

## Kant on Space and Objectivity

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**Abstract.** Gareth Evans attributes to Kant the following thesis: “space is a necessary condition for objective experience”. However, Kant does not seem to argue directly for this thesis anywhere in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this essay, limiting myself to the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and assuming that Evans’s attribution is correct, I attempt to reconstruct Kant’s implicit argument for the thesis, finding it as a corollary of the main conclusion of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, that space is a form of experience.

In ‘Things without the mind’, Gareth Evans famously attributes the Spatiality Thesis to Kant: “space is a necessary condition for objective experience”.<sup>1</sup> The truth of the thesis bears upon the connection between the objective world and the idea of space, and the attribution to Kant indelibly shapes how one interprets the opening arguments of *Critique of Pure Reason*.

However, as Evans implies, Kant does not straightforwardly defend this thesis: the difficulty consists in locating or reconstructing Kant’s argument for it. Thus, my question is this: *how does Kant argue for the Spatiality Thesis?*

With reference to Evans, Quassim Cassam locates Kant’s utterance of the Spatiality Thesis near the end of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*: “Through space alone is it possible for things [*Dinge*] to be outer objects [*äußere Gegenstände*] for us” (A29).<sup>2</sup> I will take for granted that this is indeed an expression of the thesis.

There are at least three ways in which Kant could have implicitly defended the thesis in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*: (i) via the First Metaphysical Argument (A23/B37) where he argues for a connection between space and “outer experience”, understood as objective experience; (ii) again via the First Metaphysical Argument but based on another interpretation by which “outer experience” is intimately connected to the individuation of objects (and thus objectivity); (iii) as a corollary of the main conclusion of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* that space is a form of experience.

Quassim Cassam would endorse (i) as Kant’s way of arguing for the thesis, and Henry Allison would endorse (ii). However, I argue against (i) and (ii) by giving an alternative interpretation of the First Argument and propose (iii) as Kant’s implicit argument for the thesis that space is necessary for objective

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<sup>1</sup>Gareth Evans, “Things without the Mind—A Commentary upon Chapter Two of Strawson’s *Individuals*,” in *Collected Papers: Gareth Evans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 250.

<sup>2</sup>Quassim Cassam, “Space and Objective Experience,” in *Thought, Reference, and Experience*, ed. Jose Luis Bermudez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 278.

experience.

After some remarks on the meaning of “objectivity” for Kant in relation to the thesis, and on some possible locations of Kant’s argument for it (§1), I will be arguing that Cassam’s reconstruction of the Kantian argument for the thesis is not implicitly made by Kant (§2). Similarly, I will argue that Henry Allison’s interpretation of one of the passages of the *Metaphysical Exposition*, which appears modifiable into an argument for the thesis, cannot in fact be (§3). Rather, Kant’s argument for the thesis is best conceived of as a corollary of his central claim that space is a form of experience; thus, his argument for it is best located where he explains that central claim (§4).

## §1 Preliminary Remarks

(1) The thesis concerns objects of experience which are mind-independent.<sup>3</sup> It’s useful here to distinguish between two senses of mind-independence: something is mind-independent if and only if it’s independent of the existence of minds *or* independent of mental representation.<sup>4</sup> At the very least, then, the objects of experience in the thesis are *representation-independent*. As we will see, Kant distinguishes between two senses of “object”, only one of which is mind-independent and thus relevant to the thesis.<sup>5</sup>

For Kant, “objects of experience” may refer to things perceived through the categories and concepts of understanding, usually denoted by “*Objekt*”.<sup>6</sup> According to Kant, such objects result from syntheses of intuition and the applications of concepts, giving us well-formed, quotidian items. Since these objects are mind-independent in neither sense, the thesis cannot be about them.

“Objects of experience” may also refer to what’s experienced *simpliciter*, untouched by understanding, usually denoted by “*Gegenstände*” (see A29 above). These “objects of intuition” (so I will call them) are distinct from objects of understanding, for “the manifold for intuition must already be given *prior to* the synthesis of understanding and *independently* from it” (emphasis mine; B145). Since Kant uses “*Gegenstände*” when stating the thesis, and such objects can be representation-independent (as per B145), it’s likely that the thesis, as Kant states it, concerns objects of intuition.

(2) The aim of this essay is to explore *how* Kant argues for the thesis. A second, related question is what Kant means by it. Understood broadly, the thesis posits a conceptual link between space and objective experience, but

<sup>3</sup>Cassam, “Space and Objective Experience,” 259.

<sup>4</sup>Pete Mandik, “Objectivity Without Space,” *Electronic Journal of Analytical Philosophy*, vol. 6 (1998) para. 23.

<sup>5</sup>A third sense of ‘object’ for Kant is the things in themselves, but these cannot straightforwardly constitute objective experience.

<sup>6</sup>Dustin McWhether, *The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 18.

the meanings of “space” and “objective experience” and the details of this connection need filling in. Since the thesis can be either trivial or captivating depending on how it’s understood, and assuming that Kant intends for the thesis to be non-trivial, I will assess each interpretation (§2-4) according to the significance attributed to the thesis by each interpretation.

(3) Given the assumption that Kant states the Spatiality Thesis at A29, it’s also reasonable to assume that he would argue for it somewhere before A29. I will consider two candidate locations: the paragraphs directly before A29 and the argument at A23/B37 (hereafter the “First Argument”). The First Argument is as follows:

For in order for certain sensations to be related to *something outside me* (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus, the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but *this outer experience* is itself first possible only through this representation. (A23/B37; emphasis mine)

The First Argument stands out because it argues for a connection between space and “outer experience”, possibly referring to objective experience. The paragraphs before A29, where Kant states the thesis, also qualify as a candidate, for one may reasonably expect the argument for a conclusion to be located immediately before it. The first two interpretations (§2-3) which I consider will be based on the First Argument, whereas my own proposal will be based on the few paragraphs before A29 (§4).

## §2 Cassam’s Argument and “outer experience”

Cassam attributes to Kant the following argument for the Spatiality Thesis: “space is necessary for objective experience because we can only perceive objective particulars by perceiving their spatial properties” (hereafter “Cassam’s Argument”).<sup>7</sup> As above, the First Argument might be about objects in the mind-independent sense required by Cassam,<sup>8</sup> and it does make repeated mention of perceiving spatial properties (e.g., “represent them as outside”), something crucial to Cassam’s Argument. So, the question becomes: *Can Kant be implicitly making Cassam’s Argument within the First Argument?*

I argue that there appear to be two reasons to believe that Cassam’s Argument occurs within the First Argument. The first is that the two Arguments

<sup>7</sup>Cassam, “Space and Objective Experience,” 278.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 259.

have a structural affinity. The second is that they reach the same conclusion. However, as we will see, the two reasons taken together put us in a dilemma: the arguments cannot both have the stated structural affinity and reach the same conclusion.

One may lay out Cassam's Argument as follows:

- (2.1) "[O]ne cannot perceive [or in Kantian terminology, "represent"] an objective particular without perceiving it as having spatial properties";<sup>9</sup>
- (2.2) If one cannot perceive X without perceiving X as being Y, then the perception of Y is necessary for the perception of X (suppressed premise);
- (2.3) The perception of spatial properties is just the perception of space;<sup>10</sup>
- (2.4) Therefore, "[t]he perception of space is necessary for the perception of objective particulars".<sup>11</sup>

The first reason to think that Cassam's Argument is contained in the First Argument is that the two Arguments take the same form, i.e., the same logical relation holds between their main terms. For comparison, one may lay out the First Argument as follows:

- (2.1K) "[I]n order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me, [...] the representation of space must already be their ground";
- (2.2K) If one cannot represent X without representing X as being Y, then the representation of Y is necessary for representing X (suppressed premise);
- (2.3K) The "outer" (or the "outside") is just the objective;
- (2.4K) Therefore, "this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation."

Cassam's argument takes the following form: in order for one to represent X, one must represent X as Y; *therefore*, the representation of X is only possible through the representation of Y. Kant's First Argument can be read as having the same form: in order for one to represent "something outside me" ("X"), "the representation of space" ("the representation of Y") must already be their ground; *therefore*, the representation of these things as outside me, i.e., "this

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 278.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 265.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 278.

outer experience” (“the representation of X”), is “possible only through” the representation of space (“the representation of Y”).

Their premises and conclusions take the same form, and the same logical inference exists between the premises and conclusions, i.e., the necessity of representation of Y for the representation of X is *due to* the fact that one cannot represent X without representing it as Y.

The second reason is that the two Arguments seem to reach the same conclusion, namely a variation of the Spatiality Thesis. In addition to the conclusion that the origin of space is non-empirical, the First Argument concludes with “this outer experience [*diese äußere Erfahrung*] is itself first possible only through this representation [of space]”. Whether this second conclusion amounts to the thesis, however, depends on what “this outer experience” refers to.

Cassam simply takes it for granted that the “outer” means “the objective” in the sense of being mind-independent,<sup>12</sup> and, so, that the First Argument concludes with the thesis. However, intuitively, “this outer experience” seems to refer back to something mentioned one sentence earlier, i.e., to the sensations related to “something outside me [*etwas außer mich*]”. This intuition is based on the repetition of the root “*aus*”. If so, the “outer” means what’s outside me, but not necessarily the objective; this would make the First Argument trivial, as we will see.

Daniel Warren helpfully clarifies the meaning of “outside” in the First Argument.<sup>13</sup> On Warren’s reading, “*außer*” at the beginning of the Argument has a “spatial” rather than a “metaphysical” sense, designating things spatially other than where I am, because the language in the First Argument is exclusively spatial (more on this in §3).<sup>14</sup> So, if “outer” refers back to “outside”, the First Argument *does not* conclude with the Spatiality Thesis, which concerns objective experience. Rather, Kant should be read as saying something along the lines of “(the representation of) space is necessary for the experience of spatial things”.

However, giving “outer” a spatial sense reduces the First Argument to triviality. The second conclusion of the First Argument would, at best, be read as being about the connection between the representation of space and what’s spatial. But if something is already defined as *F*, then undoubtedly it follows that this thing entails *its being F*, i.e., *F* is necessary for it. If we define “outer” as “spatial”, then it follows trivially that space is necessary for the experience of outer objects. In other words, Kant would be making an analytic claim, for the concept *spatial* is already contained in the concept *outer*. To be more charitable to Kant, it seems that Cassam is right to take the “outer” to denote the objective.

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 280.

<sup>13</sup>Daniel Warren, “Kant and the Apriority of Space,” *The Philosophical Review* 107, no. 2 (1998): 179.

<sup>14</sup>Warren, “Kant and the Apriority of Space,” 184-7.

In response to this, one might argue that the main conclusion of the argument is that the origin of space is non-empirical (“space cannot be obtained [...] through experience”), and the clause following this (what one might think is the thesis) amounts to no more than a clarification. Moreover, one might suspect that even if the second clause is counted as a distinct conclusion, it does not matter for Kant that it’s an analytic claim. For, at this early stage, Kant is concerned with the “metaphysical exposition” of concepts, i.e., with *a priori* conceptual analysis. In a sense, it’s acceptable that his conclusion is trivial, as he is merely explicating our concepts.

I believe, however, such a response is mistaken. Kant’s main conclusion of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is that space is the “form of all appearances of outer [äußere] sense” and that it alone makes possible “outer [äußere] intuitions” (A26/B42). If we insist that “outer” be given a merely spatial sense, one of his primary claims in the *Critique* would be rendered trivial: “space is the sole necessary condition for *what’s spatial*”. We cannot accept this.

In response, one might suggest that it’s still possible to attribute some significance to Kant’s claim above. Cassam, for instance, would probably suggest that “what’s spatial” has a *metaphysical* sense and that “space” is a *subjective* form.<sup>15</sup> So, on Cassam’s view, Kant would be establishing an epistemological link between the subjective and the metaphysical. However, I contend that even Kant’s second conclusion in the First Argument could be given a strong and interesting reading.

To that end, one may first observe that Kant distinguishes between “outer” and “outside”: “by means of outer sense [...] we represent to ourselves objects [Gegenstände] as outside, and all as in space” (A22/B37). That is, it is by virtue of the outer sense that we can represent things spatially other than where we are. So, to give “outer” a spatial reading would be to conflate the means and the ends, i.e., to conflate that by which we represent and the represented.

To the same end, we need to elucidate what Kant means in talking about “objects” of the outer sense at A22/B37. At this early stage, it is most plausible to read “objects” (“Gegenstände”) as referring to those which are given immediately in intuition prior to the application of the categories. (These intuitive objects, as in §1, are objective in the sense that their existence is not dependent upon mental representation.) If it’s *by means of* outer sense that we represent intuitive objects, it’s natural to assume that “outer experience”, i.e., the experience had via outer sense, is the experience of these objects of intuition.

On my interpretation, then, the second conclusion of the First Argument is this: the representation of space is necessary for the experience of intuitive objects. Note that, given my definition of “intuitive objects”, this attributes to Kant a significant claim: that, for the things which are characterised as objective in the sense that their existence is not dependent upon mental representation,

<sup>15</sup>cf. Cassam, “Space and Objective Experience,” 281.

if they *are represented* by the mind (i.e., if they become objects of outer experience), they are *necessarily represented as spatial*.

My version of the conclusion is preferable to ones that take “outer” to mean “spatial”, for my interpretation attributes to Kant a non-trivial conclusion. If I am right to interpret Kant this way, he does reach a version of the Spatiality Thesis by the end of the First Argument. Combined with the first reason, viz., that the First Argument takes the same form as Cassam’s argument, it appears that Cassam has correctly reconstructed Kant’s Argument for the thesis.

However, these two reasons are, in fact, in tension: if the two arguments have the same form, the First Argument *does not* conclude with the Spatiality Thesis; but if the First Argument does, they *do not* share the same form.

If the two arguments take the same form, as per the first reason, the conclusion of the First Argument must be expressed like this: X is only possible through Y. Filling in “X” and “Y”, we get: the representation of *these things outside me* (which has a spatial sense) is only possible through the representation of space. This is because “X”, when the argument takes this form, refers back to the things spatially other than where I am. However, the second reason *denies* that the First Argument concludes with a claim about spatial things.

If, however, the First Argument concludes with the claim that space is necessary for experience of intuitive objects (as per the second reason), it does not conclude with the claim that space is necessary experience of spatial things (denoted by “something outside me”). But the latter claim would be the conclusion if the two Arguments take the same form.

The two reasons put us in a dilemma. Neither reason is individually sufficient to ground the containment of Cassam’s Argument in the First Argument. Therefore, I conclude that Cassam has failed to reconstruct Kant’s argument for the Spatiality Thesis.

### §3 Allison’s interpretation and “outside me”

Assuming that my argument above, that the First Argument does conclude with a Spatiality Thesis, is correct, it’s reasonable to examine other interpretations of the First Argument, with hopes to reconstruct Kant’s argument for the thesis, before looking elsewhere. One influential interpretation is offered by Allison who maintains that the First Argument concerns the necessity of space in grounding the *individuation* of objects.<sup>16</sup>

Allison himself does not intend for his interpretation to concern the thesis. But it appears that if we supply a suppressed premise and accept the claim which Allison attributes to Kant, the result is an elegant argument for the thesis, contained in the First Argument. However, as I will argue, we cannot interpret Kant as arguing for the thesis in this way, for we cannot attribute Allison’s claim to Kant.

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<sup>16</sup>Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 82-87.

Taking the First Argument as about the connection between objective individuation and space, Allison finds in it the claim that space is necessary for us to tell apart qualitatively identical but numerically distinct objects: space is necessary for us to represent things “not merely as different” (i.e., qualitatively different) “but as in different places” (i.e., numerically different).<sup>17</sup>

With Allison’s claim as a premise, we may reconstruct the First Argument as follows:

- (3.1) The representation of space is necessary for numerical difference;
- (3.2) Numerical difference is necessary for objectivity (suppressed premise);<sup>18</sup>
- (3.3) Therefore, the representation of space is necessary for objectivity.

We self-consciously supply (3.2), knowing that, when it’s combined with (3.1), we get the conclusion, a variation of the thesis, which we can attribute to Kant. That is, we may supply (3.2), a claim *not found* in the First Argument but one that holds true for Kant, *only if* we can attribute (3.1) to Kant.<sup>19</sup> But we cannot attribute (3.1) to Kant.

This is because Allison has misinterpreted the phrase “not merely as different but as in different places” to be about the individuation of objects. As we have seen, Warren argues that “outside” should be given a spatial but not an “ontological sense”.<sup>20</sup> That is, *pace* Allison, he argues that “outside” just means “spatially other than” but not “non-identical to”. If so, Kant does not claim (3.1). In support of this, Warren gives several convincing reasons; I will mention two.

First, the language in the First Argument is distinctively spatial.<sup>21</sup> “Outside”, “another place in space”, “next to”, and “different places” are all spatial, not ontological. Against Warren, one might object: these descriptions *do entail* ontological differences. In response, we merely need to note that, although “spatial difference” and “numerical difference” may be co-extensional, what Kant *means* in the First Argument (i.e., his intension revealed by the use of language) has strictly to do with spatial difference.

Second, Warren acutely observes that the very purpose of Kant putting the explanatory bracket after “outside me” is to make explicit the distinction

<sup>17</sup>Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, 82ff.

<sup>18</sup>For Allison, (3.2) would be understood epistemologically (10f.), e.g., having an *idea* of objectivity.

<sup>19</sup>Warren (1998) would probably question the truth of B2: for a minimal kind of objectivity, it’s enough that I distinguish between qualitatively different things (*cf.* 188). However, Kant likely holds B2 true, for objects of intuition only possess extrinsic or relational features (A285/B341). The only way to tell these objects apart is by their non-qualitative features.

<sup>20</sup>Warren, “Kant and the Apriority of Space,” 184.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 185.

between “outside” and “outer” which appears later in the First Argument.<sup>22</sup> “Outer” may have an ontological sense, but not “outside”. Warren’s observation resonates with mine in §2 that Kant intends to distinguish between two cognates of “*aus*” at A22/B37.

So, we cannot attribute to Kant (3.1) nor, therefore, (3.3). That is, Allison’s interpretation of the First Argument is not modifiable into an argument for the Spatiality Thesis. There are other interpretations of the First Argument to consider.<sup>23</sup> But due to the space limitations, I will now attempt to locate Kant’s argument elsewhere.

#### §4 A Corollary of Transcendental Idealism

We have seen that an argument for the thesis which Cassam attributes to Kant cannot be found in the First Argument, and that, on Allison’s interpretation, Kant cannot be read as arguing for the thesis with the First Argument either. The other likely location for his argument is in the passages directly before A29, where Kant states the thesis: “Through space alone is it possible for things to be outer objects for us” (A29).

Cassam suggests (but dismisses, as we will see) a connection between Kant’s Spatiality Thesis and the main conclusion of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*,<sup>24</sup> which is also a doctrine of “Transcendental Idealism”: “Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us” (A26/B42).

Taking seriously Cassam’s suggestion, and using the doctrine above as the premise, we may incorporate Kant’s clarifications of the doctrine in A27/B43 and interpret Kant as arguing for the thesis in either of the following two ways:

(4.1) Space is an *a priori* form of outer intuition (A26/B42);

(4.2) A “form” is a “necessary condition” for representing “appearances” (A27/B43);

*Either*

(4.3a) Appearances are “objects of sensibility” [*Gegenstände der Sinnlichkeit*] (A27/B43);

(4.4a) Therefore, space is a necessary condition for representing objects of sensibility (A29).

*Or:*

(4.3b) “Outer intuition” comprises objects independent of mental representation (see §1);

(4.4b) Therefore, space is the necessary condition for representing objects of intuitions (A29).

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., n.10.

<sup>23</sup>E.g., Falkenstein (1995, 161ff.) and Warren himself. They argue that, since we represent things as located before we can represent spatial relations, the origin of space is non-empirical (the first conclusion). Their interpretations appear to have no direct bearing on the Thesis.

<sup>24</sup>Cassam, “Space and Objective Experience,” 236.

Kant, then, seems to give us two routes to reach the thesis. Via either route, a doctrine of Transcendental Idealism (4.1) *analytically* implies the Spatiality Thesis as the conclusion. This is because the other premises (except (4.3b)) are Kant's definitional elaborations of the doctrine.

I will assess my proposal by highlighting its merits and responding to two objections. The main merit is that it receives the best textual support thus far. The entirety of the argument, on my reconstruction, is traced back to claims Kant explicitly makes. The second merit is the close textual proximity between the conclusion and the premises. The whole argument is contained in section (b) of "Conclusions from the above concepts" (A26/B42 to A29/B45). The interpretation thus meets the expectation that an argument directly precedes the conclusion.

A tempting objection is that (4.4a) is not an instance of the thesis. This is because "objects of sensibility", being something close to sensations, are dependent on mental representation. But the thesis, at the very least, is a claim about mind-independent objects (see §1).

In response, one may compare (4.4a) with (4.4b), which is more evidently a version of the thesis. Specifically, we may ask whether "objects of sensibility" and the representation of "objects of intuition" are something similar. They are: "representing objects of intuition" describes how the *representation-independent* objects are put under a subjective form, which is roughly the meaning of "objects of sensibility".

Considering this, I concede that the phrase "objects of sensibility" indeed does not denote representation-independent objects. But I maintain that "objects" in "objects of sensibility" denote objects, just as "objects of intuition" do. That is, I am distinguishing between "objects" and "appearances"; the latter are representation-dependent. So, (4.4a) in effect says that space is necessary for representation-independent objects to *become sensible*.<sup>25</sup> If so, (4.4a) is still an instance of the Spatiality Thesis, for it makes a claim about representation-independent objects.

Another objection, one that Cassam is likely to raise, is that my interpretation misrepresents the relation between the Spatiality Thesis and (4.1), that space is the form of sensibility. Cassam maintains that, since Kant's aim is to "explain in more basic terms" the correctness of the Spatiality Thesis, it cannot be a paraphrase (a "notational equivalent") of (4.1).<sup>26</sup> Rather, to ground the thesis, (4.1) must be more basic than and "grasped independently from" the thesis.<sup>27</sup> However, unlike the reconstructions in §2 and §3, my account effectively represents (4.1) and the thesis as equivalent.

Cassam seems right about the basicness of (4.1).<sup>28</sup> However, my account is

<sup>25</sup>Cf. the non-trivial conclusion I attributed to the First Argument (§2).

<sup>26</sup>Cassam, "Space and Objective Experience," 264.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 264.

<sup>28</sup>E.g., see Strawson 1997, 237: space being a form of sensibility is 'an ultimate *fact* [...] not

compatible with this. Without (4.2), (4.3a) and (4.3b), it is not clear at all that the thesis follows from (4.1). That is, the connection between *Transcendental Idealism* and the thesis is not explicit and certainly not “notationally equivalent”. To see this, note that (4.1) can be explained independently of the thesis, but the reverse might not hold true. Moreover, this is not controverted by my suggestion that (4.1) analytically implies the thesis: X may analytically entail Y, where X is grasped independently of and is more basic than Y.

Moreover, my account is compatible with the thought motivating this objection. The thought is perhaps that, since objects considered prior to experience are non-spatial, the connection between the spatial and the objective must be explained by the non-objective, i.e., subjective sensibility.<sup>29</sup> So, the form of sensibility, being the condition making the connection between space and objectivity possible, must conceptually precede a thesis about this connection. The version of the thesis, on my interpretation of Kant, is that when the representation-independent objects become sensible, they are *thus* represented as spatial. This claim conceptually separates sensibility from objectivity, and objectivity from space, and does not put the connection between objectivity and space prior to sensibility.

## Conclusion

I have offered a reading on how Kant argues for the connection between space and objective. Attempting to locate Kant’s argument for the Spatiality Thesis in the First Argument, I first questioned whether it implicitly contains an argument Cassam attributes to Kant, then entertained and modified Allison’s interpretation of it. I have, finally, argued that the argument for the thesis, construed as an analytic corollary of Transcendental Idealism, is best located in A27/B43. This interpretation receives the best textual support and can stand up to objections.

If my account is accurate, we can confidently attribute the thesis that “space is a necessary condition for objective experience” to Kant. Moreover, my contentions on how to understand sensibility, objectivity, and the “outer” in context of Kant’s argument for the thesis suggest an unconventional way of reading the opening arguments of *Critique of Pure Reason*.

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capable of further explanation’.

<sup>29</sup>*cf.* Cassam, “Space and Objective Experience,” 263.

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