientific criticism of the activity of reason and of the reasoner himself to ensure that here in theological science he is behaving rationally, that is, that here his reason is conforming properly and obediently to the object given. All science, be it theology or physics, is characterised by humility and a readiness for the most ruthless self-criticism.⁵⁵

The *telos* of reason, Torrance suggests, is to conform the understanding to the object beyond the knowing subject. Blanshard’s view of reason is innately antithetical to this fundamental goal, concerned instead with the application and exploration of its own innate capacities. Finally, Torrance argues that Blanshard’s understanding of the nature and purpose of reason is particularly inappropriate within Christian theology on account of the distinctive object with which theology must be concerned:

The object of theological knowledge is God infinite and eternal “always Subject”. As Barth puts it, not “the absolutely other” (a notion which Barth cast away many years ago), but the living God who gives Himself to us and reveals Himself in Jesus Christ, and summons us to obedient conformity to Him.

In Christian theology, therefore, reason is summoned to behave in terms of Jesus Christ [...] ⁵⁶

Reason in Christian theology cannot proceed as if its object were inert. Instead, in Christian theology, reason is reactive to the self-revelation of God and has a duty of obedience to God. In this connection, Torrance introduces the doctrine of sin to the discussion, not in terms of the attenuation of humanity's cognitive faculties, but (as was characteristic of his early thought) in terms of the sinful application of human reason as 'the attempt of reason to behave in terms of itself and its own norms instead of behaving in terms of the love of Christ'.⁵⁷

The divergence in what the two men mean by 'reason' is by now very clear – a fact Blanshard comments on in his penultimate letter (April 20, 1952). Blanshard reiterates that he and Torrance are speaking of reason in two different ways.⁵⁸ Blanshard identifies reason as the 'standards of natural reason' and insists that these are 'valid for the knowledge of God', and argues that to stretch the meaning of reason as Torrance does is unacceptable.⁵⁹ However, in his final letter in the exchange (April 23, 1952), Torrance closes off the conclusion that he and Blanshard are operating with two incompatible but equal forms of reason. Instead, Torrance suggests that Blanshard holds a view of the supremacy of reason as that which 'exists independently of the objectively given world' and as that which 'bears within itself the condition of understanding the truth'.⁶⁰ Such a view of reason as itself containing the foundations of its right application, Torrance argues, has been rendered redundant by the new unitive frame of thought in the natural sciences and metaphysics: reality is inherently intelligible and does not need rational coherence to be imposed upon it; rather, the role of reason is to uncover the intelligibility inherent in reality.⁶¹

The priority of the intelligibility inherent in reality over our thought concerning it is re-iterated in Torrance's appeal to the threefold *ratio* of truth in Anselm's thought in which the *ratio* of the Truth itself is fundamental over and above the rational experience of faith and the rational conformity of faith to its object.⁶²

Accordingly, Karl Barth has sought to evolve a new method of theological exposition in which, while seeking out in Anselmian

fashion the full rationality of faith in obedience to the Truth, he tries to formulate and communicate it as a whole.⁶³

In this connection, Torrance presents his rejection of Blanshard's notion of an autonomous reason that proceeds in accordance with its own internal laws and coherence. He insists once again that the internal truth of reality must determine how it is to be known. As a result of this, the truth of God, far from being determined by the laws of human reason, transcends human concepts.⁶⁴ In this way, Torrance forcefully rejects the independent validity of natural reason. However, he recognises that reason has a role in facilitating the unfolding and comprehension of revelation, in continuity with his affirmation of the unity of intuitive and discursive reason some ten years earlier.



Tracing trajectories in Torrance's mature thought

In these exchanges, Torrance's thought on the nature of the function of reason is cast into sharp relief. Torrance will have nothing to do with reason that is autonomous from, or antecedent to, determination from the side of reality. Torrance rejects the view that reason operates according to its own norms and laws and argues that the true *telos* of reason is to facilitate the knowledge of reality as it is in itself. The emphases found in Torrance's thought at this early stage are continuous with Torrance's later thought. However, in Torrance's mature thought, these same perspectives are marked by greater epistemological and theological sophistication. These continuities and developments can be mentioned only in outline.

First, Torrance's fierce resistance to Blanshard's view of reason operating in accordance with its own norms and laws, acting with imperious disregard for the actual nature of reality, flowers in 1971 with his pointed antithesis between true objectivity and 'objectifying' thought.⁶⁵ Objectifying thought is that which conditions its own knowledge by imposing an 'inflexible conceptual structure' on that which it experiences.⁶⁶ Central here is Torrance's critique of Kant for transferring absolute space and time as a regulative structure into the human mind as the forms of intuition⁶⁷ through which intelligibility

is imposed upon phenomena.⁶⁸ On the other hand, true objectivity, Torrance argues, takes ‘its shape from the structure of the object’,⁶⁹ allowing the inherent intelligibility of reality to determine what is thought of it.⁷⁰

Second, Torrance’s resistance to Blanshard’s affirmation of the sole sufficiency of reason develops, in Torrance’s mature thought, to his nuanced stance on the place and the limitations of formal logic in *Theological Science* (1969). Torrance argues that formal logic has a vital role to play in developing systems of thought characterised by valid inference, but rejects the exclusive use of symbolic formal notation on the grounds that it separates logical inference from actual connections in reality.⁷¹ Instead, Torrance argues that the application of human reason in the development of logically valid systems of thought is to enable ‘us to see more clearly the objective relations in the real world’.⁷² It is in this sense that Torrance has proposed the synthesis of discursive reason and intuitive reason through the unification of coherence statements and existence statements so as to develop conceptual systems that are fully determined by reality, in which human reason has a place of integrity.⁷³

Third, concerning the place of reason in theology in particular, Torrance’s rejection of Blanshard’s view that theology should take place through the application of reason in accordance with its own innate laws eventually comes to fruition in Torrance’s rejection and reconstruction of natural theology. Torrance rejected autonomous natural theology as an idealized rational structure developed prior to positive knowledge of God in his self-revelation. Natural theology only imposes cognizable form upon God’s self-revelation and inevitably distorts it (i.e. autonomous natural theology is like object-making thought in Torrance’s view).⁷⁴ In his reconstruction of natural theology Torrance re-envisioned natural theology as the internal rational structure of theology under the determination of God’s self-revelation through which the inherent Trinitarian structure of God’s self-revelation is cognized and articulated in human forms of thought.⁷⁵ In this connection, natural theology has become a human rational structure determined by God’s self-revelation, the conjunction of which constitutes theological science:

[...] the integration of natural and positive theology within one bipolar structure of knowledge [is] the knitting together of epistemological structure and material content [which] yields what we are bound to call “theological science” [...]”⁷⁶

In this, the place and function of human reason in Christian theology is affirmed. However, its nature is not autonomous, but is dependent on revelation. Its purpose, furthermore, is not to unfold a perfect, coherent system of knowledge, discursively conceived by an analysis of ‘God’ as concept (*contra* the ontological argument), but rather to shape human thought in accordance with the inner structure of God’s self-revelation.



Conclusion

The Blanshard correspondence is an important but hitherto under-utilized part of a full understanding of Torrance’s views regarding the nature and function of reason in Christian theology. This essay has (i) described the development of Torrance’s thought up until 1949; (ii) identified that these perspectives converge in Torrance’s polemic against Blanshard in 1952; and (iii) traced how the emphases from the Blanshard letters develop in Torrance’s mature thought. The same basic orientation on the nature and function of reason persists throughout Torrance’s career: reason does not proceed in accordance with its own innate laws but is subordinate to reality and is orientated to bringing human thought under the determination of that which reality is.

Notes

- ¹ For more on this see, A. J. D. Irving, “The Hypostatic Union as Normative over the Relation of God’s Self-Revelation and Human Cognition in the Thought of T. F. Torrance”, *Irish Theological Quarterly*. Forthcoming, 2018.

- ² Aside from their reproduction in an earlier edition of this journal. See Iain and Morag Torrance (eds.), “A Skirmish in the Early Reception of Karl Barth in Scotland: The Exchange Between Thomas F. Torrance and Brand Blanshard”, *Theology in Scotland* 16, special issue (2011), 5–22.
- ³ Andrew J. Reck, “The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard”, in *Studies in Philosophical Psychology (Tulane Studies in Philosophy* 13; New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1964), 114.
- ⁴ See John Howie, “Brand Blanshard (27 August 1892–18 November 1987)”, *Dictionary of Literary Biography: Volume 279: American Philosophers, 1950–2000* (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 22.
- ⁵ Alister E. McGrath, *T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 84.
- ⁶ T. F. Torrance, *Theological Science* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), viii.
- ⁷ McGrath, *Intellectual Biography*, 23. See T. F. Torrance, *Juridical Law and Physical Law: Toward a Realist Foundation for Human Law* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1982).
- ⁸ Daniel Lamont, *Christ and the World of Thought* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1934), 12.
- ⁹ T. F. Torrance, “Itinerarium mentis in Deum”, 14, cited from McGrath, *Intellectual Biography*, 37.
- ¹⁰ See also, Paul D. Molnar, *Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity* (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2009), 5. Molnar helpfully notes that Torrance’s antipathy to subjectivism can be traced to these misgivings with Baillie’s approach, wherein the method of inquiry abstracted from the subject matter served only to cut knowledge off from the actual object that is being known.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ¹² T. F. Torrance, “Hugh Ross Mackintosh: Theologian of the Cross”, in Hugh Ross Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ* (ed. T. F. Torrance; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 74.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 78f.
- ¹⁴ T. F. Torrance, “The Legacy of Karl Barth (1886–1986)”, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 39 (1986): 289–308, cf. 294.

- ¹⁵ Ibid., 297.
- ¹⁶ T. F. Torrance, “Science and Theology” [unpublished MS], 1f. With gratitude to Dr Kenneth Henke for his kind assistance in scanning and sending the pdf of these lectures.
- ¹⁷ T. F. Torrance, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ: The Auburn Lectures, 1938/39* (Eugene, Or.: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 101.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 118.
- ¹⁹ T. F. Torrance, “Christian Thinking Today”, unpublished paper, 3. Cited from McGrath, *Intellectual Biography*, 67.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 12. Cited from McGrath, *Intellectual Biography*, 67f.
- ²¹ T. F. Torrance, “The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology”, *Evangelical Quarterly* 14 (1942): 24. See also, T. F. Torrance, *Calvin’s Doctrine of Man* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), 134.
- ²² Torrance, “Place and Function”, 29.
- ²³ Ibid., 30.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 34.
- ²⁵ Reck, “The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard”, 111.
- ²⁶ T. M. Greene, Review, *Journal of Philosophy* 37 (1940): 686, cited from Reck, “The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard”, 112.
- ²⁷ Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955), I: 213
- ²⁸ Ibid., I: 182).
- ²⁹ Ibid., II: 229f.: ‘the facts with which our judgements were to tally seem forever to elude us, and we find ourselves in a region where, on every side, there are only judgements and still more judgements’.
- ³⁰ Ibid., II: 264.
- ³¹ Reck, “The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard”, 123f. Reck identifies that here the laws of logic and mathematics constitute the self-contained system of coherence that can be identified as the sole criterion of truth.
- ³² Ibid., 114.
- ³³ Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 25.
- ³⁴ Blanshard, *Nature of Thought*, 265.

- ³⁵ Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, 26.
- ³⁶ These studies were based upon Blanshard's William Belden Noble Lectures, which were delivered at Harvard University in 1948. The thoughts developed through these studies later formed parts of the three-volume work *Reason and Goodness* (1961); *Reason and Analysis* (1962) and *Reason and Belief* (1975). Of these, *Reason and Belief* bears the subtitle *Based on the Gifford Lectures at St Andrews and Noble Lectures at Harvard*.
- ³⁷ Howie, "Brand Blanshard", 22.
- ³⁸ Molnar, *Theologian of the Trinity*, 23, n. 96.
- ³⁹ You will find this in Parts 1 and 2. See also, Howie, "Brand Blanshard", 24.
- ⁴⁰ Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, 26.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 36.
- ⁴² Heinrich Scholz, "Wie is eine evangelische Theologie als Wissenschaft möglich?", *Zwischen den Zeiten* 9 (1931): 8–53; Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics I/1* (eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 8ff.
- ⁴³ Donald S. Klinefelter, "God and Rationality: A Critique of the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance", *The Journal of Religion* 53 (1973): 117–135.
- ⁴⁴ Letter from Torrance, *The Scotsman*, April 14, p. 4.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷ Letter from Blanshard, *The Scotsman*, April 16, 1956, p. 6.
- ⁴⁸ Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics I/1*, 162f.
- ⁴⁹ Blanshard, Letter of April 16.
- ⁵⁰ Letter from Torrance, *The Scotsman*, April 19, 1952, p. 6.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² *Ibid.* [my italics].
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁸ Letter from Blanshard, *The Scotsman*, April 22, 1952, p. 6.
- ⁵⁹ Letter from Torrance, *The Scotsman*, April 23, 1952, p. 6.

- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ This is a common theme in Torrance's thought. For example, see T. F. Torrance, *Reality and Scientific Theology* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985), 3.
- ⁶² Torrance, Letter of April 23. T. F. Torrance, *Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910–1931* (London: SCM Press, 1962), 186–89.
- ⁶³ Torrance, Letter of April 23.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ T. F. Torrance, *God and Rationality* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9f.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 9.
- ⁶⁷ T. F. Torrance, *Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise* (Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock, 1998), 37.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ⁶⁹ Torrance, *God and Rationality*, 9.
- ⁷⁰ Torrance, *Theological Science*, 116.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., 225, 250–53.
- ⁷² Ibid., 256.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ Torrance, *Reality and Scientific Theology*, 65; *God and Rationality*, 133f.
- ⁷⁵ Torrance, *Reality and Scientific Theology*, 41.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., 65f.