

Interrogating the Construction of Gendered Identity in the Syrian Nationalist Narrative:

Al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi

Rahaf Aldoughli

This paper explores the politics of belonging and the alliance between the invisibility of women and the emergence of the concept of nationalism in Syria in the late 20th century. It interrogates the considerable neglect of the question of women in the writings of the three Syrian thinkers, Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣarī (1880-1967), Michel ʿAflaq (1910-1989) and Zakī al-Arsūzī (1899-1968).¹ I chose these three thinkers because of their prominent role in shaping Syrian nationalist thought (Aldoughli, 2016). Al-Husari has widely been considered the father of secular nationalism (Karpāt, 1968: 28); his theorisation forms the ideological underpinning of the Baʿth Party, later founded by Aflaq and Arsuzi (Aldoughli, 2016; Dawisha, 2003: 3; Khadduri, 1970: 205; Salem, 1994: 49; Tibi, 1997: 203). Together, the narratives of these three thinkers constitute the basis of Syrian national thought, which has evolved around two overlapping yet diffusionist conceptions of nation and nationalism: emphasising the cultural identity of the nation, and achieving its political embodiment—the Baʿth Party.² These thinkers perceived the foundation of Syrian nationalism as premised on a set of national sentiments, with language, history, and education (militarism) providing the main sources of cultural identity for the nation. While the three thinkers shared these sentiments, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi identified the need to establish a political body to represent the nation through shared experiences of identification, such

as will and determination, pain and suffering, and sacrificial heroism. A close reading of these national elements will be the first step towards unveiling the construction of gendered identity in Syrian nationalist thought. As these thinkers' narratives contextualise the emergence of nationalism in the second half of the 20th century (Aldoughli, 2016), this paper goes beyond the arguments of attributing gender hierarchy to religion and culture, and, rather, recognises the importance of investigating the early emergence of nationalist narratives as a crucial dimension in producing a masculine national identity in national imagining.

Introduction

By analysing the nationalist theories of al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi, two interconnected themes emerge. First, the contextualisation of the concept of the nation as a natural extension of the family underlines the dominance of the father figure in both institutions. Second, the use of universal terms to refer to 'people' (*jamāhīr*; *sha'b*), and their frequent substitution with masculine labels such as 'men' (*rijāl*) and 'young men' (*shabāb*), excludes women from the national imagination. This linguistic phenomenon is not confined to Syrian national theories (see McClintock, 1991, 1993; Okin, 1980), but it has contributed to the erasure of women from Syrian national memory.³

Whilst this omission of women generates an impression that men are ubiquitous, the exclusion of women from the Syrian nationalist narrative has maintained power relations and bolstered hierarchies in the national imagination. Throughout the present study, I intend to explore gender bias in the definition of nation and nationalism by first, interrogating the language used by these thinkers; and second, questioning the 'absolute will' mediated by the male figure as warrior and revolutionary in the nation, and as the patriarch in the family. Such hierarchical symmetry between the private and public spheres has reinforced an essentialist conception of the role of women, and, concurrently, portrayed men as occupying an all-encompassing role in the family, society, and the nation.

Looking at how nation and nationalism have been narrated can help us understand how contemporary thinkers conceive politics of national belonging. Whilst one may argue that the absence of women from national narratives is rather universal and not exclusive to the Syrian context (Aldoughli, 2014; Jaber, 1997: 105; Pateman, 1988; Philips, 1991), it cannot be ignored that the subordinate position of women in early political philosophy has relegated women to a secondary position in contemporary politics (see Okin 1980: 3-5). Okin's significant account of the consequences of Western national narratives in relegating women to a secondary status in Western states is a leading example of the importance of investigating the construction of gender in national narratives (ibid). In the same spirit, and using Anderson's thesis that nations are "imagined political communities" as a guiding principle (2006), I argue that an examination of the writings of the three Syrian thinkers illuminates how the national narrative has defined the rights and responsibilities of women and men as members of a national community, and also sheds light on the assumptions behind these definitions.

Starting with the importance of investigating the language of national narrative as it portrays a form of 'power', we can argue that the missing representation of women produces a masculinist imagining of the nation (Okin, 1980: 4). Berger et al. argue that "the formation of gender differences in language – that is, the ways in which categories of the masculine and the feminine are defined by and eventually ingrained in language – most often produces a rigid and fictive construction of reality" (1995: 3-4). Scott demonstrates that the gender bias, which can be traced in the writings of most contemporary theorists, has become a naturalised given (1993: 397). Scott further contextualises the authority of masculinist writing and reveals how it is infused with presenting one dimension of 'experience' and excluding the 'other', which is in turn reflected in the production of national identity (Scott, 1993: 412; see also Connell, 1987: 109). Hence, this subjective 'authority', as reflected in the theorists' nationalist language and perspectives, is a reflection of

women's absent image and voice from history (Rowbotham, 1973a: 32; Scott, 1993: 403, 405).

More importantly, there is an intimately-linked affinity between the construction of the national narrative and the construction of manhood. In this respect, Enloe demonstrates the close association between the missing representation of women and the construction of masculinity in national narration. In other words, nationalism becomes a reflection of an image of man's memories, humiliations, and hopes (Enloe, 1990: 45; see also Aldoughli, 2014; Lyotard and Clarke, 1978: 9; Mayer, 2000:9-11).

In his influential book *Nation and Narration* (1990) which offers a new substantive tool for analysing the construction of the nation, Homi Bhabha states:

Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind's eye. Such an image of the nation- or narration-might seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west (Bhabha, 1990: 1).

The importance of these words lies in highlighting the association between the construction of a nation and its narrative. In this sense, narrative can be conceptualised as a reflection of the distorted presentation of women (see Foster, 1998: 38).⁴

Conceptualising the Syrian national narrative, one can discern three distinct positions that define the cultural phase. The first concentrates on the notion that nations are natural extensions of *family*. The paradoxical nature of conceptualising the nation as a "national family of man" is that such a notion reinforces gender hierarchy in the nation. It naturalises the supremacy of the male patriarch within both family and nation (McClintock, 1993: 63). The second is the cultural construction of the nation as defined through implementing shared language, history and education. However, in the Syrian national narrative,

men are depicted as the ones who guard, preserve, and transmit these cultural identifications (Davis, 1997; Peterson, 1998). The third notion is defining national belonging as non-voluntary, whereas this naturalised belonging reinforces the ethos of masculinised patriotism, sacrifice, and heroism.

At the same time, although the civic phase expounded by Aflaq and al-Arsuzi provided different characteristics for the political embodiment of the nation—i.e. the state—this phase defines the will and determination and shared pain and suffering of its men as markers of communal experience, markers which subsequently act as a delineation of power relations. More importantly, these concepts are perceived to be measured by masculinist identifications, which in turn politicise national boundaries around the heroic deeds of men only. In this regard, the emphasis on constructing communal experience serves as a trace of men's historical national experience, thereby creating a hierarchal symbolisation of the nation.

This national experience has been identified and measured by the twinned nexus of love of country and men's readiness to sacrifice. Andrew Parker et al. argue that 'a love of country' is an 'eroticised nationalism' defined by men's physical sacrifices (1992: 1). This raises the question of whether women's absence in nationalist literature can be linked to women's implied lack of love for their country and being stereotyped within certain emphasised roles of passivity, since the love of a country presumably requires the active militarised ability of its men. Such notions highlight the reasoning behind defining the nation as a fraternity, which is intimately linked with how women's relationship to citizenship will later be conceptualised (see Aldoughli, 2016a⁵; Badran 1993). This construction of idealised femininity and masculinity in national narratives defines 'love of the country' as a male arena, in which only 'he' is allegedly capable of defending the fatherland. Hence, nationalism is reconciled with hegemonic masculinity and feminine exclusion; women are once more relegated to passive, subordinate dependents who require an active, dominant mobiliser.

Within these two phases, Syrian national narrative perpetuates an obsessive representation of the nation as a community of men, imagined and defended by men. There is no denying the fact that this empowered masculine identification between the nation and men is a reflection of nationalism as “the exercise of internal hegemony,” as Tamar Mayer (2000: 1) masterfully puts it. Therefore, these constructed gender stereotypes reinforce the notion that the nation within these narratives is becoming “gendered and radicalised” (Anthias and Davis, 1993: 127).⁶ Anne McClintock indicates that “all nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous” (1991: 104-105). It is ‘dangerous’ in the sense that it reinforces power relations and incites hegemonic ideologies of masculinised violence (ibid). Moreover, Mosse argues that “nationalism had a special affinity for male society and together with the concept of respectability legitimised the dominance of men over women” (Mosse, 1985: 67).

Finally, this gender bias, which can be traced in dominant theorisations of nation and nationalism, is not a coincidence; it stems from a ‘male-defined’ world wherein women are obscured in ‘brotherhood’. The excessively masculine language used in the nationalist narrative must not be underestimated; it reveals the “intense rejection” of women in history, and reflects how they are trapped in a world constructed and represented predominantly by men (Rowbotham, 1972: 11). Therefore, after exploring nationalist narratives, we are faced with the overlooked question of women: the exclusion of women in a manner which reconsolidates “centralized control of authority...including gender privilege” (Pettman, 1996: 138).

In line with the above argument, much of my analysis of the writings of al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi employ Nira Yuval Davis’ understanding of the intersection between gender relations and the formulation of the nation. Davis’ important contribution suggests that no matter the characteristics of the nation (whether it is a cultural or civic construction), gender relations are deeply embedded in national formations (Davis, 1997: 21-

5). Davis outlined five ways in which gender and the constructed identity of women intersect with the construction of nationalism:

- 1- As biological producers of the nation;
- 2- As cultural preservers that mark the nation's identity and reinforce cultural boundaries. Women are conceived as symbols and signifiers of national difference;
- 3- As transmitters of cultural narratives (mothers, teachers);
- 4- As keepers of national boundaries by accepting or refusing marriage from outside the national community;
- 5- As active participants in national movements.

The following discussion identifies these five gender-differentiated dimensions in which Syrian women have been forcefully substituted with men in relation to national formation. Each section will highlight how men are constructed as the main contributors to nation-building, whether in its cultural or civic phase.

Al-Husari and the masculinist construction of cultural nationalism: men as social reproducers of cultural forms

Sāṭi' al-Husari, the father of secular nationalism in the Arab world, extensively debated the origin of the idea of nation and nationalism in his works (1959: 31; 1964a: 15-6; 1985a: 15-6). His nationalist theory constitutes the basis of the *Ba'ith* ideology in Syria. Whilst one might argue that al-Husari's nationalist ideology was so thorough that it hardly left anything out (See Cleveland, 1971: 148), this overview of his works will reveal his disregard for women's contribution to national formation. In this section, I intend to analyse al-Husari's nationalist ideas with particular reference to the role of women and family in fostering national consciousness. In this context, a close reading of his three national elements—*language, history, and education*—display forms of dominance and coercion in the construction of national identity.

‘The Soul’ of the masculinised nation

In al-Husari’s theorisation, language plays the most pivotal role in defining not only the political and cultural boundaries of the nation, but also the gendered boundaries of belonging. According to al-Husari, the nation is a cultural entity that has naturally extended from the family. This naturalised conception of nation formation reinforces non-voluntary belonging to the nation.⁷ Conceptualising language as the driving force behind fostering national identity raises the question of how al-Husari constructed a gendered understanding of the role of language. Al-Husari’s conceptualisation of national language can be summarised in four propositions. First, its role as the “soul of the nation;” second, as a tool that protects the nation from losing its cultural character during times of war; third, as a tool that determines the political and cultural boundaries of the nation, and unites Arab countries through disseminating Standard Arabic and minimising the use of colloquial language; and fourth, as a preserver of national heritage in its capacity as the *language of fathers*.

From the very outset, part of the formulation of al-Husari’s national ideology is based on internalising a gendered understanding of national love and belonging. In this sense, his ideological methodology is to insist on how to define ‘love’ for the nation (*ummah*) and the fatherland (*waṭan*),⁸ wherein al-Husari emphasises that national love is a substitution for familial love.⁹ This primordial love is compared to a child’s love for *his* mother (1985a: 29). However, this definition of national love becomes part of an enforced and naturalistic sentiment that generates propaganda regarding how to produce an ideal image of the man. More importantly, national love constitutes a means of legitimising death for the nation, which is in turn embedded with gendered interpretations of national belonging.

The deep correlation between defining patriotic belonging and masculinity is further intensified by al-Husari’s social construction of kinship (*qarābah*). He argues that “the important thing about kinship (*qarābah*) and lineage (*nasab*) is not blood

relations, but rather the belief in this relation'' (1928). Al-Husari confirms that "spiritual kinship" is socially constructed through unifying language, history, and education (1985b: 105). However, despite disregarding the racial and ethnic origin of the nation, al-Husari argues that the nation is a "brotherhood" and a "fraternity of descendants from one father" (1985b: 35). He further argues that the inefficacy of the racial origin of the nation¹⁰ is backed up by his idea of intermarriages (1959: 129). While these notions suggest that the nation is culturally constructed and preserved through language and intermarriages, al-Husari disregards the role of women as custodians of the nation's cultural identity through their marriages.¹¹ Therefore, whilst the role of intermarriages in defining racial belonging to the nation highlights the role of women as producers of national boundaries, al-Husari defines the nation as a "fraternity" and a "brotherhood", based on solidarity *between the brothers (ikhwan)* (ibid).

Identifying language as the soul of the nation, which mediates and determines the mode of thinking among individuals, al-Husari argues:

Language is the most influential spiritual tie which binds mankind together. First, it is the means of mutual understanding among individuals. In addition, it is the instrument of thought... Finally, language is the means for transmission of ideas and acquired knowledge from fathers to sons, from ancestors to descendants. The language with which man grows up can mould his thought in a special manner, and deeply influences his sentiments, his language which the individual listens to since childhood is the language of the mother (1928).

The great importance al-Husari accords to language is juxtaposed against the fact that he refers to the national language as the language of "the fathers" (1959: 56). However, he never mentions women's role in socially and culturally preserving the language (see Davis, 1997; Peterson, 1998), instead he considers it the language of fathers only (1959: 56). Moreover, these words are highly reflective of al-Husari's paradoxical position towards

women. Whilst he highlights the naturalised acquisition of the language through “mothers”, he still considers language to be transmitted from “fathers to sons.” Affording language this patriarchal connotation, al-Husari disregards the influence of mothers in fostering the “sentimental” identity of the child. In other words, he denied women their cultural role in preserving the cultural identity of the nation.

At the same time, the importance of having one national language is clarified in his own words as “a mere need *for men in order to contribute politically to the nation*” (italics added for emphasis, 1959: 67). These ideas significantly imply the inseparability of language and nationalism as the former is indispensable to the modernisation of both political and social life (1959: 67). Yet, al-Husari understands this link as pertaining to the public sector (1959: 68). It is worth noting that al-Husari only gives importance to the use of language in the state apparatus to establish and disseminate the national language. However, he misses the role of the private sphere in reproducing language in the same effective manner. Paradoxically, whilst he ignores the role of women in enacting this preservation, he affirms that the most important aim is to promulgate the national language through the state apparatus (1959: 73).¹²

Since language is such a driving element in his conceptualisation of nation formation, al-Husari adamantly shows his dissatisfaction with the use of colloquial Arabic (*al-‘arabiyyah al-‘āmmiyyah*). According to him, its widespread usage has divided and weakened the sense of national unity among Arab countries. It must be noted that his view on how to deploy Standard Arabic and curb the usage of colloquial Arabic is to promote Standard Arabic through the state apparatus (1985f: 30). Yet, he stresses that, in order to deploy Standard Arabic, there is a need to reinforce the role of “intellectual men” by adopting their language and style (1985f, 29, 32). What is missed in his proposition is the fact that unless mothers at home minimise the use of colloquial Arabic, the attempt to enforce the use of Standard Arabic is inefficient. More importantly, his perspective demonstrates a

rather biased perception of women's intellectual contribution to Arabic literature and the Arabic language in his time (Altoma, 1991: 79-91).

By employing Nira Yuval-Davis's account on women's contribution to the construction of nation and nationalism, I will review al-Husari's theory on men's cultural, intellectual and heroic achievement. For example, he perceives language to be a part of the nation's heritage that is only fulfilled by fathers of the nation. Nevertheless, al-Husari disregards the role of women and the family in ingraining the national language, and substitutes the role of mothers in disseminating the standard language with "*men of letters*." This biased perception against the role of women and the private sphere in the inculcation of a homogeneous cultural identity through language has perpetuated hierarchy, coercion, and gender-bias, in the construction of national identity. This is in no way confined to language; indeed, these views encompass how al-Husari perceives history. The following section will analyse how history is narrated in his national doctrine.

Telling the masculinist narrative: men as transmitters of history and active participants in political struggles

The second central feature in al-Husari's nationalist conception is a unified version of history. In his definition of the nation as "a human being, with life and feeling. Life through its language and feeling through its history" (1985g: 19), al-Husari describes *unity of history* as it...

...gives rise to shared feelings and views. It leads to collective memories of bygone exploits and past hardships, and to a mutual faith in the awakening and to mutually shared hopes for the future ... Every nation feels its self-consciousness and creates its personality by means of its special history (1928).

Al-Husari's notion of "special history" is a *selective* approach to history in which only particular events should be recorded in the national imagining to instill a patriotic identity. This culturally constructed definition of history, based on certain imagined

communal experiences of pain and joy (1985g: 19), raises the question of how this national imagining is discursively constructed, and whether women are included within this national imagining.

In the introduction of the 2nd edition of his book *Pages of the Recent Past* (*Ṣafahāt min al-Māḍī al-Qarīb*), al-Husari indicates that the re-publishing of this book is “of great benefits to young men (*shabāb*)¹³ of the ‘present’ and to the men (*rijāl*)¹⁴ of ‘recent future’” (1948: 7). These words reflect al-Husari’s intention of instilling a sense of collectivity through the use of masculine terms to refer to his audience. Using masculinised terminology in relation to the past and the future generates a misogynist position towards women’s place in nationalism. In the same vein, this grouping of masculine peoplehood reinforces boundary relations in al-Husari’s narrative, which deems history primarily a male domain. Al-Husari proceeds in this book to call for reviving the past through creating a glorious present.

The problem is that his concept of glorious present and future is identified with empowering men and urging them to generate the “spirit of sacrifice and victory,” while on the other hand, urging men not to spread the “spirit of discontent, despair and surrender” (1948: 70). What follows is an exaltation of death and sacrifice associated with the great deeds committed by men. In his concluding words, al-Husari defines life as synonymous with courageous death, which reasserts manhood and challenges potency (1948: 112). This gratification of men’s sacrifices attempts to measure national belonging by physical strength. This in turn exposes al-Husari’s construction of nationalism as intimately linked with constructing the ideal man of the nation. It becomes very clear to the close reader that al-Husari conceptualises the nation’s realisation of glory as man’s own achievement of manhood and masculinity. He argues

The man loves the nation under the influence of nationalism, and his heart is attached to it severely, and considers himself part of it, so he becomes happy whenever its glory increases, and suffers if its strength

reduces. He aspires to see it strong and developed, and be proud of its glories (*amjād*)...and tends to do whatever can be done to defend its existence and its dignity. Besides, the man loves his fatherland (*watan*) under the influence of patriotism...and seeks to serve it, and does not delay to sacrifice his soul for its sake (1985a: 27).

These words highlight the extreme identification of nation's glory (*majd*) with man's love for the nation. Al-Husari further declares that these patriotic and nationalistic feelings are not only connected by spiritual ties but even resemble maternal love (1985a: 27-29). This portrayal of national love reflects the man-woman relation of subordination and coercion. According to al-Husari, it is this nationalistic and patriotic love that would awaken sentiments in people to struggle and sacrifice for national renewal and unity: "We must remember that the nationalist idea enjoys a self-motivating power; it is a driving impulse to action and struggle. When it enters the mind and dominates the soul, it is one of the forces which awakens the people (*al-sha'b*) and inspire them to sacrifice" (1951: 238-239). From these words, we can derive a picture of an overwhelmingly gendered representation that conceptualises national membership through physical sacrifice. It is related to the question of: who are the "people" (*al-sha'b*) who may be connoted with the characteristics of "action" and "struggle"? Moreover, it must be discerned that al-Husari's use of the term (*shubbān*) 'young men' is an affirmation of the superiority of men as the only national believers in the nation. Hence, this juxtaposition between the assertion of nationalistic faith and the ability to sacrifice for the national struggle subsequently defines the concept of belonging (1985g: 40).

Because of his belief in the intrinsic value of national faith and patriotism, al-Husari points out that the greatest possible task for patriots is to prioritise national love over love of self. Al-Husari contends that the gravest enemy to the nation is excessive love to oneself as opposed to "altruism" and "sacrifice" (1985a: 117). It is, however, essential to examine the solution

that al-Husari proposes to this “selfishness”. In his call for ultimate national devotedness and love for the nation, al-Husari suggests that the only means for raising, spreading and strengthening national consciousness is national education. He strongly believes in the role that national education can play in regenerating and creating a generation with national pride.

National education: men as active participants in a militarised nation

In his consistent attempts to construe a secular perception of nationhood, al-Husari relies on education to foster a homogeneous national identity (1985g: 20). As elaborated previously, according to al-Husari national ties among individuals are established through a unified language and history. He further outlines education as a means of instilling communal solidarity and sacrifice among *the men of the nation*. These patriotic sentiments are extolled as essential for the inauguration of national identity. Education is used by al-Husari as a means to achieve a unified perception of nationhood among men through prioritising militarism and sacrifice as the ultimate goals which constitute the nation. Al-Husari classifies schools into two types: the natural school—the home into which the child is born; and the primary school, conceived as the real social institution that fosters the national identity of the child. As such, according to al-Husari, formulation of national identity progresses through two stages. The first stage is during primary school, as it is the social and educational institution which nurtures, constructs, and prepares the child for the second stage—army conscription. It must be argued that considering militarism a part of the educational system, which underpins the national upbringing of the child, illuminates the privileging of one sex over the other in the national consciousness. This narrative, undoubtedly, promotes the image of the male warrior as a representative of the nation. In al-Husari’s own words:

If we notice the role of these two institutions (the military and the school) from a general social perspective,

we will find that there are many similarities: as the first (the school) takes the child from the family, and makes him join his peers, and the school pledges to bring up the individual nationally and socially (*tarbiyyah*) and educationally (*ta'lim*) for the benefit of the nation. However, the second (military barracks) takes the young man from his environment, and makes him socialise with other men that are prepared to serve and defend their nation (1985a: 450).

From the very outset, these words leave no room for argument regarding unto whom al-Husari is addressing his narrative. The persistent overlap between the concepts of social and national upbringing (*tarbiyyah*) and militarism (*'askariyyah*) leaves no space for women in his narrative. Worse, this conceptualisation of militarising men further promotes a hierarchal and hegemonic gendered identity in the national community.

The insistence that militarism is complementary to schooling is strikingly short sighted. On one level, al-Husari's perception of militarism as part of the educational system sustains an exclusionary narrative of female children on how they should be educated (as we will see later). Militarism effectively becomes a means of defining and maintaining group identity and affiliation; the army, as a representative of the nation, structures the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the national community. This belonging to and membership of the nation is best understood in the readiness to die for the nation, fostering a commitment to "militarised and continuously politicised conception of life, a conception that is entirely masculinist" (Kateb, 2006: 8; see Aldoughli, 2016a). The role of the family is therefore disregarded and substituted with school and military barracks. Moreover, the glory of the nation, like the glory of a man, is measured in terms of heroism and militarism. Therefore, women become non-integral in the national discourse, propagating their image as naturally passive, whereas men are conceived as active participants in the national struggle.

Al-Husari further expresses his attraction to the military barracks, to the extent that he considers their role to outweigh that of the school because they are more effective at controlling the life of the individual. Moreover, military life is a life “of activity and fatigue, it strengthens the spirit of young men’s activity and movement, and gets them familiar with the roughness of life and develops their endurance of hardship, more importantly it develops their manhood ... and the spirit of leadership that the nation needs most” (1985a: 450). In fact, conceptualising military barracks to be agencies for raising and strengthening national consciousness, al-Husari’s theorisation of nationhood is based on casting men as a metonymy for sacrifice and altruism. This subsequently relegates women to an unknown place in the national discourse (1985a: 451).

The use of schools and military service as a means of raising national and patriotic consciousness disregards the role of the family as an educational institution and neglects women’s cultural role (1984: 15,35).¹⁵ And what he classifies as natural school; family, is rather disregarded as playing an important role in inculcating national identity. In this sense, nationhood becomes reliant on men’s realisation of heroism, manhood, and aspirations. Al-Husari argues that militarism plays a special role in fostering, strengthening, and forming nationhood:

The soldier lives – during military service – outside his personal circle, and away from his personal life ... He leaves his home, town, family and profession ... He lives with a group of the sons of his fatherland who are from different towns and classes and who hold various beliefs and positions. He lives with them subject to a system in which they are included without exception. He lives there, not with the intention of returning to his original personality or of being confined to his family and a life cantered in his village. On the contrary, he works for a purpose which is loftier than all these, for a purpose which ensures the life of the fatherland and the welfare of the nation. Is there a need to clarify the

seriousness of the psychological and educational effects that occur as a result of this life in these circumstances? I do not know anything comparable to the life of the soldier, in their impact on the social qualities: military barracks as social schools, connect the individual with the nation, and involve him in the most important episode of the community, and make him feel the existence of the nation and fatherland. He learns true sacrifice of blood and self in the cause of the nation and fatherland. Therefore, we can say that the system of military life is one of the most important and effective methods in social pedagogy (1944: 65).

This extract emphasises the role of military life in strengthening ties among members of the nation, and perceives it as the source for producing and disseminating national consciousness. Leaving aside the conceptualisation of militarism as a prerequisite for constructing a consolidated community based on internal solidarity, the normalisation of militarism in national narrative characterises men as active participants in national-formation.

Undoubtedly, this idealised perception of military life generates a hierarchal social order. According to al-Husari, there are three main social classes which form the nation:

Every nation, from a social perspective, is composed of three basic social classes: The first one is composed of general people (*sawād al-nās*), the public. The second one is the upper class; the elite, is composed of men (*rijāl*) that run the affairs of the nation, and have great influence on conducting these affairs, whether through enjoying official positions in the government, or by the virtue of enjoying a scientific, social or economic status – and whether this is in the administrative or political field – or in the literary, industrial or trading one. The third class, is composed of men (*rijāl*) who occupy medium statuses in comparison with the general public and the upper class. They represent the link

between the upper class and the general public one (1944: 77-78).

In this passage there is a shift from the general use of *shabāb* which signifies young men, to a more specific use of *rijāl* which signifies mature men. This linguistic usage reinforces an image of the nation as a community composed of and based on men. The term *rijāl* ([mature] men) connotes a privileged gender, masking a hierarchal perception of the nation. Within this context, there is an infused connotation between hierarchy and masculinism, and those in the upper class are all men. Even the middle class, those who enjoy higher scientific or financial status, are specified as men only. The reader is left wondering where women fit within this social classification, and how the two fields of politics and education, represented respectively by the upper and middle classes, are restricted to men only. Women, in this sense, are not even part of these two classes, which hold the most important national front. However, one might consider that women are positioned within the ‘general class’ (*sawād/‘āmmat al-naās*), which is deemed the uneducated class (1944: 77-79).

Gender-bias can be further traced in al-Husari’s extensive exploration of what men should choose for their future professions. Al-Husari asserts the importance of choosing entrepreneurship and investment for the growth of economy (1984). He urges young men to choose business and commerce for their significant benefits in modernising society, and in turn the nation. This deep consideration for how men should improve the nation and promote national consciousness through their professions demonstrates al-Husari’s misogynistic views on women’s role as mothers and individuals. This is evidenced, first, in his failure to advance a parallel perception of how women could become more effective contributors to society. Second, he asserts that mothers have a bad influence on their sons’ professional choices (1984: 73-82). It might be suggested that because al-Husari was aware of the greater lack of education among women, he be-

lieved that they are bound to have a negative influence on determining the future of young men. However, he failed to raise any awareness about the benefits of educating women. With man placed at the higher end of the social spectrum, woman, by comparison, is conceived as a metonymy for intellectual rigidity in society and the nation.

Al-Husari further masculinises the perception of the nation by illuminating the particular education female students should receive at schools. Unlike men, according to al-Husari, women should receive *special* teaching of how to manage the household. In his own words: “Schools should adapt to the requirements of women’s education” (1944: 90). Al-Husari even deemed it necessary to establish special professional schools that catered to womanly professions and workshops (1944: 89-90). While al-Husari presents himself as an advocate of national education, it is suggested that female education is confined to the domestic sphere. Al-Husari’s proposition for special education for women emphasises the national boundaries of the feminine and the masculine. This trend of thought laid the foundation for gendered education in Syria, as skills such as cooking, sewing and embroidery later became mandatory subjects for girls in Syrian schools. Moreover, the disparity between the wider professional options offered to men and women’s confined roles in society (1944: 79-83) highlights the inferior position assigned to women in that national imagining.

Throughout al-Husari’s theorisation, his legacy in constructing a militarised conception of culture, history and education perpetuated hegemonic notions of physical strength. In other words, the connection made between militarism and nationalism throughout his national ideology appropriated shared solidarity premised on masculinity among ‘brothers’ (*Ikhwan*) of the nation. This masculine construction that was expounded in al-Husari’s national ideology was later reinforced in the Ba‘thist ideology, which makes his doctrine essential to understanding how the legacy of gender bias in Syria has been ingrained.

Michel Aflaq's Political Philosophy

The political philosophy of Michel Aflaq has long been studied as the most attributive theory towards the establishment of the political system in Syria (see El-Attrache, 1973).¹⁶ Aflaq's militant conception of nationalism is best examined through deconstructing the national concepts and language in his iconic work *Fī Sabīl al-Ba'ṯh* (Towards the Resurrection). The following account includes a fine-grained analysis of his public lectures, articles, and speeches written between 1930 and 1980. The examination of his work will also consider the perceived audience of his narrative. Accordingly, I will address the questions: how did Aflaq seek to position himself in relation to his audience? And what sort of political community did he wish to constitute? In this sense, this section seeks to provide a systematic analysis of Aflaq's emphasis on the construction of national identity, as measured by constructing the ideal image of the Ba'ṯhist man (as will later be discussed). More importantly, it seeks to illuminate how language is employed to reinforce an essentialist conception of women in Aflaq's national discourse.

Aflaq's national narrative: men as signifiers of national identity and group membership

Contextualising his conception of nationalism, Aflaq's speeches propose the image of manhood as the only representative of the ideal human being. This is exemplified in the gender-exclusionary language of one of Aflaq's earliest articles (predating the establishment of the Ba'ṯh party), entitled 'Age of Heroism' (*ḥd al-butula*) (1935). Aflaq starts by saying: "Now we close a page of weakness from our history and open a new one ... A page full of patriotism and heroism" (1935). These concepts of patriotism and heroism are addressed to "*great men*", who will be ready for this new battle for the nation. In a more explicit manner, encouraging "young men" (*shabāb*) to join the Ba'ṯh, an article circulated the following year in 1936 distinguishes between "revolutionary men" and men who are still out of the party. This

distinction does not only refer to the basic Ba‘thist ideology as “a movement from dark to light” (which is exclusively defined by men’s participation in the Ba‘th). It is a masculinist call for a *particular* type of men: those who show readiness for sacrifice. As the title, “Treasure of Life” (*Tharwat al-Ḥayāt*) (1936), makes very clear, this speech is addressed to men as the only ones who give life its meaning, and that through their participation in the national struggle. Another distinctive feature in the ideology of the Ba‘th is its reliance on the activism and impulsion of young men (*indifā‘ al-shabāb*¹⁷). In a separate article, Aflaq states that “between our nation and our men, there is chemistry, appointment, and a meeting.” In a more transparent articulation of his sentiments, he states that men’s activism and impulsion is what our nation needs: “They are the rescuers” (1955).

However, Aflaq has a particular definition of manhood. According to him, there are basic characteristics (*ṣifāt asāsiyyah*) that define men’s national belonging. Aflaq emphasises the special rank of the heroic past of the nation, bidding men to identify with the glorious past and implement it in their present and future. More importantly, Aflaq expects a certain national and moral disposition from these men towards their nation (1943). Needless to say, that these messages are selectively addressed to men, however the definitive characteristics provided by Aflaq raise the question of how he conceptualises the sense of belonging and the moral disposition required by these men towards their nation (1943). In order to highlight how these features enshrine a distinctive internalisation of masculinism in Aflaq’s national propagation, the following section addresses his conceptions of national belonging and solidarity.

Men as cultural producers of the nation: defining national love through the construction of manhood

Aflaq’s contextualization of national belonging emphasises the importance of preserving culture and tradition. In his speech

“Abstract Thinking” (*al-tafkir al-mujarad*) (1943a), Aflaq prioritises the role of men in preserving the heritage of the nation, overlooking women’s contribution to the preservation of Arab culture. Aflaq was also concerned with creating an emotional basis for the nation, based on the love men have towards the nation. In 1940, he wrote an essay titled ‘Nationalism is love before anything else,’ (*al-qawmiya hub kabla kul shi’a*) in which he drew parallels between national and familial love:

The nationalism which we call for is love before everything else. It is the very same feeling that binds the individual to his family because the fatherland is only a large household and the nation is a large family ... and as love is always found linked to sacrifice, so is nationalism. Sacrifice for the sake of the nation leads to heroism (1940).

Notably, these words fuse notions of sacrifice, glory, and masculinity in the national imagination, thereby placing men at the helm of the national arena (see 1977).¹⁸ However, this proposition of familial love and belonging has not prevented the exclusion of women from the national imagination. In fact, this sense of familial love that binds particularly “brothers” (*ikhwan*) of the nation together in their party, relegated women to the margins of national imagining. This primordial construction of national belonging in Aflaq’s theory is concerned with understanding its two fundamental principles: substitution of family and life.

Subjective and non-voluntary belonging to the nation is juxtaposed with familial love (1940), whereby creating familial bonds among members is infused with patriarchy and coercion. Aflaq’s conceptualization of the nation as a family is intimately linked with heroic sacrifices achieved by men. In the course of presenting his argument, Aflaq uses the concept of the family as a substitute for the nation, which subsequently makes women invisible in both the private and public spheres. Such a substitution ascribes masculine qualities to society and the nation. Sheila Katz points out the patriarchal side of Aflaq’s notion of national love, and sums up its impact on the masculinisation of the nation:

[M]en could become lovers and heroes. Sacrifice ... entailed shahada, the imperative to die for a family/nation ... nationalists interpreted the nation to be a place in which (at least certain) men could consider themselves at home. Dignity at home would be unassailable or, if assailed, defended by brothers. Nationalism became a male affair through masculinised definitions of national community, freedom, dignity, economic opportunity, and security (2003: 80-81).

Hence, conceiving the nation as a family, based on those who are able to discern themselves as fighters for the nation, capitalises on heroism as a prerequisite to inculcate national identity. In other words, while the definition of nationalism is demonstrated only through 'love', this love can only be accomplished in masculine terms where men are patriots and great soldiers of the nation. This in turn marginalises the role of women in the construction of the national community.

Reconstruction of heroic past through pain, suffering and struggle

Aflaq's politics of belonging entail submission to the scheme of a solidified life. Aflaq emphasises the image of the nation as a community born out of solidarity between patriots. According to him, the nation is composed only of those who embody the "national idea" (1944). The related question in this context is, how does the nation preserve its identity? Aflaq encourages a sense of belonging among those who internalise the national cause in their souls, and are therefore committed to sacrifice and die for the nation; those "who are aware of themselves and their individuality, and not that distorted, abnormal minority who are in denial of their national role" (1950). In fact, Aflaq specifies the membership of this imagined majority to be exclusively comprised of *male patriots*. This implementation of struggle, sacrifice, and suffering, as national themes which are ascribed with manhood and masculinity, is central to Aflaq's definition of national belonging. Even in the 1940s, by which time Al-Ba'th was

established as a political party, the linguistic choices of Aflaq were not any more gender-inclusive. In a detailed article on the concept of national “Faith” (*Īmān*)’ (1943c), Aflaq connects the concept of “faith” with national consciousness. He states that the value of having ‘faith in the Ba‘th’ has been confined to our ‘Arab men’ (*al-shabāb al-‘arabī*). Moreover, this faith is conceptualised as a means to “transcend partition through pain ... and struggle” (1943c).

Like al-Husari, Aflaq’s primordial conception enforces a non-voluntary belonging on members of the nation. This is clear in his article “Nationalism is a self-fulfilling destiny” (*al-Qawmiyyah qadar mujeeb*) (1940a):

Very rarely does a person (*mar’*) think of simple questions like his name and face? They are his destined features that are going to stick with him till the rest of his life. We belong to nationalism just in the very same way that we have our names since we were born, and like our facial features that we inherit from our fathers and grandfathers. Even though in adulthood we might dislike our names and we prefer if we were called other names. However, we are obliged to accept our name as well as our face because our facial features hold the meaning of our inner soul and construct our identity even if this face does not represent the perfect beauty ... Nationalism to people (*sha‘b*) is like a name and a face to an individual, it is a destiny that cannot be avoided ... So, why one bothers himself in changing his destiny while he can fulfil every step in his life with patriotism. He should say if this is my destiny, then let it be heroic ... However, what kind of ‘man’ (*rajul*) is that who does not feel proud about his nationalism (1940a).

Aflaq’s excessive use of masculine terms has ranged from the term *mar’* (person), which is specified later in the text to include men only through the use of *rajul* ([mature] man). These mascu-

line terms effectively exclude women from the national imagining. Moreover, this language choice highlights an inherent paradox: while Aflaq's conception of belonging is naturalistic, he constructs a special definition of this belonging, confined to the performativity of heroism and manliness. At the same time, Aflaq harshly condemns those who do not meet the ideal definition of *man* in his ideology:

Whenever I think about the conditions of such a man, I writhe with fear of the image of misery engulfing him and the frostbite of isolation keeping him aloof. What narrow horizons of his own, a poor soul and a silly, dull life! He goes through his life, neither knowing that he is a bough of a tree which is deeply rooted in the past and whose branches grow up through ages ... nor understanding that he is one among millions who succeeded each other throughout centuries and generations, cultivating lands ... and fighting and dying in wars. They strove for all that to write the history of their own nation, line by line, build it up, stone by stone, clarify and prove its genius and continue carrying its mission out. All those millions strove, fought, wrestled with storms and withstood disasters to lead him forth from the darkness of nonexistence into the light of life, give birth to him – the unmindful, the forgetful – enrich his life with the lives of millions, foster his actions with the efforts exerted by all generations, burden and honour him with the responsibility of the past, and let him get a name with which he is called and features with which he is distinguished among others, so that he is no more a "Zayd" or "Bakr" (John Doe); rather, when it is time for every nation to vie in boasting with one another, he can say: "I am Arab" (1940a).

These words subscribe to a monolithic definition of belonging, based on achieving masculine prowess as the normal *status quo* in the nation. The text also presents a clear-cut distinction between men classified as heroes, and those considered cowards,

depending on their readiness to defend and sacrifice for the nation. The key feature of this belonging in Aflaq's early manifestations of nationalism has been the denial of women's participation in formulating the nation (ibid). Hence, national discourse becomes embedded with power relations and hierarchy. Such a masculinist construction of national narrative is further manifested in the emphasis on reviving the glorious past (*majd*) through appreciative men:

So cruel is such a destiny as we were destined to live in the age of weakness, disgrace, backwardness and division instead of living in the age al-Walīd or that of al-Rashīd when we were backed by a venerated and invincible state, an active and unified people and a golden civilization that shone like the sun. Destiny may sometimes be cruel, but it is forever and ever just; it distributes heroism only according to difficulty and gives glory only according to efforts. And, in its view, the heroism of those striving nowadays to liberate their countries from foreign occupation and the threat of division and to extract them from the abyss of ignorance and poverty is no less than the heroism of Qutaybah and Ibn Nuṣayr. As the age of al-Rashīd and al-Ma'mūn expanded to produce philosophies and literatures, each of today's heroes will similarly be, in the view of future generations, a subject of an eternal epic, and his sacrifice will be the birth of a new philosophy (1940a).

Not only is Aflaq's language gender-biased, but his failure to recognise what women achieved on the national level in the 1940s is another dimension of how his embodiment of the past is only represented by male fighters. Also essential to constructing the nation is advocating the heroic history: Aflaq insists on the role of history in binding the nation together. However, his version of Arab history is confined to the heroic deeds of its men. This is evident in his invocation of Qutaybah, Ibn Nuṣayr, al-

Rashīd and al-Ma'mūn as representatives of Arab history (1943b; 1950).¹⁹

This emphasis on reviving the heroic past is deeply intertwined with the commemoration of the shared experience of struggle and pain by the “masses”. By Aflaq’s insistence on realising a dialectical construction of the heroic past, rites of sacrifice and struggle tend to bring the past into the present. While the use of the “masses” denotes a gender-neutral perception, Aflaq cites once more the distinction between active and passive men, filtering out women from this national construction (1957). Another demonstration of the masculinism of Aflaq’s narrative is his conception “young men” (*shabāb*) and “the people” (*al-sha'b*). This is another reference to how Aflaq conceives the “masses” (*jamāhīr*). Aflaq’s conceptualization of the masses as falling into either of two categories—“young men” or “people”—leads to a gendered construction of national identity. Even within this classification, Aflaq prioritises the role of young men in formulating and representing the nation, and bids *the people* (*al-sha'b*) to learn from them (1950a). It is not clear where women fit into Aflaq’s hierarchal social differentiation. He states that this division cannot be avoided as “young men” are the ones who present the nation with their sacrifices. The ambiguity of the term “young men” (*shabāb*), along with Aflaq’s masculinist-inflected version of patriotism, exudes a masculine definition of the nation (1957a).

Moreover, according to Aflaq, pain and suffering are not only connected with the construction of a heroic past, but are also conceived as the backbones of the nation. In his article, “Arabism and Pain” (*ūrūba wa l'alam*) (1956), Aflaq affirms the process defined as “resurrection is through suffering” (ibid). Arabism can be only be realized through “struggle” and “pain”. In his own words: “The destiny of our Arabism is suffering.” However, even these two national conceptions (suffering and struggle) are measured and identified with manliness. Along with defining “the great struggle” of the nation, Aflaq contextualised

the meaning of struggle through reaching the “perfection of manhood” (*rujūlah*) (ibid).

The trope of sacrifice and struggle continues to structure the order of people in the national imagination. Aflaq distinctively differentiates between active and passive men. In his theorisation, he considers sacrifice and struggle the definitive features of real Ba‘thists. Indeed, the following passage not only illustrates Aflaq’s hierarchal categorisation of men in the nation, it even associates “humanity” with manhood:

When activists accept the hard-won struggle and bear the sacrifices and agonies ... they are aspiring that their comrades will follow the road of national struggle in order to establish their nation for their people and their sons ... However, there is an organic link/nexus between the eras of negative struggle and the eras of positive struggle. The achievements of positive struggle are the production of virtues, steadfastness ... and the production of deep human experience by which the fighter acquires through his experience of struggle and adversity ... this is what distinguishes him from the [passive] others ... So struggle is an indivisible unit with both its positive and negative halves ... Therefore, struggle is the true life and I would say its foundation is this active part ... it is the period when the fighter is absorbed and fused with principles, suffering and sacrifice ... It is the only period by which the identity of the fighter is determined alongside his destiny, merit and his originality (1967).

Aflaq’s hierarchal construction of national identity must be understood in relation to the two dichotomised categorisations of men: passive vis-à-vis active. Such categorisation situates women in a third category, effectively relegating women in the national imagining not only to the private sphere, but to an almost invisible sphere.

Another manifestation of gender-bias in Aflaq’s national construction is based on invoking a unified concept of heritage.

According to Davis, heritage is transmitted through women (Davis, 1997: 21; see also Peterson, 1998). Aflaq, on the other hand, associates national heritage with the great experience of men. This masculine characterisation of heritage emphasises a monolithic perception with the appeal to the great deeds of men. According to Aflaq, “understanding heritage can only be through revolutionary thought and the suffering of struggle” (1967). In this sense, struggle and suffering, the twin sirens of Aflaq’s masculinist composition of national narrative, also perpetuate the concept of heritage based on those who suffer and struggle for the nation. This rhetoric of suffering and struggle is replete with images of men as representatives of the nation’s heritage.

However, in addition to identifying struggle with men’s heroic sacrifices, sufferings, and achievements, Aflaq employs other meanings of “struggle” (*niḍāl*) in his national discourse. Aflaq’s conception of national struggle has a variety of meanings ranging from the struggle to realise the ultimate goal of man through sacrifice, to the daily struggle in life and the struggle for education and knowledge (1956a). That is, his conception of daily struggle in this context has multiple manifestations in everyday life (1956a). As such, while he previously associated struggle with sacrifice, despite this change of tone, Aflaq still excludes women from his conception. He even refers to men as *munāḍilīn* (fighters) of the nation and further warns them that if they do not stand up to their role in everyday tasks, their “*rujulatkum*”, manliness, is under threat (1956a).

Indeed, even the daily struggle for education and knowledge is associated exclusively with men’s intellectual capacity (1970). Aflaq was aware that the Arab nation was entering a “new era” that required a great level of “intellectuality” in order to keep up with modernisation and global change. In his speech, “The Party of Arab Revolution” (*hīzb al-thawrah al-‘arabyyah*), delivered in 1970, he redefines the characteristics of the “ideal Ba‘thist” and the “Ba‘thi fighter”. Aflaq’s conception of “struggle” (*niḍāl*), in the early inception of the Ba‘th ideology,

was associated with militancy, fighting, and using force. However, during the 1970s, there was a redefinition of “struggle” in his thought to mean the promotion of the “intellectual foundation” of the Ba‘th. The notions of “sacrifice” (*tadhyyah*), “struggle” (*nīdāl*), and “manhood” (*rujūla*), which define the ideal “Ba‘thi fighter”, are substituted with the emphasis on education and intellectuality. However, this redefinition of the concept of “struggle” to encompass the field of education is still masculinist through the emphasis on men’s role in education and the disregard for women’s achievements and the need to educate them (see 1974a).²⁰

The army: the ideal construction of the Ba’athist man

In light of the above analysis, there is a need to illuminate how Aflaq understood the Ba‘th message, which is defined in his speech, “About the Arab Message” (*hawl al-risālah al-‘arabiy-yah*) (1946), as a belief before anything else...it precedes any practical knowledge... It is the nation...and it is the right of every individual to aspire for chivalry (*al-murū‘a*) and heroism (*al-butūla*)... However, as should be noticed, although it is required that each one should aspire for heroism, but not all people are heroic (*al’btāl*) (1946).

While Aflaq’s narrative appears to be inclusive in his reference to “all individuals” (*‘afrād*) rather than using (*shabāb*) “men”, still the correlation between accomplishing your individuality and your national role in the nation can only be achieved through heroism and chivalry and their juxtaposition with the construction of masculinity. As (*al-murū‘a*) “chivalry” in Arabic stands for “perfect manhood”,²¹ Aflaq’s poetic style demonstrates an essentialist correlation between manliness and the construction of ideal national identity. The construction of this companionship manifests in the two words—“heroism and chivalry”—that delineates an apprehension for a masculinist national conception. In the same vein, Aflaq introduces a new concept of Ba‘th, which is its revolutionary character, stressing that what society needs most is the revolutionary spirit of its “young men”

(1950b). Indeed, Aflaq states that, “in the achievement of man’s national identity, the identity of the nation will be achieved. And the realisation of his ambitions and dreams will contribute to public life” (1944). Aflaq insists that the nation comes into existence through the true embodiment of patriotism in its members’ souls.

This proposition of a revolutionary Ba‘thist identity raises the question of how Aflaq perceives the Ba‘th generation. Suffice to say that Aflaq conditions the realisation of the nation’s identity on the masculine traits of heroism, strength, and, more importantly, militarism. This identification between the man and the nation delineates a gendered nationalist conception. By fostering a stratified, masculinist culture in the national imagination, Aflaq gratifies the role of army in his narrative. His speech, “The Army is Part of the Fighting Masses” (*al-jaish hwa jīz’ min al-jamahīr al-monaḍilah*) (1974), raises further questions about how women are conceptualised within these “fighting masses”. In his own words, Aflaq states, “I am here to confirm that the Party gives a primary position to the army. In the Ba‘thist ideology and its theorisation, the army is very important” (1974). The army, then, becomes another place for idealising masculinity by epitomising concepts like heroism, bravery, and sacrifice, which are recognised as masculine traits. The Ba‘th not only affords the army an important role, it rather aims to normalise militarism in society:

The Ba‘th ideology should take care of those men who enter the army for a short period – the period of military service only – and those who remain in civil life; we should enforce values of militarism into their lives ... This is for the upbringing of the new generation, whether in the military or in civilian life (1974).

These words endow the values of militarism with a further dimension in society by configuring and extending hierarchy, patriarchy, and bravery. Aflaq’s normalisation of the military ethos highlights the hierarchal authority of male domination which resonates with enshrining a culture of masculinity. Moreover,

Aflaq extends the naturalisation of militarism into the realms of civil life. This naturalisation of patriarchal ideologies embedded in Aflaq's theorisation of the army conventionally depends on the capacity for male authority, ranging from the militaristic to the domestic. Hence, Aflaq's notion of the army as an ideological formation of society determinates the increasingly reciprocal relationship between manhood and militarism. It further transmits the authority of men in a public institution – the army – to that of the private sphere – the family.

The essentialist perceptions of women in al-Arsuzi's political theory: nature vs culture

Al-Arsuzi brings us together to praise the introduction of liberal thought in his national doctrine. His national thought embraces the application of state, democracy and free society, in contrast to al-Husari and Aflaq's chief theorisation of the nation as a cultural and primordial entity. Al-Arsuzi introduces a civic conception of the nation based on highlighting the importance of achieving a political body: the state. His national theorisation further emphasises the need to adopt democracy and freedom in the process of nation-building. Suffice it to say that such notions are the outcome of the deep influence wrought upon him by his study of the French Revolution (Choueiri, 2001: 144). This attraction to French ideals might be attributed to his excellence in speaking French, and to his studying at the Sorbonne University. He came back to Syria in 1930 very influenced by the French Revolution and its principles. This, however, later caused him trouble with the French authorities for teaching the principles of French Revolution to his students in Syria.

The lack of scholarship tackling his work is attributed to the limited access to his early and later writings. However, his influence in the emergence of the Ba'ath political system has been reconsidered, after Hafez al-Assad became president in the 1970s (Saba', 2005: 298). This is mainly because 'Assad needed an ideological preacher to further strengthen his rule over Ba'athist

supporters, so during ‘Assad’s appointment as the Syrian Regional Commander after the 1963 coup, and as Minister of Defence after the 1966 coup, he took al-‘Arsuzi with him to meet soldiers and officers in the military. ‘Assad’s interest in al-‘Arsuzi enlivened al-‘Arsuzi’s ideological stance, and in return, he wrote extensive ideological profiles on ‘Assad in the Ba’ath periodicals (Saba’ 2005: 270). This shift towards al-Arsuzi’s national theory is not only important on the political level in the Syrian context, but also has massive implications on how women are imagined in Syrian society. Widely considered the father of the Ba’ath ideology in Syria, al-Arsuzi is deemed by Dalal Elamir to be the most important leader to introduce the concepts of liberalism and nationalism in the Middle East (2010:66). It is therefore important to interrogate the perceptions of women in his theory.

Being an advocate of the civic construction of the nation, in which the idea of nation-formation transcends the realisation of the cultural identity of the nation, to the establishment of the state through means of applying democracy, free elections and freedom (1973: 321).²² In light of this civic conception, the significance of al-Arsuzi’s political writings lie in his preoccupation with constructing a theology of free society unprecedented by al-Husari and Aflaq. Therefore, the related question is where do al-Arsuzi’s primordialistic and civic conceptions situate women in relation to the state and society?²³

Al-Arsuzi’s overemphasis on the role of philology in constructing the nation, makes the analysis of his national concepts and use of language highly important. Taking into consideration how he used philology to form his national theory, I shall examine al-Arsuzi’s perception of women through a deconstruction of the language of his national theory, coupled with his insistence on state and democracy as the only viable means for constructing a national community. In other words, this section aims to examine the ideas of al-Arsuzi regarding women, particularly in relation to their nature, education, and place in the social and political order.

Emasculating the nation: A-Arsuzi, women, and society

In pursuit of an egalitarian political society and a constitution of freedom and democracy, al-Arsuzi proposes a conflicting perception of the emergence of nation and nationalism.²⁴ While his preoccupation with the idea of civic nationalism seemed paramount in his national narrative (1973: 47-48, 228-229),²⁵ he could not transcend the romanticised idea of the nation. In light of such a perception, al-Arsuzi is not different from al-Husari or Aflaq in defining the nation as an extension to the family, however, his views reflect more essentialist and misogynistic views on women. While Aflaq and al-Husari disregard the question of women in their theorisations, al-Arsuzi devotes a substantial part of his writings to what defines a natural woman and a natural man. It may well be considered one of his most fundamental principles that nature is the source of the structural order in nation and society.

From the very beginning, al-Arsuzi's conceptualisation of the nation (*ummah*) takes us to how he perceived the role of the mother (*umm*). His preoccupation with philology—the roots of the words—forms the basis of his ideological views on the roles of women in state and society. Al-Arsuzi identifies belonging to the nation with the naturalistic love born out of the mother-son relationship. This justification of national love articulates both a cultural and primordialistic²⁶ conception (213). According to al-Arsuzi, the nation as a cultural entity is sustained by the love of its sons. However, perceiving the nation as a fraternity deprives women of equal representation in the nation. In this sense, the emphasis on the role of grandfathers (*ajdād*) and sons (*abnā'*) in preserving the cultural identity of the nation further complicates al-Arsuzi's perception of women.

Al-Arsuzi stresses that the nation is based on the “natural sympathy among brothers, in the same way that the creation of the family is based on affection among kin” (: 247). Following Aflaq and al-Husari, al-Arsuzi conceptualises national belonging as preceding any philosophical or theoretical knowledge

(341), which means that national love is unconditional and uncontrolled. According to al-Arsuzi, the nation is not only an extension of the family from “a spiritual perspective”, the resemblance between the family and the nation also lies in the duties assigned to the ‘brothers’ (*ikhwān*) of the nation (344). This suggests that in both the family and the nation, man is considered the sovereign, the leader, and the superior. More importantly, this politicisation of the cultural and familial sphere warrants an examination of how al-Arsuzi conceives the relationship between men and women.

In a separate chapter of his book (The Full Works) ‘*Mu’al-lafāt al-Kāmilah vol2*’, titled “Family” (*al-Ussrah*), al-Arsuzi outlines the importance of integrating the role of the family in the formation of the nation. This is strikingly different from how al-Husari and Aflaq conceived the notion of family in their theorisations. Al-Arsuzi defines the family as held together by bonds of fraternal love. In the course of expressing the role of the family, we are reminded of the sexist perceptions appointed to men and women by al-Arsuzi:

The family (*ussrah*) as a unit is based on men and women. Man in this natural entity symbolises the ideal figure, as he becomes the role model for his sons. The mother, overflowing with emotions, fuels her sons with emotions. The gentleness of women, and the tendency of men to control and show mutual sympathy between brothers is what formulates a family environment that is full of life. In such an atmosphere, the people are trained to carry out public duties ... In such an atmosphere, the mother blooms with tenderness and mercy, and the father practices what he is naturally born into; that is his inclination for sovereignty and the administration of justice ... In such an atmosphere, all members enjoy freedom, the freedom to tackle the duties and problems of life (304).

Al-Arsuzi's words stress that every sex is assigned a different role that is suited to their nature. A closer analysis of the linguistic labels used by al-Arsuzi reveals his masculinist conceptions. Al-Arsuzi refers overtly to both men and women, which subsequently asserts the prevalent assumptions about the different functions of the two sexes. Despite this clear reference to gender, it is openly asserted that man is responsible for administering justice. This hierarchal and patriarchal understanding of the family subsequently incites a hegemonic perception of the nation.

Al-Arsuzi conceives the nation as an arena that regulates the relations between rulers and those who need to be ruled. This hierarchal conception is exemplified in his reference to the two terms "mother" (*umm*) and "leader" (*imām*). On the one hand, the mother is deemed by al-Arsuzi not only to be the origin of life in the family – in as much as she reproduces the sons of the nation – but also to symbolise "the image of the nation." Yet, al-Arsuzi emphasises that the "leader"²⁷ is the one who leads and rules the nation and the family (333). According to al-Arsuzi, a man *naturally* symbolises sovereignty and justice, while a woman is *naturally* defined by her *function* in relation to the man. In such an argument, al-Arsuzi determines the distinctive moral standards of men in applying reason and justice to both the private and the public spheres. Nonetheless, qualities such as tenderness and submissiveness, which are prescribed to women establish a certain emotional superiority. This is evident in the justification that such a differentiation of gender roles contributes to the realisation of freedom. This leads us to question the gender-inclusivity of the concept of freedom in al-Arsuzi's doctrine.

Women as producers of national boundaries: curtailing women's choices

According to al-Arsuzi, the family has a significant role in nation-formation. For this reason he considers the family as a synonym for "humanity". However, the "evolution of the family towards superior humanity" (305) is based on controlling

women's choices of their future husbands. In this context, al-Arsuzi considers controlling who a woman marries essential for formulating a nation of a superior race. In spite of his claim that his doctrine is not a racial one, when it comes to a woman's freedom to choose her partner, al-Arsuzi adamantly justifies full control over her choices (305). In this sense, while al-Arsuzi seems conscious of women's role as markers of national boundaries, this recognition is accompanied by depriving women of their freedom of choice.

One might wonder whether al-Arsuzi's opposition to mixed-race marriages encompassed both men and women. Significantly, the overt reference to the 'danger' of mixed marriages only pertains to women. Given the hierarchal structure of al-Arsuzi's conception of family and the nation, it can be discerned that the chastity of the woman is yet another masculinist construction which is used and justified to control women's choices. Using rather racist language, al-Arsuzi articulates his view that the child born to such mixed-race marriages is a "disgusting" (*muqrif*) "half-caste" (*hajīn*) (307). His proposal for the regulation of marriage and breeding reflects the priority of maintaining the purity of the race in constituting the natural boundaries of the nation.

Such notions instill aggression and racism in the Syrian and Arab national context. Yet beyond this enforced naturalness, al-Arsuzi furthers his argument in the course of constructing an ideal national identity through claiming that any marriage to a foreign man will lead to physical and psychological deficiency in the crossbred child (305-6). He argues that this child is doomed to fail culturally and socially, and even compares him to "parasites" (*tufayliyyāt*), in a bid to affirm that this child will never be able to be independent or responsible. In the course of this argument, the woman is solely regarded as a means for breeding a superior race, and that only if married to local men. In this sense, it is only logical to presume that al-Arsuzi's anti-miscegenetic²⁸ views are the roots of the deprivation from Syrian

women of the right to pass citizenship to their children if they marry non-Syrians.²⁹

Such an argument is advocated by al-Arsuzi in pursuit of the highest convention of the nation, which is a “pure” family of superior race. In his emphasis on the significance of painting the ideal “image of the Arab family,” al-Arsuzi resorts to the conceptualisation of the hierarchal order within the family (307). By conceiving that the family is natural, al-Arsuzi implies that its existence is pivotal for the satisfaction of the man. This is reflected in his argument that the man is naturally “superior to the woman” in the formation of the family (307). Interestingly, al-Arsuzi further attributes the superiority of the father in the family to the philological source of the term ‘*abb*’ (father) to be identified in its pronunciation to the term ‘up’ in English, therefore, he concludes that the word ‘father’ in Arabic symbolises ‘highness’ (*i’tilā*) and ‘eruption’ (*haijān*) (308). Al-Arsuzi justifies this linguistic association with the superior role of the man in controlling the private sphere.

On the subject of the function of women, al-Arsuzi identifies the central role of the female as attracting the man to perform her function in reproducing sons for the nation. In another chapter titled “Woman” (*al-Mar’ah*), al-Arsuzi subjects women to what he claims are natural constraints. Supporting his argument with philology again, he claims that the term “*sayyid*” (master) originates from “*asad*” (lion), highlighting the sovereignty of the man. This is also in line with the man’s natural function to be the breadwinner of his house. al-Arsuzi even associates the linguistic meaning of the term “*sayyid*” with the man’s inclination to “protect his house.” On the other hand, the woman is inclined by her nature to “stay in her sacred (*al-muqaddas*) home” (311). This association between sacredness and the home sustains an essentialist conceptualisation of women’s role. Furthermore, the potential of the woman is seen in her nature to arouse the man sexually, which in turn, secures a well-ordered moral and intellectual life for the man (311-312). This is evidently to be juxtaposed with how al-Arsuzi examines the philological meaning of

the term ‘femininity’ (*unūthah*), associating it with “stillness and silence” (*sukūn*), which in turn symbolises her natural love for “stability and settlement” (*istiqrār*) (311).

Even though this traditionalist view gives women a national function in producing a well-ordered “image of the Arab family” (307), regarding the family as a natural and pivotal institution in the nation has defined women by their sexual functions. Within this context, al-Arsuzi concludes that the woman is defined by her role in arousing the man sexually, so that she may fulfil her natural function of reproducing sons for the nation (309-310). Perceiving the woman as the guardian of chastity and morality is reflected in her function to preserve her purity for the man, so that society sustains its moral standards. According to al-Arsuzi, in such an “historical moment, the woman completes the terms of her function ... if she helped the man to do his public responsibilities. She would ingrain in him the sense of chivalry and prevent those who represent politics from shabbiness and villainy” (312). Al-Arsuzi considers the sexual purity of women the sole means of helping male politicians preserve the characteristics of manhood. He also insists that women are made for “love” (*ḥubb*) and “docility” (*wadā‘ah*) (308, 311, 310). In accordance with such essentialist features assigned to women, men are conversely perceived to possess limitless potential. Al-Arsuzi conceptualises women’s functional potentials of “sensuality” that would “fire the man and fill in him “imagination”, which subsequently would turn the man into an “artist” (*fannān*) and a “hero” (*baṭal*) (312-3).

Women as transmitters of masculinist culture and traditions

The Syrian writer of freedom and equality has hardly considered man and woman to share the same human values. Nonetheless, his notions implicitly undertook the assumptions of the origin of inequality between man and woman by the hierarchal categorisation of men and women to respectively represent the dichotomised spheres, public and private. By entrenching patriarchal privileges, al-Arsuzi argues that the “practical duties of the

woman, the responsibilities in which she completes her function and accomplishes her identity is through being a housewife. She should organise everything about house to make it a perfect place for the man to rest after accomplishing his tiring duties in the public life” (313). He continues that “the woman does her duties through turning the house to a national fireplace where children learn about the heritage of grandfathers” (313). It is important here to note that al-Arsuzi, unlike Aflaq and al-Husari, is conscious of the woman’s cultural role in preserving the culture, tradition and the heritage of the nation. However, this recognition is limited to the essentialist perception of women. This is evident in his argument that the mother, through using her motherhood instincts, shall ingrain the cultural identity of the generation without the least focus on how to improve her role to extend the confinement of the private sphere. In a more clear manner, al-Arsuzi asserts that woman’s happiness is achieved through “preserving her feminine nature and cooperating with the man to achieve what her nature entails from art and virtue” (313). It is very palatable in this context that al-Arsuzi considered the essential character of woman as determined by being the servant of man’s needs, whether in fulfilling his sexual need, reproducing the new generation, or easing his tiring days of public life.

Are women citizens?

The interesting thing about al-Arsuzi’s views on women is their inherent contradiction. While he extensively defines the woman in terms of accomplishing what he claims is her natural function, he simultaneously expresses the need for integrating women into state affairs (314-6). However, al-Arsuzi’s encouragement of women’s participation in the national construction is at odds with his emphasis on the functionalist character of women earlier. More importantly, women’s participation in the public sphere is conditioned on conforming to al-Arsuzi’s perceptions of modern, secular dress. He openly attacked women’s choice to don the headscarf (*hijāb*) and considered wearing it a reactionary

act (314-315). It later becomes clear that stressing the need for women to receive education and participate in public life is bound by al-Arsuzi's ideological motives. His aggressive attack on the *hijāb* is no wonder a manipulation of what the large religious sect of Syrian women believe in (ibid).

What may appear to be the seeds of liberal views on women becomes entirely misogynistic again when al-Arsuzi claims that the "ingenious man" (*al-'abqarī*) is rather independent and does not need the woman in his life (316). According to al-Arsuzi, this ingenious man is superior to both what he calls normal men and women who have an average level of intelligence. This hierarchal categorisation of men resonates with both al-Husari and Aflaq's earlier representations, but the relevant point here is that al-Arsuzi, even after claiming the need for participation in the public sphere by a particular type of women,³⁰ still hardly regards them as intellectuals (316). He further contends that this "ingenious man masterfully administers the rules that build the national society, whereas the women reproduce sons so that life continues" (316). These words, which follow al-Arsuzi's seemingly modernistic views³¹ on women, again position women as inferior to men.

Another demonstration of al-Arsuzi's perception of the subordinate status of women is reflected in his conclusive remarks on marriage. In the course of emphasising the superiority of the "ingenious man", he furthers a hierarchal assumption by claiming that this ingenious man is better off not marrying the woman. He argues that the ingenious man does not need the woman, as his superior nature encompasses the dichotomised characteristics of males and females. However, al-Arsuzi continues to stigmatise women in stating that "the woman cannot live without the man" (316).

Within this context, it seems that al-Arsuzi fell short of advocating true equality and freedom for women. It becomes clear that al-Arsuzi's writings on women are covertly concerned with men's preferences rather than women's social and political choices. Thus, even though women are included in al-Arsuzi's

theorisation, their role is restricted in both the private and public spheres. At the private level, al-Arsuzi advocates the regulation of women's sexuality and breeding and stresses that her natural role is to serve the man. At the public level, he confines his modernistic views to those women who conform to his ideological perceptions.

Throughout al-Arsuzi's argument, the nation is conceived as a brotherhood. Suffice it to say that al-Arsuzi considers the creation of the ideal family central to ingraining national solidarity and sympathy among brothers. Al-Arsuzi is preoccupied with constructing an ideal family based on realising the satisfaction of the brothers in the nation. This satisfaction is supposed to be the responsibility of the woman in the family, wherein her submissive function ensures the fulfilment of the man's role in the public sphere.

In al-Arsuzi's liberal notion of the state, and in his conception of how to rule the state, he affirms that the administration of the state is based on cooperation among men. In his own words: "Why not the *human being (insān)* has the right of ruling his state, as a *citizen (muwāṭin)*, the cooperation among brothers (*ikhwān*) to practice their right in fighting against despotism..., thereby confirming their determination to live" (323). The significance of al-Arsuzi's linguistic choices must not be overlooked: while the terms "human being" and "citizen" are gender-neutral, they are paradoxically equated with the masculine term "brothers". This argument cannot be understood in isolation from al-Arsuzi's cultural conception, wherein the democratic state can only be achieved through the 'brothers of the nation' (*ikhwān al-ummah*) (324). According to al-Arsuzi, this cultural construction is realised through reviving the heritage of the nation, but this relies on a monolithic perception, based on commemorating the heroic past of fathers and grandfathers (324).

The impact of al-Arsuzi's Ba'ṯist perceptions on Hafiz al-Assad outweighed that of Aflaq due to reasons pertaining to the ethnic origin of both (al-Assad and al-Arsuzi) (Seale, 1989:27).

Such preferences to al-Arsuzi's national ideology by al-Assad foreground the misogynistic conceptions of women's potentials in both the private and the public spheres. Thus, it does not take long for the reader to realise that the inclusion of women in the public sphere in al-Arsuzi's ideology is merely hypothetical. For, in order to make a real effort to emancipate women in the public sphere, there must be major changes in the way women are envisaged as naturally born to serve men's needs. Women become fated to fulfil their functions in the private sphere, which in turn become their most defining feature.

Conclusion

This paper has investigated the considerable neglect of women's contribution to nation-formation in the early period of the three Syrian pioneers, al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi. It has reviewed the main currents of Syrian national thought on nation and nationalism in extensive detail, analysing and deconstructing the traces of masculinist ideologies in national narrative. The analysis takes into consideration the two phases of the evolution of Syrian national ideas: the cultural and the political. While emphasising the cultural identity of the nation, the three thinkers were concerned with two key notions. The first was conceptualising the nation as a family which in turn naturalised the non-voluntary belonging to the nation. The paradoxical nature of this enforced belonging is that it is measured by masculine qualities.

In the cultural phase, the correlation between national love and familial love perpetuated the construction of a national identity based on the ethos of enforced militarism and masculinity. The configuration of the nation as a familial entity has been considered by Syrian ideologues as a substitution, which consequently constructs the man as a patriarch in the private sphere and a male fighter in the public sphere. More importantly, this correlation legitimated the transmission of patriarchy from the sphere of the family to that of the public (Wedeen, 1999: 52).

Although these thinkers articulated this correlation between the family and the nation, each of them conceptualised its impact

on constructing cultural identity differently. For example, al-Husari considered the family a marginal institution in the nation. His disregard for the private sphere is evidenced by the way he perceived language, history and education. He relied on the public sphere in ingraining national sentiments and substituted the role of family with schools and later the military barracks. In the same vein, Aflaq stressed that love for the nation starts in the family but disregarded the role of mothers in his theorisation and reinforced the construction of physical strength as a definer of the nation and the Ba'ath. On the other hand, al-Arsuzi took a strikingly different approach, extensively considering the family a necessary institution in the nation. Yet this conscious inclusion of the family in his national doctrine only reinforced the subordinate position of women in both the nation and the family. In his inclusion of the question of women in his theory, al-Arsuzi justified the subordinate position of women in both state and society by objectifying women as men's own possessions. Al-Arsuzi perceived women as sexual objects and servants to the man in both the private and the public space. This essentialist view of women is in line with the process of normalising militarism and masculinity in the Syrian national narrative as expounded by al-Husari and Aflaq. Moreover, al-Arsuzi's conscious appreciation of the role of mothers as cultural producers incited coercion and hegemony over women's choices.

The second key notion in the three thinkers' work is concerned with the construction of a unified conception of history. Suffice it to say that this narrative has been saturated with references to men. The social construction of memory in these narratives focused on masculinist discourses, through which memories are shaped to formulate the imagination of fatherland. In fact, this glorification of sacrifice is associated with prototyping militarised men, thereby accumulating a selective history defined by the heroic deeds of men only. Hence, the narratives of al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi masculinised time by projecting men as embodiments of the nation's glorious past and continuing

to project them as having autonomous, revolutionary and infinite impacts on nation's present and future.

This study has also employed Nira Yuval-Davis' five identifications of women's contribution to nation-building. However, al-Husari and Aflaq substituted women's cultural, social and political contribution to the nation with considering men to be guardians and markers of cultural group membership. Al-Arsuzi, on the other hand, included women in his theorisation, but with essentialist, sexist views of women's role. While women are conceived as transmitters of traditions and culture, these traditions are channeled through a masculinist prism to retell the ethos and ideals of the heroic deeds of men.

We have seen that all three thinkers identified the nation as a cultural entity and called for preserving the cultural identity of the nation. However, both Aflaq and al-Arsuzi sought to construct a civic understanding of the nation through establishing a political ideology to govern the state; namely, the Ba'ath Party. On the one hand, Aflaq constituted heroism, masculinity, and militarism as the basis of his political ideology. Moreover, he asserted that the construction of the Ba'ath Party was synonymous with constructing the ideal Ba'athist fighter. Al-Arsuzi, on the other hand, introduced concepts of free society and democracy as essential for constructing the national state. He conceptualised the "people" as political citizens, but conceived women as inferior to men. Although civic notions can be traced in the narratives of the two thinkers, they both subscribe to a legacy of domination and perpetuation through internalising militarism, patriarchy and masculinism in the construction of their nationalist concepts.

To this end, having interrogated the early emergence of the idea of nation and nationalism in Syria, this study has paved the way for reconceptualising the construction of masculinism in national narrative. Uncovering the dominant national concepts in the Syrian context can also reflect how the concepts of citizenship, rights, and responsibilities, are constructed in the Syrian

Constitution(s) (Aldoughli, 2016a). Furthermore, this imposition and normalisation of militarism in the national narrative has perpetuated a hierarchy that obstructs the elimination of the gender gap in the Syrian constitution and legislation (ibid). Therefore, this detailed analysis of the national theories of al-Husari, Aflaq and Al-Arsuzi opens the door for future studies to investigate how militarism, belonging, struggle, and history, feature in perpetuating gender hierarchy in Syrian public discourse.

Bibliography

(A) General Survey and Theoretical Works

- 1- Aldoughli, Rahaf, 'The De-construction of Masculinism in the two Contemporary Nationalist Schools of Thought: Primordialism and Modernism', *The Luminary*, 5 (Winter 2014), 63-81.
- 2- Aldoughli, Rahaf, 'Revisiting Ideological Borrowings in Syrian Nationalist Narratives: Sati 'al-Husri, Michel 'Aflaq and Zaki al-Arsuzi', *Syria Studies*, Vol 8, 1 (2016), 7-39.
- 3- Aldoughli, Rahaf, 'Negotiating Gender Boundaries in the Constitutional Narratives (1973-2012): Construction of Militant Identity', *SyriaUntold*, 23 June 2016a. <<http://www.syriauntold.com/en/writer/rahaf-aldoughli/>>
- 4-Altoma, Salih J., 'The Emancipation of Women in Contemporary Syrian Literature', in *Syria, Society, Culture and Polity*, ed. by Antoun, Richard J. and Donald Quataert (State University of New York Press: US, 1991).
- 5- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).
- 6- Anthias, F. and Nira Yuval Davis, *Radicalised Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1993).
- 7- Badran, Margot, 'Independent Women: more than a century of feminism in Egypt', in *Arab Women: Old Boundaries*, ed. by J. Tucker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 48-129;
- 8-Bhabha, Homi K., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990).
- 9- Berger, Maurica; Brian Wallis; and Simon Watson, (eds), *Constructing Masculinity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995).
- 10-Choueiri, Youssef, *Arab nationalism: a History: Nation and State in the Arab World* (n.d: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001).
- 11- Cleveland, William L., *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' Al-Husri* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).
- 12-Connell, R. W., *Gender & Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics* (UK: Polity Press, 1987).
- 13- Davis, Nira-Yuval, *Gender & Nation* (London: SAGE Publications, 1997).
- 14- Dawisha, Adeed, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton and Oxford, 2003).

- 15- De Grazia, Victoria, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945* (London, England: University of California Press, Ltd.).
- 16-Elamir, Dalal Arsuzi-, 'Nation, State, and Democracy in the Writings of Zaki al-Arsuzi', in *Nationalism and Liberal Thought in the Arab East: Ideology and Practice*, ed. by Christopher Schumann (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 66-91.
- 17- El-Attrache, M, *The Political Philosophy of Michel Aflaq and the Ba'th Party in Syria* (Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 1976).
- 18- Enloe, Cynthia, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
- 19- Foster, Roy, 'Storylines: narratives and nationality in nineteenth-century Ireland', in *Imagining Nations*, ed. by Geoffrey Cubitt, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp.38-56.
- 20- Heuer, Jennifer, 'Gender and Nationalism', in *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview 1770-1880* (California: ABC-CLIO, Inc.), pp. 43-58.
- 21- Jaber, Nabila, 'Islam Revisited: Wo(man)hood, Nationhood, and the Legitimizing Crisis of Gender Equality', in *Remaking the Middle East*, ed. by Paul J. White and Williams S. Logan (Oxford: Berg, 1997), pp. 105-127.
- 22- Karpat, Kemal H., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (London, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).
- 23- Kateb, George, *Patriotism and Other Mistakes* (London: Yale University Press, 2006).
- 24- Katz, Sheila H., *Women and Gender in Early Jewish and Palestinian Nationalism* (USA: University Press of Florida, 2003).
- 25- Khadduri, Majid, *Political in Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
- 26- Koonz, Claudia, *Mothers in the Fatherland* (London: Methuen London Ltd, 1988).
- 27- Lyotard, Jean-Francois and Clarke, Deborah J., 'One of the Things at Stake in Women's Struggles', *Focus on the Margins*, Vol. 6/7, (Autumn 1978), 9-17.
- 28- Mayer, Tamar, *Women and the Israeli Occupation: the politics of change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

- 29-Mayer, Tamar (ed), 'Gender ironies of nationalism: Setting the stage' in *Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp.1-22.
- 30- McClintock, Anne, "No Longer in a Future Heaven": Women and Nationalism in South Africa'', *Indiana University Press*, No. 51 (1991), 104-123.
- 31-McClintock, Anne, 'Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family', *Feminist Review*, No. 44, *Nationalism and National Identity* (Summer 1993), 61-80.
- 32- McClintock, Anne, *Imperial Leather* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
- 33-Mosse, George L, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
- 34- Okin, Susan Moller, *Women in Western Political Thought* (London: Virago, 1980).
- 35- Parker, Andrew; Russo, Mary; Sommer, Doris, and Yaeger, Patricia, *Nationalisms and Sexualities* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992).
- 36- Pateman, Carole, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988).
- 37- Peterson, V. Spike, 'Gendered nationalism: Reproducing "Us" versus "Them"' in *The woman and war reader*, ed. by Lorentzen, & Jennifer Turpin (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp.41-49.
- 38- Pettman, Jan Jindy, *Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics* (London: Routledge, 1996).
- 39- Philips, Anne, *Engendering Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991).
- 40- Rowbotham, Sheila, *Women, Resistance and Revolution* (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1972).
- 41- Rowbotham, Sheila, *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* (England: Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, 1973a).
- 42- Saba', Michel, *Sa'ade and Aflaq in the Political Orthodoxy Thought* (Sa'ade w Aflaq fi l-fikr al-siyasi al-'arthodoxi) (Beruit: Manshurat 'Afaq Jam'iya, 2005).
- 43- Salem, Paul, Bitter, *Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994).

- 44-Seale, Patrick, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).
- 45- Scott, Joan W., 'The Evidence of Experience', in *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*, ed. by Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halpern (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 397- 415.
- 45-Tibi, Bassam, *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997).
- 46- Wedeen, Lisa, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).
- 47-Syrian Nationality Act (1969), <http://www.ref-world.org/pdfid/4d81e7b12.pdf>

(B) Works of Sati al-Husari

- 1-'*Awamil al-Qawmiyya*, a lecture delivered in 1928, online version can be found on:
http://freearabvoice.org/?page_id=104 [Accessed on 17th of June 2014].
- 2- '*Ara*' wa *Ahadith fi 'l-Tarbiyya wa 'l-Ta'lim* (Speeches and Reflections upon Pedagogy and Education) (Cairo: 'al-Risalah Matba'a, 1944).
- 3- *ṣafahāt min al-maḍī al-qarīb* (Pages from Recent Past) (Beirut: Dar al-'ilm lilmlayyin, 1948).
- 4- *Muhadarat fi nushu al-fikrah al-qawmiyya* (Lectures on the Growth of the Nationalist Idea) (Cairo: Matba'at al-Risalah, 1951).
- 5- *Ma Hiya al-Qawmiya?: Abhath wa Dirasat 'ala Dhaw'I al-Ahdath wa al-Nadhariyat* (What is nationalism? : enquiries and studies in the light of events and theories) (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm al-Malayeen, 1959) (this book will be used in other editions).
- 6- *Abhath mukhtarah fi al-qawmiyyah al-'arabiyya* (Selected Studies on Arab Nationalism), Vol1. (Cairo: Bar al-ma'arif, 1964a).
- 7- *Ahadith fi 'l-Tarbiyya wa 'l-Ijtima'* (Speeches on Education and Society), (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahddah al-Arabiyyah, 1984).

- 8- *Abhath mukhtarrah fi al-qawmiyyah al-'arabiyya* (Selected Studies on Arab Nationalism), Vol1. (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-'Arabiyyah, 1985a).
- 9- *Hawl al-Qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah* (About Arab Nationalism (Ḥawla 'al-qawmīyah 'al-'arabīyah) (Bayrūt : Markaz dirāsāt 'al-waḥdah 'al-'arabīyah 1985b).
- 10- *Fi al-lūgha wa al-'dab w 'laqutihuma bi al-qawmiyya* (Language and Literature and their Relationship with Nationalism) (Lebanon: Markaz dirāsāt 'al-waḥdah 'al-'arabīyah, 1985f).
- 11- *'rā' w dirasāt fi al-fikr al-qawmī* (Speeches and Studies in Nationalist Thought), ed. by Muhmad al-Rumihi, 2nd edition (n.d.: Majalt al-'rabī: 1985g).

(C) Works of Michael Aflaq

- 1-(*'hd al-butula*'), 1935.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch01.htm>
- 2-(*thā'rwat al-hyyat*), 1936.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch02.htm>
- 3--(*al-qawmiyya hub qabl kul shaī'*), 1940.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch30.htm>
- 4-(*al-qawmiyya qadar mūjīb*), 1940a.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch31.htm>
- 5--(*Wājib al-'amal al-Qawmī*), 1943.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch35.htm>
- 6-(*'al-tafkīr al-mujarad*), 1943a.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch34.htm>
- 7-(*fi thizra al-rasūl*), 1943b.
<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch33.htm>
- 8--(īmān), 1943c.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Baath-Volume%20I-Ch03.pdf>

9--(*al-jīl al-‘arabi al-jadīd*), 1944.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch36.htm>

10--(*hawl al-rīsalā al- al-‘arabyyah*), 1946.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch25.htm>

11--(*al-ba‘th al-‘arabī iradīt al-hayyat*), 1950.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch13.htm>

12--(*al-‘umāl wa al-īstīrakyyah*), 1950a.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch55.htm>

13--(*al-ba‘th al-‘arabī hwa al-īnqilab*), 1950b.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch18.htm>

14--(*khubrat al-shyyūkh w īndīf‘ al-shabab*), 1955.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch08.htm>

15--(*al-‘uruba w l’alam*), 1956.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20II-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%202-Ch22.htm>

16--(*al-masīr al-‘azīm wa al-‘māl al-yawmiyyah*), 1956a.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20IV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%204-Ch23.h>

17--(*Niḍāl al-wiḥdah huwwa niḍāl al-jamahūr*), 1957.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20II-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%202-Ch45.htm>

18--(*liluhda tarīriq wahid*), 1957a.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20II-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%202-Ch46.htm>

19--(*nafham al-turāth b al-fikr al-thawrī w al-mua‘ana al-niḍaliyyah*), 1967.

<http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20III-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%203-Ch04.htm>

20--(*hīzb al-thawrah al-‘arabyyah*), 1970.

<http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch08.htm>

21-(*al-jaish hwa jīz' min al-jamahīr al-monaḍilah*), 1974.

<http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch26.htm>

22-(*al-mustaqbal lan yūbna 'īla bi al- 'ilm wa fī minzār al-wihīdah al-'arabyyah*) 1974a

< <http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch36.htm>>

23-(*al-hizb tasūduh alrūh alwahjīdah*), 1977.

<http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch11.htm>

(c)

Zaki al-Arsuzi, *al-Mu'allafāt al-Kāmilah, vol II* (Damascus: Matābi' al-Idārah al-Siyāsiyyah, 1973).

Endnotes

¹ Henceforth al-Husari, Aflaq and al-Arsuzi respectively.

² For further reading on the evolution of these two diffusionist schools of thought: the cultural and civic construction of the nation, see (Aldoughli, 2016).

³ For further reading on the importance of investigating the role of national narratives in perpetuating masculinism in state policies, see Okin's study of Western national philosophy and the influence of its narrative on different countries such as France and UK.

⁴ Roy Foster affirms the centrality of 'narrative' in constructing 'nationality' as it evolved over history. He states: 'The idea of nationality as a narrative is becoming a cliché: but it is not a cliché of recent creation, fashionable as it has been in the work of various postmodern critics' (1998: 38). His article is a case study of Ireland.

⁵ This short article demonstrates the construction of patriarchal militant identity in the Syrian Constitution(s) as influenced by both the cultural and civic nationalist elements that shape Syrian national thought.

⁶ This alliance between nationalism and gender bias has been widely considered by prominent theorists. For further reading see: Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland* (London: Methuen London Ltd, 1988), p. 21; Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.2-6; Victoria De Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945* (London, England: University of California Press, Ltd.), pp, 2, 5-6; Tamar Mayer, *Women and the Israeli Occupation: the politics of change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp.1-15; Pateman, Carole, *The Sexual Contract* (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), p.4; Jennifer Heuer, 'Gender and Nationalism', in *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview 1770-1880* (California: ABC-CLIO, Inc.), pp. (43-47), 43-58.

⁷ This forceful belonging is also advocated through emphasising that speaking Arabic makes you an Arab. This in turn highlights the broad role of language from a definitive cultural means of formulating the nation to a tool for perpetuating coercion and hierarchy. In his own words: 'Every Arab-speaking people is an Arab people. Every individual belonging to one of these Arabic-speaking peoples is an Arab. And if he does not recognize this, and if he is not proud of his Arabism, then we must look for the reasons that have made him take this stand. It may be an expression of ignorance; in that case we must teach him the truth. It may spring from an indifference or false consciousness; in that case we must enlighten him and lead him to the right path. It may result from extreme egoism; in that case we must limit his egoism. But under no circumstances, should we say: "As long as he does not wish to be an Arab, and as long as he is disdainful of his Arabness, then he is not an

Arab." He is an Arab regardless of his own wishes. Whether ignorant, indifferent, undutiful, or disloyal, he is an Arab, but an Arab without consciousness or feeling, and perhaps even without conscience'. (Translation from Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton and Oxford, 2003), p. 72.

⁸ Al-Ḥuṣārī makes a clear distinction between fatherland (*watan*) and nation (*ummah*): for him the nation (*ummah*) is 'a group of people' whereas the notion of fatherland 'basically, is a certain geographic land' (1985a: 23).

⁹ The use of the masculine term is taken from al-Ḥuṣārī's narrative.

¹⁰ Al-Husari defies the ethnic origin of the nation that it is composed of one race. For further readings on this see: Aldoughli, 2016.

¹¹ This is according to Davis (1997) analysis of women's role in national formation.

¹² This is evidenced in his emphasis on the role public institutions play in maintaining the cultural language of the nation. He enlisted some tools to preserve language which are through the influence of schools and teachers, and the churches and men of religion (1959, 72).

¹³ This word is often used in Arabic to refer to young men, presumably from the age of 18 to their mid-thirties.

¹⁴ This word is used to refer to men in mature age, between 35-55.

¹⁵ It is worth noting that al-Ḥuṣārī's notions of education and school recur in many of his books, and are even occasionally repeated word-for-word. If anything, this confirms his strong views on the necessity of fostering a specific concept of nationhood, grounded first in schools and later in the military barracks.

¹⁶ A thorough study of 'Aflaq's political philosophy, it is almost the only study to dedicate so much attention to Aflaq's national concepts, although it does not address the question of women. El-Attrache highlights the difficulty of conducting research related to the Ba'ṯh party. In his own words: "The problems encountered in this research were the unavailability of documental materials and the scarcity of published Arabic books on the subject. In Syria, it is considered dangerous and often arouses suspicion to go to governmental offices and bureaus and ask for documents and papers. After the ill-fated six-day war of 1967, the Ba'ṯh and Syrian officials have become even more cautious of anyone seeking written materials or asking questions concerning the Party and/or the government" (p. vi).

¹⁷ While the term *al-shabāb* sometimes colloquially used to broadly mean youth, however, in the context of Aflaq's narrative it is addressed to young men as it is associated with the readiness to die for the nation and being military prepared.

¹⁸ In fact, the notion that national love is on the same level as familial love was still dominated 'aflaq's thought 37 years later. In a speech delivered in the opening of the 11th National Conference in 1977, Aflaq emphasises that

“the party is one family”. He states: We feel that the sense of one family is predominant in the party, and this is very important for our national struggle”. For full speech, it can be found at: <http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch11.htm>

¹⁹ For further reading on Aflaq’s masculinist notion of the heroic past see his speech delivered on the 5th of April in 1943b (*In Memory of the Prophet*) in which Aflaq glorifies the heroic deeds of grandfathers and argues that remembering the heroic past will shape a heroic future (such as recalling the glorious past of Qutaybah and Ibn Nuṣayrand the age of al-Rashīd and al-Ma’ mūn). It must be noted that this speech excessively uses the term ‘*rajul*’ (mature man) signifying Aflaq’s conception of a national community inclusive of men only: <http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch33.htm>. See also: (*al-ba’ th al- ‘arabī irādīt al-hayyat*) 1950 at: <http://albaath.online.fr/Volume%20I-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%201-Ch13.htm>.

²⁰ In another speech delivered later in the 1974a (*al-mustaqbal lan yūbna ’īla bi al- ’ilm wa fī minzār al-wihīdah al- ‘arabyyah*), Aflaq evaluates the significance of education for the nation’s future and the realisation of unity. While this speech reflects a distancing from militarism compared to Aflaq’s past work, his words are still highly masculinist.

Aflaq salutes the scientific achievements of men and the extent to which these achievements will inspire the nation’s future. of the fact that these achievements are confined only to men, coupled with his reference to scientists as ‘heroes’ and ‘brothers’ reinforces the association with ‘manhood’.

At the end of his speech, Aflaq calls for scientific cooperation between Arabs in different countries. He directs his message to the ‘Arab human being’. While this would seemingly encompass all Arabs irrespectively of sexual identity, Aflaq bases cooperation between ‘Arab human beings’ on ‘brotherly love’ and ‘brotherhood’:

‘But I must tell you that I am simply and essentially proud of the Arab human being everywhere and of the Arab people who are the origin of tournaments and heroes, and that my heart skips with joy whenever I see brothers in different Arab countries who gather in an Arab country where they cooperate in a brotherly fashion for one common destiny’ < <http://albaath.online.fr/VolumeV-Chapters/Fi%20Sabil%20al%20Baath-Vol%205-Ch36.htm>>

²¹ This translation is according to Almaany translations site: <http://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A1%D8%A9/>

²² The chapter ‘The Emergence of Nationalism in the Modern Ages’ (*nushu’ al-Qawmiyyah fi al’ usur al-hadiyytha*) in Vol II. His proposition of national concepts: ‘will’, ‘determination’, ‘state’, ‘consent’ can be traced in pp. 321-323. Further references to this book will be given in parenthesis.

²³ For further readings on al-Arsuzi's primordialistic and civic conceptions of the nation, see (Aldoughli, 2016).

²⁴ By 'conflictual perceptions', I mean that al-Arsuzi perceives the nation as both a cultural and civic construct. In other words, he argues that the origin of the nation is primordial that is an extension of the family, but at the same time, he advocates the political establishment of the nation which proposes the need to establish a political state. His views transcend both Husari and Aflaq and shows a clear influence by the two conflictual schools of thought: the Germanic and the French. For further readings on the early emergence of the Syrian national thought in the narratives of Husari, Aflaq and Arsuzi, see (Aldoughli, 2016).

²⁵ Further references to this source will be given in parentheses after the quotation.

²⁶ The term 'primordialistic' means that the origin of the nation is based on sharing the same language, history, culture and ethnic origin.

²⁷ He means the masculine guardian.

²⁸ The interbreeding of people considered to be of different racial types.

²⁹ According to the Syrian Nationality Act which was enacted in November 1969 under decree number 276, just after the ascendance of the Baath regime to power. For full read of the Nationality Law, see the link: <http://www.ref-world.org/pdfid/4d81e7b12.pdf>

³⁰ Those who do not wear *hijab* (headscarf).

³¹ By 'modernistic views', I mean his civic conceptualisation of the nation. Arsuzi's theorisations encompasses the importance of realising the political body of the nation; state. In this sense, he was one step ahead of his contemporary peers (Husari and Aflaq).