This move to lower-level properties that have fewer logical connections should not be seen as a new or disturbing change in four-dimensionalist theories of persistence. Recall that person-stages cannot have all sorts of important psychological properties anyhow, such as remembering where they were three years ago, or correctly believing that they will be at work at such-and-such a time next week. Instead, many of these properties are already implicitly understood as lower level properties, even though memories are the only ones to have been explicitly redefined this way. The poster child of this kind of logically restricted property is the quasi-memory. 'Quasi-thoughts,' or properties that are explicitly defined to not imply personhood, should be no more threatening to a four-dimensionalist theory than quasi-memories, which explicitly do not imply identity. Although many refined definitions of quasi-thoughts would allow these views to bypass the too many minds paradox, the simplest would define quasi-thoughts as being psychological properties which supervene only on the non-modal properties in the supervenience base of thoughts.

We should accept this schema because it most accurately reflects our intuitions regarding personhood and consciousness, and because neither Olson nor Merricks have offered compelling argumentation to deny it. Shoemaker gives a similar claim, and motivates it via functionalism, but we can deny the problem of the too many minds even if we don't accept Shoemaker's functionalist account of the mind.

So, regardless of our beliefs regarding personal identity, survival, and personhood in general, we can and should resist the problem of too many minds by restricting the ownership of psychological properties to persons only.

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Is It Reasonable For 'Art' To Have No Definition?

John Fluharty

The concept 'art' has no definition. It is open to interpretation and change; what is constituted as art is based on a range of rational reasons, contextually different between individuals and situations. I will show that Wittgenstein's theories about aesthetics (different from family resemblances) were on the right path, and that Morris Weitz's open concept view was flawed, but can be revived by cluster accounts, such as Berys Gaut's. However, I will also show that Gaut was mistaken to give set criteria that constitute a highly disjunctive concept (definition) of art, but that rational reasons in an epistemic field can provide individual concepts of art, allowing for an explanation to the

vagueness in defining art. Thus, I shall begin with the anti-essentialists and move onto cluster accounts, finally finishing with a reason-based cluster account of art.

1. Anti-Essentialism and Objections

Anti-Essentialist—or most simply—the view that art cannot be defined, emerged as a response to the Essentialist Functionalists—the dominant view in the first half of the century—who hold that art is defined by most often one, but occasionally more, valuable functions that it fulfils[i]. Anti-Essentialism has reminded us that the valuable functions of art change over time. It has its roots in Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances, and asserts that there are no necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that exclusively specify something as art. Weitz, in one of the most influential papers of the century in aesthetics[ii], claimed: 'If we actually look and see what it is that we call "art", we will find no common properties—only strands of similarities,'[1] because 'logic of the concept' precludes 'art' from having necessary and sufficient conditions.'[2] 'Aesthetic theory is a logically vain attempt to define what cannot be defined…to conceive the concept of art as closed when its very use demands its openness.'[3] Naturally, this opened up the floor to definitional responses with anti-essentialist elements such as: Institutionalists, Historical definitions, and hybrid theories.[iii] Before continuing with Weitz, though, I shall briefly look at Wittgenstein's views on aesthetics.

Wittgenstein holds that not only can aesthetic conception not be defined necessarily and sufficiently, but aesthetic appreciation cannot be described; this would demand complete description of aesthetic environment—myriad language games applicable to actual aesthetic situations. More simply: there is no reason to speak of the comprehensiveness of the language we use and further aesthetic appreciation is a sign of aesthetic understanding though the grammar of 'understanding' is spread across a intricate practice of aesthetic appreciation; no single aesthetic appreciation exhibits itself. There is no single means of aesthetic appreciation.[4] Philosophical aesthetics should be a form of grammatical investigation with our diverse interaction with art. This is threefold: '(i) drawing attention to the actual situation in which aesthetic judgements are being made (whether we agree or disagree, and about what, and why); (ii) proceeding by making comparisons between the occurrence of our aesthetic judgement and other language games as a means for drawing attention to the actual situation; (iii) trying to make one see the aspect, which is constitutive of the actual situation; that is, to notice that an interpretation is given as a description of an *experience* [my italics], and that assenting signifies, not the exchange of information, but […] finding one another (in language).'[5]

Weitz's view developed over three main essays: 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics' (1956), 'Wittgenstein's Aesthetics' [1973], and *The Opening Mind* [1977].[6] Let me summarize his view that emerged over several years:

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1 Pg 125, Weitz, Morris, 'Role of Theory in Aesthetics', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; reprinted in Philosophy Loots at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, ed. Joseph Margolis, rev edn (Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1978)

2 Pg 126, Ibid

3 Pg 122, Ibid

4 Pg 299, Gunter, Eran, 'Critical Study: An Inadvertent Nemesis—Wittgenstein and Contemporary Aesthetics' British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 45 No. 3 July 2005

5 pg 300, Gunter, Eran, 'Critical Study: An Inadvertent Nemesis—Wittgenstein and Contemporary Aesthetics' British Journal of Aesthetics Vol. 45 No. 3 July 2005

6 Weitz, Morris, The Opening Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), Weitz, Morris, 'Role of Theory in Aesthetics', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; reprinted in Philosophy Loots at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, ed. Joseph Margolis, rev edn (Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1978), and Weitz, Morris, 'Wittgenstein's Aesthetics' in Benjamin R. Tilghman (ed.), Language and Aesthetics, (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1973)

1) some empirically descriptive and normative concepts are open and some are closed
2) open concepts are open in a variety of logically distinguishable ways
3) open concepts enrich thought and discourse by serving conceptual functions that could not be so served if those concepts were closed
4) at least some, if not all, types of open concepts are always open
5) an open concept which is always open, such as a perennially flexible concept like 'art' or a perennially debatable concept like 'tragedy', is always open because of its function or use and its corresponding logic or logical grammar.[7]

The problem with Weitz's theory should be apparent from the start. Relying on a concept of family resemblances leads to a vacuous definition; everything does and can be made to resemble everything else in some shape or form. It follows then that simple resemblances should not be used to explain why a concept cannot be defined.[8] A further problem with Weitz's theory is that of art as 'open concept', which directly follows from having a family resemblance theory.[iv] Definitions, it is held by Weitz, apply only to closed objects; though, for example, 'family' can maintain as closed, though the members are changed , even by those unrelated by blood, i.e. adoption.

It has also been objected that Weitz misunderstands Wittgenstein, who has several different versions of family resemblance: e.g. 'language', 'chair', and 'number'. They all have an element of vagueness, but also have different employment in language. Fredrich Waismann coined the term 'open-textured concept' to refer to the recurrent dubitability appended to the conditions of application of certain concepts.[9] The similarity between Waismann and Wittgenstein is that anticipation of the application of certain concepts is impossible, and the conditions of application are uncertain. Wittgenstein, though, believes there are other ways for a concept to be open: (i) there are cases in which there are no rules of application, (ii) there are cases impossible to anticipate application, (iii) the concept of games, such as the one Weitz uses, , involves vague boundaries or blurred edges. To connect this with Weitz; Weitz does not distinguish the various kinds of open concepts. Art is open textured in all three senses, though Weitz compares art to 'games', which is open in only one sense.[10] Thus, an anti-essentialist definition should explicitly state which open-concept 'art' falls under, and why.

Furthermore points (4) and (5), above, give Weitz the most trouble, and indeed, he fails to answer questions such as 'What are concepts?' And 'What is it to have concepts?'.[11] Weitz uses the terms 'logic' or 'logical grammar', to imply a 'use-pattern'—or corresponding pattern of use—of open concepts. He is wrong to imply that use-patterns guarantee a concept is always open; functions and use patterns change over time.[12] Unfortunately, Weitz gives little support for this assumption. The ability of the concept 'art' to change over time needs to be explored, as well as the prospect of any unchanging features. Without, *some* sort of evidence of unity or a 'deep-seeded' structure in the concepts of artwork, open concept theories of art look vacuous and susceptible to collapse.

Following from this discussion, four clear objections to Weitz emerge: (i) family resemblances can lead to a vacuous account of art, (ii) closed definitions can take on new defining characteristics, (iii) Weitz is ambiguous as to which 'open concept' he supports, and (iv) he fails to explain what a concept is or what it means to have one.

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7 Pg 38, Kamber, Richard, "Weitz Reconsidered: A Clearer View of Why Theories of Art Fail", British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 38, No. 1. January 1998

8 This and other objections can be found in: Davies, Stephen, Definitions of Art (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 1.

9 Waismann, Fredrich, "Verifiability," The Aristotelian Society for the Study of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 19 (July 1945): 119-50

10 pp 2-9 Scalafani, Richard, ''Art', Wittgenstein, and Open-Textured Concepts', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring 1971)

11 pg, 39 ramber, Richard, "Weitz Reconsidered: A Clearer View of Why Theories of Art Fail", British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 38, No. 1. January 1998

12 Pg 39, ibid

2. Reviving Anti-Essentialism and Cluster Accounts of Art

To maintain an anti-essentialist theory these objections must be answered. Richard Kamber asserts that it is correct to be sceptical about the possibility of a theory to reveal the continued unity of art over time; the mistake comes in assuming there is an essential openness or disunity in concepts of art. Weitz's scepticism is shared, but not his analysis. Kamber's analysis is threefold: first, art is an umbrella concept such as contemporary users cannot agree on a necessary condition for something being an artwork; second, if contemporaries did show a necessary conditions for something's being an artwork, it would need to show the property is a result of deep structure; finally, no theory has made this case yet. There is no deep structure connection.[13]

Kamber reinvents Weitz by throwing out the open concept solution and replacing it with an umbrella concept, which simply claims that the concept of art keeps encompassing new dimensions. This would seem to help objection on (ii), though not the others. Berys Gaut, however, has identified a necessary condition for art, and handles objections (i)-(iv) well, while still maintaining there is no definition of art.

Gaut argues that art is not a resemblance-to-paradigm construal (something is art by virtue of resembling paradigm art-works) such as Weitz's theory suggests, but rather a cluster construal to family resemblance that gives correct characterization of art. The argument rests on counterfactual cases of supposed art objects rather than the importance of originality in art. Wittgenstein indeed developed a cluster account, from family resemblances, of the meaning of proper names. Weitz's resemblance-to-paradigm model leads to his vacuous account; the cluster account avoids this by stating criteria.[14] This route, also would be supported by Wittgenstein's direct views on aesthetics, stated above—in which he holds that there is no single means of aesthetic appreciation, but aesthetics should form an investigation of interaction with art—as well as supported by Kamber's umbrella concept.

A cluster account 'is true of a concept just in case there are properties whose instantiation by an object counts as a matter of conceptual necessity toward its falling under the concept. The properties, called *criteria,* are simply the possession of a property which is a necessity of an object's being a concept.[15] Gaut gives several reasons why a criterion counts towards a concept:

1) if all of the properties that are criteria are instantiated, this suffices for an object to fall under the concept; and more strongly, if fewer than all of these properties are instantiated, this also suffices for the application of the concept. So there are jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the concept.

2) there are no properties that are individually necessary conditions for the object to fall under the concept (that is, there is no property that all objects falling under the concept must possess)

3) there are disjunctively necessary conditions for application of the concept. By the second point, it follows that if a concept's meaning is given by a cluster account, one cannot define that concept, in the sense of fixing *individually necessary* and jointly sufficient conditions for it.[16]

Indeed, there is a logical difference separating the resemblance-to-paradigm accounts from clusters; cluster accounts appeal to general properties to explain the relevant features, resemblance-to-paradigm accounts explain them by resemblance to particulars.

Gaut appeals to Wittgenstein to *define* the contents of his cluster account. "Don't think, but

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13 pg 44-45 ibid

14 pg 275, Gaut, Berys, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005, pp. 273-88.

15 pg 273, Gaut, Berys, " The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005, pp. 273-88.

16 Pg 27, Gaut, Berys, "'Art' as a Cluster Concept", in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, pp. 25-44.

look!"[17] This is simply an appeal to look at how art is used in language, to which, Gaut concludes that art must challenge the intellect rather than being merely just for pleasure. Gaut then gives us a list to help *define* what he think should count towards an objects being art: '(i) possessing positive aesthetic qualities (I employ the notion of positive aesthetic qualities here in a narrow sense, comprising beauty and its subspecies); (ii) being expressive of emotion; (iii) being intellectually challenging; (iv) being formally complex and coherent; (v) having a capacity to convey complex meanings; (vi) exhibiting an individual point of view; (vii) being an exercise of creative imagination; (viii) being an artefact or performance that is the product of a high degree of skill; (ix) belonging to an established artistic form; and (x) being the product of an intention to make a work of art.'[18] Having a list, as such, yields a concept that is noncircular.

Furthermore, Gaut gives a necessary condition for something's being an artwork: action. Each one is a product of action, and importantly, selection (such as found art) is a form of action. Selection as a work of art adds to properties of something, or changes them, 'a piece of driftwood in nature cannot express despair,'[19] but selection can give it that quality[v]. This identifies that deep structure of art, to which Kamber asserts as important. I shall now turn to some of the objections that have been made by Thomas Adajian, and Gaut's responses, but concentrate more on Robert Stecker's claim that Gaut's cluster theory is a disjunctive definition of art, incognito. I shall then bring up some objections of my own.

Adajian objects that Gaut's cluster account is—because it appeals to Wittgensteinian positions of family resemblance—not any better than definitions of art. Moreover, by leaving his cluster account open to revision, Gaut appears to contradict himself by denouncing definitions, while holding a concept that is a disjunctive definition. In parallel, simply because a definition has not been pinned down, does not mean there is not one, however it can be responded that using a cluster theory sidesteps many of the problems for definitions. Gaut concedes that the epistemic version of the argument fails, though a heuristic one holds, based on reasonable search principles. Stecker argues that Gaut's cluster account is really just a disjunctive definition in disguise:

> If the concept of F is a cluster concept, then there are several different sufficient conditions for being an F, no conditions are individually necessary for being an F, that is, there is no condition that all the Fs must satisfy, and finally, there are disjunctively necessary conditions for being an F, that is, it must be true that if something is F, then it satisfies one or another of the sufficient conditions for being F.[20]

However, for an F to have these characteristics, it would be true of F that it is disjunctively defined. What makes Gaut's version distinct from other disjunctive definitions, is that, whether something is a sufficient condition to qualify as art, is indeterminate. Further, there are no set numbers of disjunctive conditions. One response is to affirm that his definition is not conjunctive, and draw a distinction between highly disjunctive and variegated definitions and simple disjunctive and conjunctive definitions, and we find that there is not a correct definition of art that is simple disjunctive. Thus simple disjunctive and conjunctive definitions are defective. Highly disjunctive theories have many disjuncts.[21] What must be explored now, is the candidate account.

Let us explore the ten criteria that Gaut proposes in the candidate account for an object to be art. Stating specified criteria that an object—which is considered to change in form over time— must fulfil to constitute it as that thing is flawed. Many things that are not art, with simple disjunctive definitions can fulfil Gaut's criteria: the games of chess, for example, would fulfil i-viii; that is, it is beautiful, graceful and elegant to watch (or play); it can express emotion for the players; is intellectually challenging; complex; each move or strategy has meaning; it exhibits an individual

17 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, part 1, 66

18 pg 274, Gaut, Berys, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005, pp. 273-88.

19 Pg 29, Gaut, Berys, "'Art' as a Cluster Concept", in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, pp. 25-44.

20 Pg 48, Stecker, Robert, 'Is it Reasonable to Attempt to Define Art?', in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000

21 Pg 286, Gaut, Berys, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended", British Journal of Aesthetics, 45, 2005

point of view; exercises creative imagination; and it is part of a performance. A sexual experience could fulfil most criteria as well, especially an early sexual experience which could prove intellectually challenging. The only two chess does not fulfil are (ix) and (x), specifically (ix) which begs the question: *What are the established art forms and who decided they are established?*[vi] Furthermore, (x) being a product of intention to make a work of art undermines a subcategory of Gaut's necessity of *action*: selection. Selecting something in nature as art, does not constitute the making of a work of art, and it certainly was not intentional for nature to make it as art. Further, *action*, seems unimportantly necessary; action denotes that *something* is being created (or selected) but does not give a defining characteristic. Moreover, note that (ii-vi) all are forms of communication, something I will come back to.

Gaut's theory allows for some of the criteria to be objected; not all criteria must be filled to constitute something as art. The criteria in the cluster are necessary disjunctive. However, the example of the chess game or sexual experience shows that lists can be flawed. Set criteria, strictly necessary, or loosely necessary, do not work for constituting an open concept. Moreover, is disjunctive necessity rationally possible? Necessity involves a condition an object *must* meet to be considered that object, though a set list of criteria that art must necessarily fulfil some (different ones for each art object) to be considered art, begs the question: *Are any of them really necessary?* We can formulate this discussion into a few clear objections to the cluster account: (I) More concepts than art fulfil a substantial number of criteria; (II) (ix) begs the question and (x) self-contradicts the necessity of *action*; (III) are highly disjunctive definitions based on a set of criteria rationally possible?

3. Reason-based Clusters

I suspect the cluster account can be saved, though, without a set list. Gaut states that certain qualities give reason to constitute an object as art. Can *reason* be exploited to give support to a cluster account? I think it can. Drawing on ideas about rational reasons in relation to a subject, or actor, a contextual and subjective concept of art can be built up to help prevent Gaut's cluster account from collapsing without a set list. To begin, we can distinguish three types of reasons: practical, epistemic, and evaluative reasons[vii].

- He has reason to feel proud of himself: despite all the pressure on him he won the match.
- That electrician has failed to turn up again! Yes, you have some reason to be annoyed with him.
- Freda has good reason to be resentful about the way she was treated[22]

I shall focus mainly on the epistemic reason, which can be applied to theories of art:

- I have reason to think Frank Gehry's Guggenheim is art: it is beautiful, graceful, and elegant.

Reasons can be seen as a fact in a 'non-committal, formal or nominal way, in which facts can be simply equated with true propositions, propositions being understood as information-contents, Fregean thoughts'[23] Actions, beliefs, and feelings are intentionally linked to their accountability as reasons. Moreover, reasons are *facts* that stand in relation to an actor, and reasons can be strong or weak based on the number of *facts*:

> Thus R, the reason relation we're considering, holds between a plurality of facts, an actor, an act-type, a degree of strength of the reason, and a time:
> The facts pi are at time t a reason of degree d for x to φ.
> $R(pi, t, d, x, \varphi)$[24]

22 pg 1 Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished

23 pg 2 Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished

24 pg 3 Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished

Therefore:

> R (The facts that the Guggenheim is beautiful, graceful, and elegant are at this time a reason of good degree for me to believe it is art.)

Before we move on, I must clarify the concept of degree of strength. Reasons can be of varying degrees of strength. This is certainly one of the problems that plagues concepts of art. Definitional theories struggle because of the vagueness of some items to be considered art. Having reason that is context dependent, yields an explanation to this vagueness. It explains, rather easily, how something is called art at one time by one person and not at another time by another person. This can be refined by pointing out that most if not *all* knowledge of what art is is *a posteriori*. It comes from experiencing how the term is used: "Look, don't think!". One further element of reasons I would like to explore are epistemic fields. Epistemic reasons are relative to a field which contain facts, the strength for the belief depends on other facts in the field. The field can be enlarged as more information becomes salient; likewise, facts can be overwritten as new ones become salient.[25] Importantly, we need a notion of rationality to prevent a vacuous theory. If we have a reason to believe something is art—that is not forwardly rational—than perhaps that can allow anyone to dub anything as art without good reason. Thus, we can introduce a concept of rationally self-determining actors, who can assess reasons to believe or feel by their own reflection. They decided whether they should do more investigation, or have sufficient reason to believe. This is called self-audit. There are warrantable reasons, open to self-audit obtained by reflection. These warrantable reasons are held within the epistemic field, called the epistemic state. 'The fact that p is in x's epistemic *state* at t if and only if[26]:

> i) x could come to believe, at t, that p, simply by attention to the fact that p without any further action, and
>
> ii)   in an epistemic field of x's that contains the fact that p that very fact is sufficient reason for x to believe that p, whatever other facts obtain in the field'[27]

Thus, we can see that experience coupled with rational thinking can lead to good epistemic reasons to believe some set of relations to an actor. I believe this can be applied to a cluster theory to yield an anti-essentialist definition of art able to side step all of the objections yet raised. Let me try to put this theory into a set of premises:

> i)   There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that specify something as art

However

> ii)   Art used as cluster account such that there are properties whose instantiation by an object counts as a matter of conceptual necessity (set by individual warranted rationality) towards its falling under the concept.
>
> iii)   There is no universal list of properties
>
> iv)   There are, instead, individual clusters set by epistemic reasons subjective to an individual
>
> v)   Reasons are factual propositions that stand in relation to an actor and vary in degrees of strength
>
> vi)   Factual propositions come through experience
>
> vii)   Epistemic reasons about what constitutes something as art are relative to a field of facts obtained through experience, which can expand or be self-audited by rational deliberation

Therefore,

> The concept of art has no objective necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather, is made up of a cluster of individually necessary subjective properties set by *a posteriori* facts in

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25 pg 6, Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished

26 All these ideas on reason originate from Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished

27 Pg 9, Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished

relation to that subject, from which, rational deliberation give the subject warranted rational reason to constitute something as art.

Art, then, is instantiated as anything a rational agent believes it to be, in so far as he has rational reason to believe it. This proves a contextual definition, and is faithful to other anti-essentialist positions. It changes over time; holds true to the three types of open concept based on the reasons we use them in language; the epistemic field of reason yields a cluster of facts with which to constitute an object as art. It also explains indeterminacy of disjunction by showing different subjects have a different field of epistemic reasons to constitute an object as art; moreover it is not a highly disjunctive because there is no set list of instantiation. Furthermore, the objections raised against Weitz's original theory are satisfied by this definition where open concepts are based on experience in art's use in language, rationalized by warrant. Moreover, it satisfies the epistemic challenge against the cluster account, as well by avoiding a set list of criteria, and the disjuncts.

4. Conclusion

The majority of Gaut's cluster criteria were based on communication, as was Wittgenstein's account of aesthetics based on grammatical investigation *experience* of interaction with art. Basing rational reasons on the interaction of the construct of 'art' in language seems the *rational* course. It fully covers all the set objections brought against the anti-essentialists by taking them head on, or side stepping then. Thus, due to the vagaries of experience and use of 'art' we find there are no necessary and sufficient conditions to define it. 'Art' is open to take on new meaning. Therefore, there is no definition of art.

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i. Modern Functionalist definitions include Beardsly, Monroe, "Redefining Art" The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays, ed. Michael J. Wreen and Donald M. Callen (Ithica N.y.: Cornell University Press, 1982): Hanfling, Oswald, "Art Artifact and Function" Philosophical Investigations 18 (1995) 31-48: Rowe, M.W. "The Definition of 'Art,'" Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1991) 271-86.

ii. Weitz, Morris, 'Role of Theory in Aesthetics', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; reprinted in Philosophy Loots at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics, ed. Joseph Margolis, rev edn (Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1978).

iii. Institutionalists who try to avoid anything functional, and define it by the way it (art) attains its art status include: Dickie, George, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974); and Diffey, T.J., "The Republic of Art" The Republic of Art and Other Essays (New York: Peter Lang, 1991). Historical definitions identify relevant similarities and trace them back to 'first art', these include: Levinson, Jerrold, "Defining Art historically" Music, Art, and Metaphysics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Carney, James , "The Style Theory of Art" Pacifica Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 272-89. Hybrid definitions attempt to define art with some sort of function without pinning the functions down, these include: Stecker, Robert, Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

iv. Many of these objections originally come from Maurice Mandelbaum: Mandelbaum, Maurice, 'Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning the Arts', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol, 2 (1965).

v. Gaut goes on to give methodological considerations, that are not immediately salient to this essay. An account of the concept should be:
(1) 'adequate to intuition: it must agree with out intuitions about what we would say about actual and counterfactual cases: if the account claims that some object satisfies the concept, but it intuitively doesn't (or vice versa), then that is one strike against the account.
(2) normatively adequate: some intuitions that do not fit the proposed account may be rejected: there will be a reflective equilibrium between the account and intuitions[…]it must include a theory of error: some account must be offered of why people have the mistaken intuitions they do.
and should have
(3) heuristic utility: it should be such as to figure in true or at least promising theories about the object to which the concept applies.'

These quotes were taken from:

Pg 30-31 Gaut, Berys, "'Art' as a Cluster Concept", in Theories of Art, Noël Carroll (ed.), University of Wisconsin Press, 2000, pp. 25-44.

vi. For example, Roger Scruton argues against Photography (which many would take to be an established art form) as an art form in: Roger Scruton, "Why Photography is Not Art," in Golblatt and Brown, op. cit., p. 90

vii. All explanations of reason in this section are drawn from: Skorupski, John, 'The Unity and Diversity of Reasons' Unpublished. They can applied to concepts of art to explain many of the problems with anti-essentialists.

Interview with Simon Prosser

(Conducted on 3ʳᵈ June 2008. Interviewer: Joe Slater).

Joe Slater: It's common knowledge among your students that you were originally a physicist. At what point did you "see the light," as it were, and come to philosophy?

Simon Prosser: Not while I was still doing physics. I often get asked how I started off in physics and got into philosophy. It's not something uncommon, actually. There are quite a few philosophers who did either physics or mathematics at first. I think it's because in the case of people doing physics they're often interested in the big questions about space and time and the universe and so on. Certainly what happened in my case was just that I mis-located the things that I was interested in. I thought physicists were the people who addressed the really big questions about those topics, and it took a long time to realise that actually what physicists do is mainly mathematics; figuring out things that are specific to the actual world. So I did my physics degree feeling that something wasn't right, but I didn't know what. I even started a Masters degree and had a conditional offer of a PhD place before I finally had to accept that physics wasn't really the thing for me, but I didn't know what I did want to do at that time. I had done just one very short philosophy of science course during my physics degree, so I had just a little idea about what philosophy was. It seemed to come very naturally to me, but it took a couple of years after finishing with physics before I finally decided that I should come and study philosophy properly. Because things hadn't really worked out with the physics I was very cautious about it, so I did a one-year conversion course, a postgraduate diploma. I went into it thinking "well, just be very careful and see how this goes." But I very quickly realised that I was very, very keen.

J: You've been a member of staff here at St Andrews since 2002?

S: That's right.

J: What attracted you to St Andrews in the first place?

S: Well, to be honest, the job situation in academia generally and certainly in philosophy is such that you often don't have much of a choice, especially at first, so if I'm completely honest what brought me here initially was the fact that they offered me a job. Every time a job is advertised loads and loads of people apply. But I was very happy to get a job here because it's an exceptionally strong department. In surveys that people respect it's usually rated in the top two or three departments in the UK. And I always wanted to live by the sea. I'm very happy about that too.

J: Are you likely to still be here in a few years time, or are you planning to move on...?

S: No plans to move anywhere at the moment. I think I like the place more and more as time goes