scenarios, there is a sense in which the further process of deferred interpretation is *not* optional, i.e. it must be undertaken in order to achieve understanding in the sense of interpreting correctly what the speaker intended to communicate.

But it might be questioned why we need the notion of understanding the literal content at all. In cases where the literal content and the intended content diverge, there is a strong intuitive pull towards not attributing understanding unless the intended content is arrived at. In the cases where the literal content and the intended content coincide, understanding could then be explained by the same notion of understanding the speaker's intended content.

However, it seems that there are cases where we particularly need the notion of literal understanding. One way of seeing this is to imagine a scenario in which the hearer has no way of accessing what the speaker might have intended with the utterances. For instance, imagine that the hearer of (2) only possesses the information that the speaker is Jesse James, but knows nothing about James' doings or the traditions pertaining to condemned prisoners. In such a scenario, the singular, non-deferred, interpretation of the utterance is the most reasonable one for the hearer to opt for. And significantly, it would be wrong to say that in such a scenario the hearer has failed to understand the utterance; it is just that she did not have all the information required to realise that the speaker had a different communicative intention.

Consequently, it seems that the Gricean premonition that our theory of utterance interpretation will need both notions of what it is to interpret an utterance correctly is reinforced.

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Who Has My Thoughts?

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The too many minds problem can be adapted to attack nearly every account of personal identity. The problem can be phrased loosely as a question: why do certain things count as people and others not? For example, if this human organism is a person, why isn't this brain also a person? It seems to be thinking; but I (the organism) insist that I am the person, and the brain is just a part of me. The problem also arises as an objection to "perdurantist" theories that maintain that persons persist by

having temporal stages as proper parts; the perdurantist maintains that every person is made up of a number of different "temporal parts" at different times, the maximal combination of which is a person. However, there doesn't seem to be any strong reason to deny personhood to every person stage, and they seem even more likely to be persons than brains—they can look at themselves in the mirror, scratch themselves, pick their noses, and perform all sorts of other actions typically associated with persons that brains just cannot. While each version of the problem attacks a different view, they all rely on the same fundamental intuitions and can be presented by essentially the same argument.

In this paper I will canvass a few of the ways in which the argument has and can be applied and show how they can all be easily resisted by blocking a central premise.

Too Many Minds and Animals

The first use of the argument that I will examine is that of Eric Olson (Olson, 105). Olson utilizes the argument as an attack on psychological accounts of identity. He begins by pointing out that, according to the psychological approach, there are two coincident objects wherever there is a human animal: a psychological continuer and a human organism. At any time, these distinct objects have all and only the same parts. The difference in these two objects, according to Olson, lies entirely in their "modal or dispositional properties" (Olson, 105), namely, the human animal has the property of possibly continuing to exist without higher brain function, whereas the psychologically continuing person could not simultaneously exist and be brain dead. Olson claims that "[o]n the psychological approach, a rational, conscious being with the wrong persistence conditions would not be a person. But if you and I are not animals, there would seem to be plenty of beings with the right psychological features to be persons but the wrong persistence conditions, namely, human animals." (Olson, 106). Olson sees this as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the psychological approach. "There could not be non-people who are exactly like people but for their persistence conditions" (Olson, 108).

So, Olson's argument has two premises and is valid via modus tollens: (1) if the psychological approach is correct, then there are some things exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people, and (2)there are no things exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people. Thus, the psychological approach is not correct.

The second premise to Olson's argument can be seen as an appeal to a sufficiency condition for personhood: having complex psychological properties is sufficient for personhood. This is a strongly intuitive principle; it is difficult to see how something could be as psychologically complex as a person without being a person. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to give an analysis of just what constitutes a complex psychological property, we easily distinguish clear cases of such higher-order thinking from clear cases of *insufficiently* complex psychologies: the difference between a normal human and an eagle, for example. While this explication is vague, it is precise enough for the purposes of this paper. Hereafter, I will use 'thought' to mean the sort of complex psychological property sufficient for personhood.

Two Further Applications of Too Many Minds

Before I consider solutions to this version of the problem, I will give two other applications of it. The first is from Shoemaker (Shoemaker, 499-500). Shoemaker points out that Olson's own position is vulnerable to a similar attack. Olson claims that persons just are human animals. Shoemaker points out that even under Olson's view there is an object coincident with and indistinguishable from every person that has different persistence conditions: his "corpse to be." This is an object which is coincident with the human animal, apparently shares all of its physical properties, but will continue to exist after that animal dies. Apparently the only difference between a person and his

corpse-to-be is what Olson calls "modal or dispositional properties:" persistence conditions. Shoemaker claims that if Olson's reasoning is accurate, the corpse-to-be is exactly like a person psychologically, and so we can construct an argument logically indistinguishable from Olson's in which the first premise reads (1*) if the biological approach is correct, then there are some things exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people. According to Shoemaker, this argument is at least as strong as Olson's, despite being directly opposed to Olson's view. So, something must be wrong here. Shoemaker then offers a solution, which I will briefly discuss later in this paper.

The third application of the too many minds problem (so-called by Shoemaker) that I will consider is from Trenton Merrick's book *Objects and Persons*. Merricks uses the problem to motivate his position of ontological eliminativism. He sets up the problem explicitly as a paradox consisting of four statements:

(1) Within the region filled by atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake) human organismwise, there is exactly one conscious entity.
(2) Any object with atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake, human) brainwise among its proper parts is conscious.
(3) Within the region filled by atoms arranged human organismwise, there is a human organism that has atoms arranged brainwise among its proper parts.
(4) Within the region filled by atoms arranged human organismwise, there is a brain that has atoms arranged brainwise among its proper parts.

(Merricks p.49)

Merricks points out that any three of these statements are compatible, but the conjunction of all four is a logical contradiction. We must choose to deny at least one. Merricks then argues for three of these claims and against the fourth.

Merricks claims that we ought to accept (1). According to Merricks, denying (1) leads to an unacceptable skepticism: Merricks and Olson agree that if there are two things thinking my thoughts, it is impossible for me to determine which of them I am. As Olson has it, if only one of them is a person, then I cannot through introspection determine that I am a person (I could have the wrong persistence conditions). According to Merricks, we will also be led to unacceptable uncertainty about the truth of some of our statements, such as "'I am not a mere brain but instead a human organism'" (Merricks, 50).

It is not clear that Merricks' defense of (1) given here works, but only for reasons that expose more fundamental difficulties involved in denying (1). These difficulties arise from the fact that uses of self-referring terms are singular. If there are multiple thinkers of a given thought, then singular terms such as 'I' fail to refer. So, if 'I' does not refer to anything, then 'I could not know whether I was a mere brain rather than a person' would be a false sentence, as would *any* sentence that expresses an introspective report about the thinker (where 'the thinker' is a definite, and singular, description). It is also possible that, if (1) does not hold, then there are a plethora of thoughts corresponding to each token introspective report—one thought per thinker. Unfortunately, this is just as conceptually problematic. Either of these situations are epistemologically more deeply counterintuitive than the one explicated by Merricks and Olson. They get it right; we ought to accept (1).

Merricks also argues that we ought to accept (2): "[d]enying (2) might lead to unwarranted skepticism about who, or what, is conscious" (Merricks, 50). I will revisit this defense later in this paper. So, according to Merricks, we are left with (3) and (4). Merricks argues that, because of what sort of things we believe persons to be, we ought to accept (3)—that human organisms exist—but deny that brains exist (4), leaving us with a form of ontological eliminativism in which only simples and objects with non-redundant causal powers, such as persons, exist.

Note that there are a number of other ways to apply Merricks' version of the paradox: given any (non-dualist[1]) account of personal identity, simply find two distinct objects that have what

1 Some, but not all, dualist accounts of mind are immune to the problem. An account which allows for objects

Merricks calls 'atoms behaving brainwise' among their parts and you have the same conundrum. Considering the universality of the problem, no particular view of personal identity seems preferable as a response to it. In the next section I will examine some of these responses, and show that they fail.

Initial Solutions

The best options involve attacking the argument on grounds neutral to the various views of personal identity. We have three choices: we may accept that there can be multiple objects, only one of which is a person, all sharing the same thoughts; we may follow Merricks and reject the existence of any objects counting atoms behaving brainwise among their parts other than persons. Finally, we may reject the view that two physically identical objects must be psychologically identical.

Harold Noonan chooses to reject the second premise in Olson's argument, that there are no things exactly like persons psychologically that aren't people, and to deny Merricks' first statement, that "[w]ithin the region filled by atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake) human organismwise, there is exactly one conscious entity" (Merricks, 50). Noonan first admits that there are in fact plenty of things that share the thoughts of any given person and then attempts to assuage the counterintuitive situation (Noonan, 209). According to Noonan, we don't realize that we constantly have company because of the way our language is formed. This also allows us to resist uncertainty regarding statements like "I am not a brain" or "I am a person." Noonan argues that the reference rule for 'I' is not that 'I' refers to whatever is using 'I', but instead to the *person* using 'I.' Noonan does not claim that only persons are able to use 'I;' instead he claims that whoever is using 'I' is talking about the person using 'I' (Noonan, 210). Recall that on the schema that Noonan endorses, there are a number of objects that all have thoughts, one of which must be a person. So, if anything is thinking a token thought, there is guaranteed to be a person thinking that same thought; Noonan believes that all of the thoughts reference the person. Noonan claims that this fixes the epistemological problem outlined by Olson and Merricks: "I can know that I am a person, since if I were the animal and not the person thinking the thought I am currently thinking in thinking I am the person, I would *still* be right" (Noonan, 211). This also allows singular terms to properly refer.

Noonan's response fails, partially because it is difficult to make sense out of Noonan's proposal. Note that Noonan himself comes dangerously close to breaking his own rule for the reference of 'I' when he claims that "if I were the animal […] I would *still* be right" (Noonan, 211). Depending on how this sentence is meant to be read, he may or may not actually break his rule here; if he doesn't, this statement is very odd: it is a subjunctive conditional in which the antecedent is necessarily false. The natural understanding of this sentence, in which the antecedent is true at some worlds (and 'I' refers to an animal), is not a conceptual possibility under Noonan's framework. This shows that Noonan is making an unjustified claim about the meaning of 'I', which he does not sufficiently defend; rather, he merely posits that we accept it to circumvent the paradox. In absence of further argumentation, Noonan's response to the argument seems *ad hoc*, especially considering that it does not confront the most fundamental issues of the problem.

Noonan's response fails to address either of the deeply counterintuitive situations of the too many minds paradox: firstly, if the paradox goes through, two distinct objects can share, not just qualitatively identical propositional attitudes, but numerically identical thoughts. Noonan's attempt to assuage our intuitions by explaining how all of these statements will always be true only addresses the surface of the problem. Recall that the heart of the dilemma was never about the truth of our statements; our inability to know whether our statements are true or false is merely a way of illustrating the absurdity of the consequent: *something else* is (also) thinking your thoughts.

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composed of both mind and body is vulnerable to the attack, as both the mind by itself and the composite object made up of the mind and the body together seem to be thinking; however, dualist accounts that deny that the mind and the body together make up an object get around this difficulty.

Secondly, and more importantly, Noonan does not recognize any sort of psychological complexity as being sufficient for personhood. The intuition that psychological complexity is logically linked to personhood underlies Olson's second premise. It has strong intuitive backing and supports, not just Olson's biological view, but also most psychological accounts of identity across time. To these accounts, the person *just is* whatever is thinking the right thoughts. If Noonan denies this principle, he ought to provide some strong argumentation, which he does not.

So, we should accept that only one thing is thinking our thoughts, and that there are no things that have psychological properties indistinguishable from those of persons that fail to be persons. This rules Noonan out, and leaves us with a few options: first, we can follow Merricks' line and embrace ontological eliminativism, or we can deny that all physically identical objects are psychologically identical.

Here we should not commit ourselves to Merricks' stark ontology. The intuitive backing for the existence of non-person objects complex objects is clearly stronger than the support for the claim that (as Merricks puts it) "Any object with atoms arranged (normal, healthy, awake, human) brainwise among its proper parts is conscious" (Merricks, p. 49). Merricks presents his solution to the problem of too many minds as motivation for ontological eliminativism rather than as a knock-down argument for it. His main argument for his view comes later. So, Merricks denies that there are non-person objects for reasons independent of the too many minds problem. If we are going to follow him in ontological eliminativism, we should likewise do so for independent reasons, and be thankful that we do not have to worry about the problem of too many minds. If, however, we are not already eliminativists, we should not deny the existence of non-person animals for the sake of this paradox.

The Proposal: Brains Don't Think

This leaves us with one option: denying that all objects with functioning brains as parts have thoughts and psychological properties. In other words, we ought to deny Olson's claim that the human animal is "psychologically identical" to the person, despite being physically identical at a microscopic level. This at first seems *ad hoc*—aren't we just denying thoughts to animals and brains simply to circumvent Olson's argument?

Let us first examine the support that Olson and Merricks present to support the claim that all intrinsically physically identical objects are psychologically identical. Merricks supports his second claim (2) just by pointing out that "denying (2) might lead to unwarranted skepticism about who, or what, is conscious" (Merricks, 50) and challenging whomever denies (2) to "offer a replacement that would explain why atoms arranged brainwise, for some kinds of things (like me) is connected to consciousness, but not for other kinds of things (like my brain)" (Merricks, p. 51).

Olson supports his premise by giving a thought experiment according to which you are put into a replication machine. The machine does not destroy you; however, it does create an object physically identical to you a few feet away from you. Olson notes that, because the new object is physically identical to you, we believe that it is a person. He then notes that the only physical difference between this object and you is relational: it is a difference of a few feet. A few feet couldn't make prevent something from having psychological properties, so our intuitions stipulate that we can know that an object is conscious based only on its nonrelational microphysical features. So, he thinks, if this object is conscious, it looks like the human animal coincident with you is conscious--after all, it has the same microphysical features as your duplicate.

Here Olson's example shows that relational properties cannot make a difference in the psychology of two otherwise indistinguishable beings. This is, of course, a few steps away from showing that *only* microphysical features can make a psychological difference between two objects; presumably, you and your duplicate have the same modal and dispositional properties, even those that are not microphysical. But it does lend some intuitive support to the notion that really only the

microphysical is relevant.

Olson then examines various reasons to believe that two physically indistinguishable objects could be psychologically distinct. He considers the view that, because psychological properties are *emergent* properties, it should not be so surprising that two physically identical beings have different psychological properties. After all, the psychological properties are distinct from the physical properties. Olson rejects this view, saying, "things cannot have different emergent properties unless there is some underlying intrinsic difference between those things" (Olson, 101). Olson then uses the example of fragility, which is a property emergent from the microphysical features of the object, to support his claim that there must be some physical difference to correspond to the difference in emergent properties.

While Olson does not explicitly explicate the concept of emergence here, I will take it to be something along the lines of *supervenience* (for Olson, it actually has to be a bit more, as I'll show later). A-properties *supervene* on B-properties if and only if, for any change in A-properties there also is a change in B-properties. In this case, the A-properties are said to be *supervenient* and the B-properties said to be the *supervenience base*. To use Olson's example, fragility is a property that supervenes on microphysical structural properties; hence two microphysically identical objects are identical with respect to fragility.

There are a few distinct types of supervenience relevant to the relationship between psychological and physical properties (here I use 'mental' and 'psychological' interchangeably). A-properties can supervene *individually* on B-properties: that is, any two individuals (or objects) with distinct A-properties must have distinct B-properties. Secondly, A-properties can supervene *globally* on B-properties: that is, any two *situations* (or possible worlds) with distinct A properties must have distinct B properties. In order for Olson's argument to be cogent, psychological properties must be *individually* supervenient only on microphysical properties; macrophysical modal or dispositional properties, as he calls them, must not be part of the individual supervenience base (B-properties) (Chalmers, 33, and Kim, 158). Hereafter I'll use 'modal properties' to mean the sort of macrophysical modal properties disallowed by Olson's argument.

It may seem that his argument will be easily resisted by the property dualist, who believes that there is no logical connection between the physical and mental properties expressed, while there is a clear logical connection between microphysical properties and fragility. However, Olson's use of "emergence" is sufficiently vague to be compatible with the view that mental properties supervene only naturally, and not logically, on physical properties: in other words, that the mental properties are linked to physical properties by contingent laws rather than logical relations. Many property dualists accept that such connections exist: David Chalmers explicitly endorses this thesis (Chalmers, 124); even Donald Davidson admits that a *form* of supervenience is compatible with his view (Davidson, 250). Of course, for those that do not, there doesn't seem to be any reason to accept Olson's claim of dependence.

Under any materialist framework, the existence of psychological properties is logically implied by the existence of certain physical or functional properties: at the very least these psychological properties *logically supervene* on physical properties. Of course, many materialists claim that the relationship between psychological and physical properties is stronger: namely, that psychological properties are identical with physical properties of some stripe. As the explication I have given of supervenience implies that the supervenience relation is reflexive, these views are captured by this weaker principle; every property supervenes on itself.

Under the property dualist framework, the existence of psychological properties is implied by the existence of physical or functional properties together with some additional psycho-physical laws: mental properties *naturally supervene* on physical properties. Olson's argument hangs on the assumption that this supervenience relation is individual supervenience on intrinsic properties. But even completely ordinary physical properties, if sufficiently complex, are *not* individually supervenient on microphysical properties! Consider the following example:

Imagine that every member of VCU's Philosophy Club was also a member of the VCU basketball team. Here we would have two objects that were microphysically identical, with the principal difference between them being their persistence conditions: the basketball team could survive a cut of funding to the philosophy club that the club could not survive, and the philosophy club could survive the dissolution of the team, whereas the team couldn't. Now, the property of scoring points is the poster child of a complex property that is dependent on microphysical properties: something physical must be different between two situations in which a team has different points values. Imagine that the basketball team had 82 points. While the philosophy club would be microphysically identical to the basketball team (by being made of exactly the same parts as the basketball team), the philosophy club would not have 82 points. So, while scoring points clearly *globally* supervenes on microphysical properties, and while the philosophy club is a system microphysically identical to the basketball team, the philosophy club does not instantiate the property of having scored 82 points, while the basketball team does. But the basketball team and the philosophy club are microphysically identical; the difference between them *in virtue of which* many of these ordinary properties apply or fail to apply is what Olson calls "modal or dispositional."

So, the modal and dispositional properties of microphysically identical objects *are* relevant to the instantiation of particularly complicated supervenient properties. In other words, complicated physical properties supervene individually on modal properties in addition to the non-modal microphysical properties. But of course, the relationship between psychological and underlying physical properties is considerably more complex than the relationship between points and the properties of basketball teams. So if Olson's claim is that psychological properties supervene individually on non-modal microphysical properties, it needs further support.

However, this does not show that psychological properties do not individually supervene only on non-modal microphysical properties, or that not everything that has the relevant physical properties has the relevant psychological properties. Right now, the defender of the two many minds argument is at an impasse; his argument is no longer entirely convincing, but neither is it decisively refuted. I will now show that there are good reasons to deny that this relationship holds between psychological and non-modal physical properties.

There are a number of ways to motivate the view that not all physically identical things are psychologically identical, many of which are specific to particular views in philosophy of mind. Shoemaker, for example, claims that a proper understanding of functionalism compels one to deny thoughts to certain objects. However, even if you do not agree with Shoemaker's functionalism, you ought to accept his conclusion.

Recall that one of the supports of the too many minds paradox was this: having complex thoughts is sufficient for personhood. This just means that everything that has thoughts is a person. But that is logically equivalent to the statement "anything that's not a person doesn't have thoughts." So, being a person is a necessary condition for having thoughts.

And if that's true, then those defending against the various incarnations of this argument have independent reasons to deny thoughts to person-stages, brains, or corpses-to-be: they aren't people. Of course, they will have to give some additional explanation of *why* they aren't people, but this explanation will surely be non-empty and vary with the account of personhood and personal identity: different views will give different reasons, but none of these reasons will be "brains don't have thoughts." Any view of personal identity will have some reason that I, and not my brain, is a person (unless, of course, according to that view I *am* my brain); even Merricks finds interesting reasons to count humans as persons and deny existence to brains, rather than vice versa. The point here is that that additional explanation, *whatever it is*, is enough reason to deny thoughts to person-stages, brains, or anything else, even if it involves modal and dispositional properties. If that explanation is lacking, it had better be lacking for reasons other than this.

Recall that Merricks defends his central second claim by challenging its denier to "offer a

replacement that would explain why atoms arranged brainwise, for some kinds of things (like me) is connected to consciousness, but not for other kinds of things (like my brain)" (Merricks, p. 51). This can easily be done by any account of personal identity: we just build in to the connection between the arrangement of the atoms and the possession of mental properties the criteria for being the unique experiencer of those properties. Establishing these criteria is closely related to the project of personal identity, and while stances on the problems in personal identity do not always imply particular criteria for personhood, they frequently narrow the candidate range. For example, perdurantist theories of personal identity rule out person stages as persons; psychological continuity theories rule out human animals[2].

The paradox of the too many minds is going after the problem of personhood and consciousness from the wrong direction. Given a set of numerically distinct objects, a set of token thoughts, in the case that all of the objects contain the systems from which the thoughts emerge, we ought not immediately assume that the thoughts belong to all of the objects. Instead, we should examine the differences between the objects and then decide which one is the person and has the psychological properties. In most cases, this can be done non-arbitrarily: recall that some of the objects can survive brain transplants whereas some can't, and some are able to look at themselves in the mirror while some of them aren't. Perhaps there are some cases in which multiple candidate thinkers are equally well suited to carry the thoughts; in these cases, it will be arbitrary which one thinks[3].

Four-Dimensionalism and Objections

Thus far I have assumed that this reply is compatible, and palatable, to all accounts of personal identity. This is not obvious: I claim that only persons, and not person-stages, have thoughts. This may seem anathematic to four-dimensionalist projects which seek to eliminate persons in favor of person stages. The idea that only persons (and not person-stages) have thoughts is no more of a threat to the reduction of persons to person-stages than the claim that only basketball teams (and not basketball players) have points is a threat to the reduction of basketball teams to basketball players. It is still clear that the team has its points *in virtue* of the properties of its players, even though the players themselves do not have any points. This view requires a modification of four-dimensionalist theories, but the modification is syntactical.

My argument does show that the relationship that holds between person-stages and makes some accumulation of stages a person, rather than some other, cannot be defined in terms of their thoughts, any more than the relationship between basketball players that bonds them into a team (let's call it the B-relation) can be defined in terms of the points of the members. Interestingly, the B-relation *could* be spelled out in terms of into which basket the players put the ball (with, of course, a few other details filled in). Similarly, the relationship between person-stages could easily be defined in terms of lower-level properties which do not have the disturbing implications of thoughts but retain the significant features.

So here's the idea: according to Olson, and according to many naïve notions of thoughts, the individual supervenience base for psychological properties does not include the modal or dispositional properties that make someone a person. I have argued that the base does include these properties, and that properly, thoughts only apply to people. I propose that the properties that link person-stages into a person supervene merely on those lower-level properties that don't imply personhood—the ones that Olson thinks make up thoughts all by themselves.

2 So, on a perdurantist view, four-dimensional maximality is a criterion for personhood, and therefore (on the current view) a criterion for having thoughts. Similarly, on a psychological view, not possibly existing without higher order brain function is a criterion for personhood, and so a criterion for having thoughts.

3 Like Noonan's response, this view solves the problem syntactically. However, this solution is superior for two reasons: firstly, it saves the intuitive definition of 'I', which Noonan ignores; and secondly, it preserves the logical implication from psychological complexity to personhood, and from personhood to psychological complexity.

This move to lower-level properties that have fewer logical connections should not be seen as a new or disturbing change in four-dimensionalist theories of persistence. Recall that person-stages cannot have all sorts of important psychological properties anyhow, such as remembering where they were three years ago, or correctly believing that they will be at work at such-and-such a time next week. Instead, many of these properties are already implicitly understood as lower level properties, even though memories are the only ones to have been explicitly redefined this way. The poster child of this kind of logically restricted property is the quasi-memory. 'Quasi-thoughts,' or properties that are explicitly defined to not imply personhood, should be no more threatening to a four-dimensionalist theory than quasi-memories, which explicitly do not imply identity. Although many refined definitions of quasi-thoughts would allow these views to bypass the too many minds paradox, the simplest would define quasi-thoughts as being psychological properties which supervene only on the non-modal properties in the supervenience base of thoughts.

We should accept this schema because it most accurately reflects our intuitions regarding personhood and consciousness, and because neither Olson nor Merricks have offered compelling argumentation to deny it. Shoemaker gives a similar claim, and motivates it via functionalism, but we can deny the problem of the too many minds even if we don't accept Shoemaker's functionalist account of the mind.

So, regardless of our beliefs regarding personal identity, survival, and personhood in general, we can and should resist the problem of too many minds by restricting the ownership of psychological properties to persons only.

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Is It Reasonable For 'Art' To Have No Definition?

John Fluharty

The concept 'art' has no definition. It is open to interpretation and change; what is constituted as art is based on a range of rational reasons, contextually different between individuals and situations. I will show that Wittgenstein's theories about aesthetics (different from family resemblances) were on the right path, and that Morris Weitz's open concept view was flawed, but can be revived by cluster accounts, such as Berys Gaut's. However, I will also show that Gaut was mistaken to give set criteria that constitute a highly disjunctive concept (definition) of art, but that rational reasons in an epistemic field can provide individual concepts of art, allowing for an explanation to the