COSMOPOLIS: TOWARDS A POSITIVE CONCEPTION OF CYNIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Jason Hill, wondering about the contemporary relevance of Cynic cosmopolitanism, claims that '(I)t is still not clear whether Diogenes, in widening the human community to include others, was advocating anything like what contemporary moral cosmopolitans such as myself have in mind.'[1] On his account, the answer seems to be that the Cynics are relevant as originators of a 'radical notion of cosmopolitanism,' but their equation of human citizenship with rationality (correspondence to 'cosmos' or the world's order) is 'exalted,' 'abstract and idealistic.'[2] The advance made by the Stoics over the Cynics, he argues, is that with the former we have a move toward the concrete, towards a moral practice of 'cross-communal affiliation' that more closely presages 'the concomitant decline in the significance of tribal fixation and its attendant overdetermination,'[3]. I maintain that these ideas are already operative with ancient Cynics such as Diogenes and are in fact more radical than the Stoic version that succeeds them. Seneca indeed advocates leaving behind one's own oppressive social structure and venturing beyond to other nations and states in order to fulfill one's rational human potential. However, in this as in many other matters he never bothered to take his own advice. In contrast, the Cynics actually do practice this 'cross-communal affiliation' and actively seek to unsettle fixed ethnic identities not from some imaginary cosmopolis that remains hopelessly idealistic but rather immanently from within the different communities they move between.

Perhaps a more important difference between Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitanism is the fact that the former aims at real political transformation via the practice of transvaluation while the latter espouses the 'abstract' and 'idealistic' cosmopolitanism Hill attributes to the Cynics.[4] For a Stoic, one can inwardly remain a citizen of the cosmos while outwardly following existing oppressive social conventions, indeed one is often counseled to do just this, or else die or go into self-imposed exile. The two options are often meant as a consolation in the present, only becoming 'real' alternatives in the most extreme situations of oppression—e.g., being enslaved, or suffering violence that would disgrace oneself. For the Cynic, in contrast, one cannot remain inwardly a member of a rational cosmic order, while maintaining outward compliance with social conditions however irrational and oppressive these are. Rather, the Cynic attempts to make the 'cosmic order' outwardly manifest in any given social order by transforming the latter so that it fulfills its promise of a shared good life for human beings. One does this by precisely and specifically negating those given features of social life that do not stand up to rational scrutiny—ethnic superiority, nationalistic chauvinism, male 'superiority' over women, the loftiness of the wealthy at the expense of debasing the poor. I examine each of these aspects of Cynic cosmopolitanism in what follows.

Were Diogenes merely the espouser of an abstract and idealized cosmopolitanism, a utopia in which only truly rational human beings, the 'wise', are recognized as citizens regardless of race, class, and gender, we would be hard-pressed to explain his close engagement with all manner of Athenians and Corinthians, drawn from all social strata, and with a variety of intellectual figures and political leaders spanning the breadth of the ancient Greek world. And when we turn to his *Politeia*, for all its satirical features it is nevertheless clear that he is arguing for quite specific revolutionary transformations of social life that are not compatible with the kind of anti- or apolitical 'rugged individualism' the Cynics are often taken to embody. Though Cynics such as Diogenes themselves lived like 'rugged individuals,' independent of whatever socio-political environment they found

themselves in, this was the case only because the given conditions of ethnic, class, and gender oppression and exclusion functioned to hinder in advance any attempt at a revolutionary transformation of social relations. For instance, in Athens those who were *xenoi* (foreigners) or *metics* (resident aliens), those who were too poor to meet the property requirements for citizenship or had lost everything and had to become day-laborers and sailors, likewise women sequestered within the houses of their fathers and husbands, were not officially recognized as citizens; they were denied fundamental civic rights such as *isonomia* (equality before the law) and *parrhēsia* (free speech).

Thus, the first act of resistance to this order was to remove oneself individually from the wrong state of affairs, to become a 'rugged individual,' as it were—to escape oppressive warping and establish a space for critique. This space was not the imaginary realm of an idealized 'cosmopolis' but rather the very real contested political space of the various communities the Cynics wandered through. They were, like Socrates, 'out of place' in their supposed homes.[5] 'Being out of place' (*atopos*) at home, being at home in being out of place, the Cynic sought to render given ethnic, gender and class-based exclusionary practices that were presently settled and 'at home' within various national spaces as truly 'out of place'. The Cynic further seeks to transform what is currently understood as 'out of place' or 'absurd' (women's equality with men, the equality of barbarian and Greek, the worthiness and honesty of manual labor and thus the equality of poor workers with their aristocratic, leisured 'superiors') into that which belongs 'at home'. These measures actually fulfil the promise of the homeland and its ideals rather than betraying them ideologically and with brute force.

Thus also, to respond to Hill's question: ancient Cynics such as Diogenes are indeed advocating something not unlike what he himself is proposing as a self-declared 'contemporary moral cosmopolitan.'[6] In fact, they are doing so in a variety of ways that have yet to be recognized. To show this I will briefly delineate a few essential features of Hill's contemporary cosmopolitanism while suggesting their Cynic provenance, before turning to a detailed treatment of the ancient

context for the emergence of Cynic cosmopolitanism and the latter's still poorly understood basic features. According to Hill, moral cosmopolitanism's essential features include 'moral forgetting.' 'Unlearning the past, throwing off the tyranny of false legacies, is a new way of infusing the world with an assemblage of that which is truly one's own. To create a new moral self is to create a self that is willing to undo the old self in many respects.'[7] This is the first step, which makes possible the others—we must first bracket what we have been (made) in order to make ourselves freely. To do so requires forgetting what has been done to us. The Cynics model an exemplary form of this forgetting—the first moment of transvaluation, which subverts dominant social conventions and shows them to be untenable, irrational, inconsistent, failures (the negative moment of Cynic critique). For instance, consider Diogenes' response to the person who reminded him of his past, that he was just an exiled counterfeiter from the semi-barbaric Pontus: 'That was how I became a philosopher' (D.L. VI.49). Suffering exile is forgotten and replaced by a proto-evocation of *felix culpa*. The loss of national identity is affirmed as a precondition for becoming a philosopher and for inhabiting the 'cosmos'.

The sentence of exile imposed upon Diogenes by the Sinopeans is transvalued into his sentence on them—exiled by them, he becomes a philosopher; being a philosopher he condemns them to staying at home in Sinope. In other words, Diogenes 'forgets' his national identity in order to achieve a superior identity—that of the cosmopolitan philosopher—while those who see his statelessness as a reproach mistake their own myopia for his indignity. Consider the similar moment in the life of Antisthenes. Being asked what learning is the most necessary, he replied, 'How to get rid of having anything to unlearn' (*to periairein…to apomanthanein*) (D.L. VI.7).

Unlearning connotes an active process of casting off one's uncritically accepted conventional cultural baggage, a necessary propaedeutic for beginning to genuinely learn anything at all. One clear example of this is the Cynic tradition of the master requiring a prospective pupil to engage in activities conventionally deemed shameful, though not on any natural or rational grounds. For instance,

carrying a fish or a piece of cheese around in public, or answering a pupil's initial request for instruction by brandishing a staff in his or her direction. Conventionally, it is shameful to carry around foodstuffs in public (as though one were a servant, and with the obtrusive smells of the items in question assailing the dignified noses of one's peers) and shameful to be insulted by an 'inferior', especially by someone who has every outward appearance of an impoverished beggar. Yet it is paramount that one 'unlearn'—that is 'forget'—these conventional notions of shame, not to become as shameless as a dog, as those with too casual and polemical an understanding of Cynicism would have it, but rather truly to understand what one *should* be ashamed of, namely one's uncritically accepted belief in the propriety of certain standard forms of conduct. Likewise, one must comprehend one's conventional attempts to 'fit in' with what is traditionally expected of one based on one's fixed place within an irrational social hierarchy.

The second feature of contemporary cosmopolitanism is 'moral maturity'—taking up responsibility for authoring one's own self, which Hill characterizes as 'a weaned identity.'[8] In Kantian terms, this would be *Mündigkeit*, or 'maturity' in the sense of being able to reason consistently for oneself and engage in spirited debate with others, without dependence on the authority of 'guardians' (teachers, parents, officials, etc.). For the Cynics the correlate term is *autarkeia*, self-sufficiency as freedom from dependence on others. Being free from dependence on others does not mean being free from their influence or from engaging with them in various kinds of dialogue or struggle. Rather, it means freely relating to others, responding to them from a position that cannot be compelled to act otherwise than reason, human nature, suggests.

In characterizing moral maturity as a 'weaned identity,'[9] Hill draws attention to that from which moral maturity must depart: the teat of uncritically accepted social conventions that one need merely reflect rather than think through and truly, autonomously, make one's own. Diogenes first weans himself, and then also seeks to wean others. Over and over again he engages with others to show them that their uncritical acceptance of social conventions is untenable, is riven by

contradiction, requires the suppression of reason, requires us to 'not think too much' about what it is we are doing and why. He thus aims to make those he meets morally mature, to free them from their tutelage to various authorities, whether famous philosophers, tyrants, religious institutions and officials, or politicians. More than this, though, an ancient Cynic such as Diogenes, on my reading, is also a paradigm for what Hill describes as the 'creative agency'[10] that underlies moral maturity, where it is not just a matter of being able to reason for oneself and take responsibility for one's decisions but also of re-imagining and re-inventing the static self that has been imposed upon one by social conventions and historical baggage, turning it into one's own artful work.

As we will see, the ancient Cynics' creative agency involves not merely re-imagining culturally inherited and oppressively cumbersome identities predicated upon the exclusion of others but of transvaluating, and redeeming, such traditions with an adversarial political praxis that carries on a kind of immanent critique pioneered by Socrates, in which traditional values are simultaneously inhabited, made one's own, and not merely transformed, made other than they were initially, but in fact revolutionized and thus brought 'full circle' back to what they were supposed to be all along.

The Problem of the Sources and the Articulation of a Novel Approach

A spectre haunts the interpretation of ancient Cynicism: the spectre of historical veracity. What we have of Cynic philosophy is gleaned from a tradition that simultaneously preserves and distorts it. There are few primary texts from Cynics themselves that are extant and even what we have on this score is by no means the best of the ancient Cynics. The poetry of Cercidas and the diatribes of Teles[11] represent some of the earliest primary materials. While interesting, even they already take shape in the post-Antisthenes, post-Diogenes era when ancient Cynicism is already a contested legacy, being appropriated by emergent Stoicism, and in dialogue with Aristotle and his followers. The philosophy of the dogs (*kynes*) is already a bone of contention amongst the various heirs of Socrates and the proliferation of Greek schools in

the Hellenistic era. To illustrate what I mean by the 'problem' of the sources let us consider two important discussions regarding the fragmentary state of the sources and the complex literary nature of much of what remains, whether 'original' texts or later recapitulations of Cynic ideas and themes by sympathetic, neutral, and hostile sources. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé note that since the Cynic sources are mostly biographical, compilations of anecdotes and apophthegmata, and since these collections are much later than their original subjects, a 'cautious approach' is warranted, 'since nothing guarantees the historicity of the tradition.'[12]

As we will see below with Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting,[13] though, and as becomes clear in further remarks by Branham and Goulet-Cazé, [14] this historical unreliability does not mean interpretation of the philosophical significance of ancient Cynicism is impossible. In fact, the problem turns out to be not so much one of acknowledging the difficulty of accessing a historically veracious account of ancient Cynicism as it is of wading through and sorting out the contested legacy of ancient Cynicism, in which the 'original' version is only ever refracted through a variety of lenses, some sympathetic, some neutral, many hostile. The figure of Diogenes 'is…always already in the process of reception.'[15] There is no direct access to his works, and anytime we read anything about them we are reading it from a source that has received the legacy in a certain way.

The different receptive-interpretative options range from 'idealization of the tradition… to selective reinterpretation and appropriation… to satiric denunciation… and overt suppression.'[16] It should also be noted, and is further complicating, that the example Branham and Goulet-Cazé give for satiric denunciation (Lucian) can also be cited as a source of 'idealization of the tradition', as he is the author not merely of *Peregrinus Proteus* but also of *Demonax* (negative and praiseful portrayals of Cynicism). Thus some sources cannot even be categorized into one of these three types but are instead profoundly ambivalent. These factors lead them to conclude that 'The study of Cynicism…is inseparable from the study of its reception.'[17] Because so many different ancient authors and partisan groups appropriated and

interpreted Cynic material and re-presented it in a variety of contexts, according to 'their own social and intellectual trajectories…we should resist the temptation to reduce these many individual acts of reception to a single structure or pattern.'[18] In other words, what we have is a kind of *poikilos* mosaic that would be flattened out and made drab if we forcefully abstract a single essence or pattern to Cynic philosophy. On my view, we should embrace this messiness and accept it, acknowledging the variety of interests behind Cynic appropriations and re-presentations, its historical opacity, while nonetheless seeking out its philosophical significance—a significance that is not reducible to any one 'structure' or 'pattern.'

The reading of the Cynics attempted here, part of a much larger project,[19] lays some of the groundwork for interpreting them as prototypical figures engaged in what Horkheimer and Adorno call the 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'. Niehues-Pröbsting provides support for this reading when, discussing the reception of the Cynics in modernity, he argues that

> in Cynicism, folly is not a contingent moment, but a consequence of reason itself, the consequence of the excesses of reason. Cynic folly is the dark and seamy side of reason. In Cynicism, the Enlightenment discovers the danger of reason being perverted, reason turning into irrationality and madness, reason being frustrated because of its own far too exalted expectations. The Enlightenment becomes aware of this menace to itself through its affinity with Cynicism. The reflection on Cynicism provides a necessary piece of self-recognition and self-criticism. Consequently the failure of the Enlightenment—or of one part of it—leads to cynicism in the modern sense of the word. 'Cynicism is *enlightened false consciousness.*"[20]

On such a reading, the Cynics can be seen to be working through the *Bann* ('spell')[21] of Enlightenment reason which consists of the construction of a perfect society founded on the immiseration and psychological mutilation of the vast majority of its members: equally,

the reasoned attempt to articulate ethical ways of life promising individual flourishing despite a systemically unjust socioeconomic order. These options are offered as though one could live on one's very own island of the blessed in the midst of a war zone: they unwittingly engender the very opposite of that which is intended—Plato's *kallipolis* a totalitarian noocracy, Aristotle's elitist 'golf club',[22] neither is a place where most human beings would realize their potential since most would be reduced to mere means, 'human resources', for the lives of their 'superiors'. In contrast, the Cynics attempt to restore what has been excluded from traditional political life to its rightful place as genuine and precious part of such a life, they bring each excluded element back from its suffered marginalization. Thus women, slaves, workers, barbarians, resident aliens (even children and animals, perhaps) will all be essential active parts of a shared flourishing life rather than relegated to mere supports or props for their elite male overlords. They are human beings, too. And the promise of political life was the common and mutual flourishing of the political animal—the human being, not a small subset of males drawn from and exalted over the human race.

According to Niehues-Pröbsting the problem of Cynic sources is not so much their fragmentary nature as it is their literary form. This is because what the tradition has preserved is for the most part stories of what particular Cynics did or said at some time. It is not just the case that anecdotes and apophthegmata 'are the most significant media of Cynic tradition,' they are also 'the literary forms *most suitable* to Cynicism and its representation.'[23] In other words, it is no accident, or at the very least need not be interpreted as an accident, that what we primarily have in the case of the Cynics are anecdotes and apophthegmata rather than a random sampling of the works one finds listed at the ends of their respective lives in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, but rather it is the case that there is something essential about Cynic philosophy that only a non-systematic, non-treatise literary form can provide and facilitate. This anecdotal tradition regarding the Cynics was quite influential for the Western tradition until it was undermined in the modern era, first by Pierre

Bayle and like-minded proto-Enlightenment encyclopediasts by means of historical criticism, according to which much of the preserved anecdotal tradition is historically spurious, later additions that cannot be traced to their putative original sources,[24] and then by Hegel and his followers, who faulted Cynicism for its non-systematic character.

This concern still animates contemporary scholarship to the extent to which one is concerned with identifying what can be attributed with historical veracity to the historical Diogenes and what cannot be, or more generally with identifying that which is authentically of the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. and that which in all likelihood are latter additions and modifications. More broadly, if one considers the whole of ancient Cynicism, a question is raised with what belongs properly and in a historically plausible way to antiquity and what reflects a late-antique Christian appropriation that is then carried on all the way through the Renaissance and into modernity, culminating in the significant influence of the reception of Cynicism upon the Enlightenment. One here sifts through the various texts and rules in or out this or that anecdote or apophthegma on the basis of its perceived connection to the 'real' Cynicism of ancient Greece (and perhaps its extension into the Roman era, through Lucian, Julian, and the Church Fathers). What we see here is the culling of the tradition in favour of an accurate historical representation of ancient Cynicism, which, as Niehues-Pröbsting acutely notes, fails to recognize 'that the value of an anecdote—its philosophical and moral meaning—does not necessarily depend on its historical truth.'[25]

What I am after in my reading on the Cynics is precisely this—'its philosophical and moral meaning'—rather than historical veracity. This does not mean that the historical context of ancient Cynicism, and its relation to other contemporaneous philosophical schools, should be willfully ignored or that one should never point to historical conditions as illuminating an understanding of a given passage or text in question. It is rather a case of not looking to such conditions for the final answer, or for the conclusive import, of Cynic thought. For instance, the emergence of ancient Cynicism is clearly connected with the well-known 'decline of the polis'. One could view ancient Cynicism as a

valid, or perhaps hysterical, reaction to such a state of affairs. However, at best this would merely curate ancient Cynicism as one more museum piece in the antiquities section of the history of ideas—alongside exhibits on other Hellenistic schools.

In contrast, I am trying to identify the philosophical significance of their work for those of us today that still take ourselves to be heirs of the Enlightenment project of constructing a world in which reason and peace prevail over unreason and war, in which national differences are overcome by a cosmopolitics that preserves those differences while negating them as pretext and motive for violent conflict. Whether this or that particular anecdote or saying is historically accurate is of concern for classicists and historians, for purposes of classification and for a better understanding of various historical periods.

On my reading, though, even the fabricated stories are worth reading as ciphers for the philosophical and moral meaning of ancient Cynicism. For one thing, they often present a 'likely story' (*eikos mythos*) that may as well be true even if it in fact is not. Not unlike Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides, they present us with a reasonable approximation—and an inventive one—perhaps even 'better' than the original in some cases. Also, they point to the fact that in cases of transmitting a tradition what matters most is not literal accuracy and careful bookkeeping but rather the preservation of its ethos by means of dynamically creative re-invention: if the Cynics, like Socrates, were primarily oral philosophers, if even their supposed writings were amusing pastimes that did not forthrightly reveal their actual views (like Plato, perhaps), then asking what they really did or said at some time and what was a later fabrication or embellishment is akin to asking what the historically accurate version of the *Iliad* or the *Nostoi* were, since we cannot trust Homer to give us a faithful portrait.

The second and even worse undermining of the Cynic tradition was carried out by Hegel and his followers who dismissed the Cynics, and all literary non-systematic philosophy, as not in fact truly philosophical. The history of philosophy, on this view, is a history of systematic theories or at least of theories that aspire to systematicity,

to explaining the totality of that which is. According to this line of thought, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, make the grade but the Cynics do not. Since the material on them is inextricably entwined with their biographies, indeed, with their way of life, with their philosophy *as* a way of life, it is on this view philosophically irrelevant, of interest only to historians, or if at all to historians of philosophy then only insofar as it reflects and sheds light on other 'real' philosophical schools, such as the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Stoa.

Niehues-Pröbsting perceptively points out that the reception of Cynicism in modernity has taken place largely outside of these historicizing and systematizing-classificatory schemas, occurring '…in the conscious imitation of particular Cynic gestures, in the avowal of Cynic maxims and attitudes, in the literary relation to Cynic motifs and the figure of the Cynic, in the use of this figure as one of projection and identification.'[26] Ultimately, in the larger project of which this essay is but one part, I hope to trace as well the Cynic reception in modernity, as prototypical figures for the dialectic of enlightenment, as carrying out an auto-critique of the Greek enlightenment that prefigures the later critique of the Enlightenment inaugurated by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud and extended by the Frankfurt School. Hence I am not so much interested in presenting a historically verifiable version of ancient Cynicism that has been reduced to an extreme Socraticism. Rather, I want to trace the archetype of a certain kind of critical response to the Enlightenment project of a rationally ordered society in which human beings would realize their full rational potential and live flourishing lives. I thus read Diogenes and his *Politeia* as a significant critique of the failures of Platonic and Aristotelian attempts to construct ideal political communities, prefiguring later critiques of bourgeois democracy and even late capitalism.

Ancient Context for Cynic Cosmopolitanism

The Cynic cosmopolis is openly inclusivist, even universalist, with room for women, slaves, workers, while the designations 'barbarian' and 'resident alien' cease to exist as meaningful characterizations of human beings in the context of a polis as wide as the cosmos. It thus

prefigures Immanuel Kant's Fifth Thesis, from his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective*, that '*The greatest problem for the human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement of a civil society which administers right universally.*'[27] Two things are worth noting in this thesis specifically with regard to a Cynic connection: the claim that 'nature' is what impels human beings toward the accomplishment of a cosmopolitan community and that such a community is 'universal'. The claim concerning nature ought to be read in the light of the Cynic conception of a life *kata phusin* ('according to nature').

According to one ancient summary of Diogenes' views, 'instead of useless works human beings should choose works according to nature so as to live happily' (D.L. VI.71). As we will see below, to live according to nature does not mean to renounce human rationality and live like an animal but rather to hold nature and social convention in a critical opposition so that the latter makes good on its claim of being a refined version of the former. Another way to put this is to see that for the Cynics, as for Aristotle, human beings are rational animals—though the Cynics never lose sight of human animality and its demands such that they would idealize human essence as a kind of disembodied, or de-materialized, operation of intellect.

Rather, and this also separates them from Kant, the human body and its animal needs are not a hindrance to or so much encumbrance on the human intellect. Proper care for the human body, and its exercise, is given its place as co-constitutive of human happiness rather than an uncomfortable and perhaps embarrassing *factum brutum*.[28] The significance of 'universal' in Kant's thesis echoes the radical meaning of cosmopolitanism: a universal political community, a community without borders in which no one is left out. While it is possible, though quite difficult, to find the kernel of a concept of a universal political community in certain passages of Aristotle's *Politics*,[29] what I hope to show here is that the Cynics are the real source of the cosmopolitan project, and that their ancient cosmopolis is not merely something crude and unformed, not merely a parody of its precedents (such as Plato's ideal polis in the *Republic*), but rather offers a number of positive

features that link it to what are often thought of as distinctly modern and even contemporary cosmopolitan concerns.

The Cynics are often taken to reject the polis outright, a view that will be critiqued below. However, their 'rejection' of the polis is actually made for the sake of the polis. The Cynics simultaneously inhabit and withdraw from the midst of the polis and have a concern for its fringes that carries on a Socratic politics of publicly confronting and interrogating authorities and their claims to legitimacy. At the same time, they approach each fellow human being as a brother or sister in order to test their commitment to virtue, and thus their progress toward fulfillment of human nature in rational activity, i.e., their progress toward the happiness that is their natural end. While the general inclination has been to read the Cynics as rejecting social conventions, traditional beliefs, and politics, we shall, like Diogenes enter the theatre as everyone left it,[30] run against the current and read them as in fact seeking to redeem values, by restoring to them the value they have lost in their failure to live up to their promise. Though indebted to the work of nineteenth century German scholarship, and more recent work in Germany and the United States, what follows is an original attempt to develop a clearer and more detailed understanding of the Cynic contribution to ancient political thought.[31]

In what follows a Cynic politics will be articulated that will show them not to be merely negators, mere critics of existing social conventions, but rather at the same time espousers of a positive conception of both political practice and of a better social order that can be realized by human action and is practicable. In the first place, a couple of remarks on Cynic political methodology will be made, situating their political thought and practice within the Socratic tradition, while also noting how crucial it is to understand the purpose of their hyperbolic mode of expression so that we do not misunderstand them to be advocating an extremism virtually impossible on any general or universal scale.

Next, an outline of their politics will be ventured in which both negative and positive moments will be treated. Having argued against a

merely negative conception of Cynic cosmopolitanism, a discussion of the essential features that would characterize a positive Cynic cosmopolis will be presented. Cynic views of labor, economic organization, equality of the sexes, sexual relations, freedom, and redemption of the excluded, their proposed inclusion and integration of all human beings within a cosmopolis where everyone has a valued place will be delineated and analyzed. Throughout, points of intersection and agreement with the Socrates of both Plato and Xenophon, as well as Aristotle's ideal polis and political thought more generally, will be emphasized while critical differences will also be noted and serve to sharpen understanding of the Cynics on politics, while tracing some of the ways in which they follow from a Socratic precedent. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of the Cynic cosmopolitan legacy for modern and contemporary cosmopolitan projects.

The Cynics as Inheritors of Socrates' Art of True Politics

In Plato's *Gorgias* Socrates famously characterizes his philosophical practice of engaging others in conversation and subjecting their views to critical evaluation as 'an attempt at the art of true politics.'[32] Already in this seemingly absurd characterization of private conversations as the realm for true political practice there lies a proto-Cynical transvaluation of values. Socrates is affirming that what would have been considered *idiōtikē* or 'private' is in fact *politikē* or 'public, political' (while what conventionally passes for *politikē* is *rhētorikē* or rhetoric, hence actually *oudemia* or nothing at all, a mere *tribē* or pastime, a kind of *kolakeia* or flattery).[33] To understand more clearly what Socrates has in mind we must look to his own clear and concise description of this 'true art of politics' in the *Apology*. This political practice consists of going around and engaging others, shaming them for naked pursuit of wealth and status and reminding them that virtue or excellence is not merely more important but fundamental for human happiness—all the wealth, power, and status in the world is worthless without it. Those who protest that they in fact

do care for their virtue are questioned and tested to see if they are sincere: if so, they are released; if not, they are reproached.[34]

This practice is thoroughly and yet unconventionally political in its use of *parrhēsia*, an Athenian political right, outside the confines of the *ekklēsia* and in private conversations with others. Yet, these 'private' conversations were most often conducted in very public settings, in the *agora* and in *gymnasia*, thus blurring the lines between the private and public (and yet not being another traditional form of *parrhēsia*, privileged speech between equals behind closed doors).[35] Socrates adduces his voluntary poverty as proof of his divine mission, noting that instead of tending to his own household affairs he instead 'always does your business, going to each of you privately, as a father or an older brother might do, persuading you to care for virtue'.[36]

The 'true political art' practiced by Socrates consists of interrogating others who neglect virtue to pursue wealth and status, of reproaching them and attempting to turn them toward the pursuit of virtue instead. And this is the 'true' art of politics because it aims to accomplish what traditional politics, with its dispensation of offices and redistribution of wealth, has promised but failed to accomplish: the actual happiness, the flourishing of human beings living together within the political community. Socrates is condemned to death for this practice and before being led away curses those who have condemned him:

> I affirm, you men who condemned me to death, that vengeance will come upon you right after my death, and much harsher, by Zeus, than the sort you give me by killing me. For you have done this deed supposing that you will be released from giving an account of your life, but it will turn out much the opposite for you, as I affirm. There will be more who will refute you, whom I have been holding back; you did not perceive them. And they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more indignant. For if you suppose that by killing human beings you will prevent someone from reproaching you for not

> living correctly, you do not think nobly. For that kind of release is not at all possible or noble; rather the kind that is both noblest and easiest is not to restrain others, but to equip oneself to be the best possible. So, having divined these things for you who voted against me, I am released. Apol. 39c-d (Trans. by West)

These others whom Socrates has held back, younger and harsher, who carry out his vengeance on the Athenians, are none other than the Cynics. Indeed, it is Socrates' younger and close associate, Antisthenes, traditionally considered the founder of Cynicism,[37] who later drove Anytus out of Athens and saw that Meletus paid for his frivolous accusations with his life.[38] He certainly could not be referring to his other followers, none of whom carried out Socrates' practice of confronting and reproaching others for neglecting virtue in this direct, agitating manner. Having been condemned to death Socrates sets his pack of Cynics, initially Antisthenes and other unnamed associates,[39] loose upon the Athenians to continue his 'true political art' of reforming the lives and priorities of those around them, though the Cynics, being harsher, are not so much estranged insiders in the manner of Socrates and his wealthy fellow-travelers (such as Plato or Aristippus) but rather militant agitators and even revolutionaries, seeking to fundamentally challenge and transform the social and political life Socrates was content to simply unsettle and question from within, with his characteristic civility and nearly inscrutable irony.

One final Socratic key for interpretation of Cynic cosmopolitanism is to be found in Plato's 'Digression' in the *Theaetetus*, especially the critique of the wealthy and of nobility (174e-175b), where the philosopher's 'cosmic perspective' sees through the pettiness and small-mindedness of conventional distinctions involving wealth-based status and the purity of bloodlines. It must be emphasized that this 'cosmic perspective' is not merely a superior perspective compared to those 'stuck' on the 'ground level', as it were. Rather, seeing things from this perspective is seeing them as they *truly* are—the distance allows us to regard them soberly rather than mistake them from our too-close proximity as we stumble along myopically within the

quotidian. Consider two of Socrates' examples there: the most extensive landowners still possess plots of land that are the equivalent of a drop of water in the ocean, when viewed from the cosmic perspective, and thus their pretension to be 'great' on this basis is ridiculous, while those who claim a noble bloodline on the basis of a certain number of noble ancestors or by tracing their lineage back to some exalted demigod are again guilty of myopia—they stop at the ancestor that fulfills their pretentious claim while ignoring the fact that if one merely looks further back one inevitably finds a base ancestor. As Socrates puts it, 'every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks' (175a). Here we begin to see the rudiments of the Cynic cosmopolitan attempt to conceive of a universal political community on the basis of shared *human* kinship that overcomes provincial and short-sighted exclusionary prejudices.

Cynic Hyperbolism, or How Wrong Life Can Be Lived Rightly

Aristotle, in Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, defines virtue as a mean between extremes that is not invariable and inflexible, nothing objective out there in the world independent of us but rather always a 'mean relative to us (*to* [*meson*] *de pros hēmas*)' (NE II.6, 1106a35-1106b1). This follows an earlier claim, which is another variant of a recurring motif, that

> …matters of conduct and expediency have nothing fixed or invariable about them, any more than have matters of health. And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still less is exact precision possible in dealing with particular cases of conduct.' (NE II.2, 1104a4-7)

Aristotle's conception of virtue as a situation-specific mean between extremes,[40] always to be determined by *phronēsis* within a concrete set of circumstances, entails extreme difficulty in hitting the mark. Indeed, this extreme difficulty and its rare accomplishment is in tension with his claim that such virtuous action is the natural end of human life, given that nature as principle describes the goal to be accomplished

always or for the most part by beings with a principle of motion within themselves, including living beings and including the human being. However, Aristotle offers some practical advice, tips for target practice, as it were: (1) In aiming at the mean we should err toward the extreme that is less vicious (i.e., err on the side of caution, with the 'lesser evil' resulting if we miss the mark); (2) we should tend exaggeratedly toward those vices to which we are disinclined in order to hit the mean (overcorrect to offset our existing bad habits); and, finally, (3) we must be extremely guarded in relation to pleasures to avoid being pulled wide of the mark by them. These three practical bits of advice all reveal that in extreme situations extreme measures may be necessary to avoid the extremes that are vice and to successfully achieve the mean that is virtue. If we are navigating a narrow path it is better to go astray in the less bad way, if we are struggling against an already existing vicious inclination it is better to exaggerate our conduct toward the opposite vice, and if the alluring seduction of pleasure beguiles it is better to be overly austere than to indulge ourselves. Since virtuous action is a moving target and circumstances are constantly changing,[41] there are many situations in which deliberately overshooting the mark is in fact advisable.

The Cynics practice an art of deliberately overshooting the mark, which in what follows will be characterized as hyperbolicism. Diogenes decides to live in a barrel when the building of his cottage is delayed,[42] he throws away his cup when he sees a child drinking water from its cupped hands,[43] he rolls around in hot sand during the summer and embraces snow-covered statues in the winter,[44] he enters the theatre as the audience is exiting,[45] and so forth. Any one of these actions could well seem a bit extreme and yet each can also be seen as a deliberate and studied attempt to overshoot the mark so as to hit it, to make adjustments for the wind and weather, so to speak, of vicious inclination become predominant. This is particularly clear if we recognize that these actions are not a universal prescription for humanity much less the expression of an inflexible and consistent principle on the part of the Cynic but rather are situation-specific attempts to respond to the extreme conditions of life in 4th century

Greece, in which the polis, the traditional political community, was disintegrating and being supplanted by Macedonian imperialism. Extreme political and economic instability called for a correspondingly extreme ethical practice if the individual was to hope to still find happiness amidst the ruins of a dying order. Yet, far from thus reducing Cynicism to a historically appropriate response to a historically specific situation we can also take from this the outlines of a theory and praxis of resistance to political and economic instability more generally, as the prototype for satiric criticism and radical agitation that motivates outrage at socioeconomic injustices. In other words, perhaps a universal lesson is to be derived from the particular case study. The attempt to imagine and to actually in some sense institute a universal political community, a cosmopolis, responds to particular crises by attempting to overcome the partisanship of the particular. To overcome 4th century Greek instability a universal human community is required, and as with Socrates' earlier remarks here too we note that existing exclusionary practices are to be confronted with a politics of inclusion, of making room for those left out and giving them a place 'at the table'.

In her discussion of the growing employment of mercenaries during the 4th century, Nancy Demand points out that as small farmers were undermined by constant warfare ravaging their land, and as they lacked the necessary financial means to rebuild during the fragile periods of peace, concentration of land into the hands of a wealthy few became more prevalent. The smaller farmers 'sold out' to the opportunistic rich, and then flooded the cities looking for work. Demand notes that:

> Thus the poor filled the cities, the wealthy accumulated larger and larger estates, and the gulf between the rich and the poor grew. Constant civil strife brought exile and loss of property to large numbers of even the wealthiest, transforming men overnight from respectable landowners into wandering, homeless exiles. Tens of thousands of such homeless and destitute men roamed about Greece, often endangering the settled population.[46]

G.E.M. de Ste. Croix puts the matter more bluntly: 'In the political sphere, democracy barely held its own in the fourth century, and in many cities outside Athens the class warfare which had already become widespread in the last quarter of the fifth century became more acute.'[47] Meanwhile in philosophy at this time we find a series of attempts to imagine a perfectly just political community,[48] such as Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's 'practicable utopia' of Books VII and VII of the *Politics*, both of which remain extant, whereas their Cynic and later Stoic analogues are lost, with only meager fragments preserved.

The significance of the decline of the polis for the elaboration of Cynic cosmopolitanism is often remarked upon. I.M. Nakhov argues that 'The historical significance and function of Cynic cosmopolitanism' emerges from out of the historical, political and economic context of the disintegrating polis of the 4th century, in the wake of the Peloponnesian War and on the verge of submergence into Macedonian hegemony. As Nakhov puts it,

> Neither slaves nor metics, the emancipated and the very poor who had lost their worldly possessions in the war, who had to suffer hunger and illness and wander from place to place in their search for sustenance, recognized fervent patriotism. Restricted in the exercise of their human and civil rights they saw the world as a vale of tears, as an arena in the struggle for survival, in which harsh labor and suffering were their lot. Indeed, it is in fact not even important in which land one suffered all of that and from where one's forefathers came. The Cynics gave expression to the sentiment of these classes of people and with the radicalism peculiar to them repudiated civil rights in every polis, whether or not it was their native city. Cynicism condemned the existing state in every present form—be it democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic or tyrannical.'[49]

While condemning every existing political community, and thus perhaps seeming entirely negative and impossibly exaggerated in their

hostility to existing regimes we must not overlook the fact that the Cynics lived within these imperfect existing states and sought to reform and transform them from the inside, and offered, as we will see below, a number of positive proposals as well as a positive conception of a much more inclusive and rational form of political association that would take the place of what they were condemning. Nakhov's suggestion that 'This [Cynic] critique [of the polis] did not in the least spring from the wish to make anything better'[50] is thus uncharitable in its assumption that radical and thoroughgoing critique must be entirely negative, destructive, perhaps even nihilistic. This is particularly disappointing given Nakhov's sensitivity to the social and economic background of the emergence of Cynicism. On my reading, in contrast, the Cynics simply recognize that if one wishes to make anything better one must always start from a proper and thorough understanding of just what, and how very much, is wrong in the first place. The Cynic acknowledges this, makes it manifest and renders it palpable, and seeks to get others to do so as well in the hopes of motivating radical social and political transformation, and certainly has a conception of what a well-functioning and flourishing human life looks like, at least in outline, even if this presents at times an all too negative outline, imagined from out of the depths of current injustices and malformations.

We should beware of overstating Cynic hyperbolicism, of reading it too literally and viewing it as posing a model for human life that is too difficult and primitive to ever win wide support or even be plausible for most human beings. On the one hand, the Cynic way of life responded to the real dangers besetting most human beings in their time: exile, impoverishment, hunger, homelessness, and enslavement. On the other hand, Diogenes is quite clear that he does not want others to imitate him or live his way of life: 'He used to say that he followed the example of the trainers of choruses; for they too set the note a little high, to ensure that the rest should hit the right note (D.L. VI.35). It is crucial when interpreting the Cynics to always understand in advance that they are deliberately 'setting the note a little high' (and sometimes more than a little) in order that others, less able or willing to go to

such extremes, will hit the right note. Cynic hyperbolicism, like Aristotle's practical advice for hitting the mean in adverse conditions, is deliberate overshooting of the mark for the sake of hitting the mark. This alone, to say nothing of the often polemic or Stoicizing tendency of the sources, requires careful attention, heeding the nuances and the goal (*telos*) that Cynic elegant simplicity (*euteleia*) is aiming to reach so that we do not miss the mark in our interpretation and take them to be absurd or pathological extremists who were simply vain attention-seekers or even nihilists.

Cynic Politics as Negative Task: Ideology Critique and Militant Agitation

In turning to a consideration of Cynic politics it is first necessary to clearly understand the polysemy of the oracle received by Diogenes so that we can grasp both the negative and positive aspects of Cynic political-philosophical views and practice. According to Julian, the oracle commanded Diogenes *paracharaxon to nomisma* or 'transvaluate the values' (*To the Uneducated Cynics*, VIII). The first ambiguity to confront is the double-meaning of *nomisma*, meaning both 'currency' and 'current values' or 'customary beliefs'. The second ambiguity concerns the imperative form of the verb *paracharattein* or 'to transvaluate', which, as Nieheus-Pröbsting has pointed out,[51] can mean to alter a stamp used to mint coins, to re-stamp coins already stamped, or finally to use a fabricated stamp to mint base metal into coins. William Desmond ignores all three of these possibilities and asserts a fourth one exclusively: 'putting the coin (*nomisma*) of custom (*nomos*) out of circulation.'[52] More precisely, this is actually a version of option two, where one re-stamps already minted coins in such a way as to de-legitimize their usage and render them worthless, something like blotting out the serial numbers and seals on a piece of paper currency. Is Cynic transvaluation simply a rendering inoperable of traditional values? There are good reasons for rejecting such a thesis.[53] On my reading, Cynic transvaluation seeks to redeem existing values by subjecting them to an immanent critique that reveals their present inadequacy in order to motivate us to remake them into what they are supposed to be, i.e., adequate.

Leaving aside the stories told about the historical Diogenes as either a counterfeiter or an assistant of his father, Hicesias, who was a counterfeiter, the philosophical significance of the oracle hinges on just what 'transvaluating' the 'current values' amounts to when thought through the metaphor of minting coins. Following Nieheus-Pröbsting, the philosophical practice intended is clearly one of re-stamping coins already stamped, 'transvalution' of (already existing) 'values', which has a Nietzschean ring because Nietzsche appropriated the Cynic oracle for his own purposes in his later work. Diogenes re-stamps traditional values with new values, replaces an outmoded or inadequate traditional view with a new view better suited for the present, based on careful observation of the various phenomena in question, with careful attention to embodiment and material exigencies. Negatively, this consists in showing how and why current values are inadequate and in fact no longer truly current while at the same time, positively, replacing them with something better and more accurate that appropriately fits the situation at hand. At a deeper level, which must left aside here,[54] this reflects a more basic mission of showing how discrete and diverse phenomena are not simply subsumed into their concepts, are in fact often incongruous when thought in the light of the concepts supposedly explaining them.

But why, one might ask, do currently accepted values require transvaluation from the Cynic in the first place? The answer can be seen from another consideration of the Cynic relation to Socrates and the Socratic true political art. According to Niehueus-Pröbsting, for Socrates, 'active politics' aiming at the common good is renounced in favour of 'an indirect path of concerning himself with affairs of the state that consists of testing and advising individual citizens on an individual basis, but not the assembly of citizens as a political organ.'[55] However, 'the indirect path' Socrates charts is in fact not inactive (in the sense of being merely a private affair) in contrast to a traditional publicly active political role but rather a Socratic transvaluation of the political task itself and a carrying out of that task in a *new* way that is the *only* way still genuinely possible under the deteriorating conditions of Athenian political life in the late fifth and early fourth century.[56] Socrates, after

all, is nothing if not active, and to his enemies is a meddling busybody. The Cynics carry on his oblique and yet active true politics.

Nieheus-Pröbsting argues that Socrates navigates a middle position between the utter estrangement of an Aristippus and the political engagement of an Alcibiades or a Nicias. This middle position of simultaneous political engagement that is indirect and yet distanced from, outside of, traditional channels, is nonetheless still political since like a statesman, Socrates 'attempts to realize once more the unity of individual self-preservation and the common good.'[57] The Cynics, in contrast, tend a little more toward utter estrangement but only because in the interim, and with the death of Socrates, it became clear that it was no longer possible for a citizen to practice true politics: thus Plato moved his school outside the city and Aristotle followed suit, the latter even leaving Athens near the end of his life because 'he did not wish the Athenians to sin twice against philosophy' (Ael. VH III.36). The failure of Athens' radical democracy to nurture genuine *parrhēsia* in the assembly, its displacement by rhetoric and demagoguery,[58] meant that philosophers like Socrates and Diogenes had to practice it para-politically, outside of and along the fringes of its traditional setting in the assembly, in places like the *agora* but also in the Piraeus and on the outskirts of town. And they did this for the sake of the common good yet without losing their lives in the process. In other words, the only place where politics could be carried out, where the common good had any hope of still being accomplished, was away from the site of its corruption, and in a new transvaluated practice that made it supremely political to engage one or a few at a time in open and free, fearless conversation for the sake of the well-being of their souls, rather than to address crowds for the sake of applause and votes.

For the Cynics, Heinrich Gomperz notes, '[Reason] should ground theoretically the same transvaluation that is to be practically realized.'[59] This of course does not mean that reason reveals that everything human beings are presently doing is simply vanity but rather it finds the true value already concealed, suppressed, denigrated, within social life and restores it or 're-valuates' it to prominence, i.e., redeems value. Thus the practical realization is not active nihilism or

impossible utopianism but an attempt to work out from within a fundamental transformation of social life that returns it to its task of accomplishing the flourishing life of a community of rational animals. Diogenes, we are told, 'Claimed to oppose [*antitithenai*] daring to fortune, nature to convention, and reason to suffering [*pathei*]' (D.L. VI.38). This is sometimes taken to mean that Diogenes champions or advocates each of the latter terms, exalting them over the former and replacing the former with the latter as his transvaluative practice. However, the verb *antitithenai* should give us pause, for it does not mean to set above but, in its radical sense, to set (*tithenai*) in contrast (*anti*).

What Diogenes in fact does is to hold the two terms of each relation open in opposition to each other, using each to critique the other and playing each off the other in order to do justice to each. Daring only makes sense if fortune really is something menacing, and the Cynic would hardly be heroic if he or she had managed to master fortune and then went about dominating it at every turn. Fortune and daring give meaning to each other in an opposition that must permanently be held open, with each new turn of fortune menacing even the most intrepid agent while remaining open to daring, capable of being navigated though it may require the cunning of Odysseus. Likewise, and more importantly for the political context, nature is not exalted over convention nor is reason simply exalted over suffering. Rather, nature is used as a critical model for the interrogation of the rationality of convention while reason is opposed to suffering so that suffering is allowed to 'speak' (*legein*) and disclose its plea (*logos*). Reason discovers either the meaning of suffering, that which was ignored at our peril, or, if it has no meaning, is brute subjection to violence, discovers this and seeks a way to overcome it by learning to listen to its plea. Convention is criticized when it deviates from nature not so that nature might replace it, something impossible for human beings as *rational* animals, but rather so that nature can inform the transformation of social conventions that are at present contraventions of rational human nature.

Thus, uncritically accepted social conventions, beliefs and practices, that have not been subjected to nature as a critical model, that have not been criticized and tested for their truth, are sometimes referred to by Cynics as *typhos* or 'smoke' (=ideology). *Nomisma* are not ideology as such: they are ideological only when they constitute 'The opinion, of things that are not, that they (truly) are,' as Sextus Empiricus describes the conception of *typhos* according to Monimus (*adv. Math.* VIII.5). When *nomismata* fail to grasp the truth of things and fail to live up to their promise, fail to accomplish the common good and preserve individual members of the political community, fail to regulate social life toward the end of shared flourishing and instead sanction the apparent though unreal flourishing of a few while consigning most to an all too real misery, then *nomismata* are so much *typhos* and those holding them so many *typhloi* ('blind persons'). Antisthenes even characterizes the point of life and greatest good as freeing oneself from ideology,[60] and when asked what the most important thing to learn was replied that it consisted in not having anything left to un-learn, i.e., being freed from the spell of ideology. Heinrich Gomperz points out, in his discussion of the Cynic conception of *typhos* (*Einbildung*), that "Ideology' is at work particularly when one supposes that two of the same things or processes are different because they are more specifically determined in a particular place or at a particular time or else by an incidental circumstance.'[61]

To put this in Adornian terms, Cynic ideology critique exposes the way in which 'objects are not subsumed into their concepts.'[62] The pointing out of incongruity in the manner Gomperz is here alluding to (which is one side of the coin, the other being the Cynic focus on singularity and the attempt to do justice to the 'accidental' in an account of essence) is central to this critical task, and the key to interpreting one of the fundamental purposes of Cynic humor. Inessential differences, such as birth, social status based on inherited wealth, as well as a variety of more concrete and mundane examples, are ideologically held to be essential, while significant differences of wisdom, knowledge, reason, or virtue are ignored. What counts as difference and what counts as identical is taken for granted and yet

often not merely mistaken but the site of social and political injustice, and the Cynic provocatively and humorously brings this to light.

Frequent ideological targets of Cynic critique include: the polis in its existing forms (especially tyranny and democracy) as flourishing political community, masculinity in various guises (violent aggression, claim to mastery and lordship, athletics), traditional religious beliefs and practices (particularly the efficacy of prayer and beliefs or rituals pertaining to the afterlife), economic value as determined by monetary worth, Greek chauvinism, the facile esteem for leisure irrespective of its employment, traditional marriage and family life, and militarism. In none of these instances do the Cynics simply condemn an existing ideological value absolutely, offering no guidance for a better alternative and satisfied to merely mock and scorn. Rather, in each case they condemn existing ideological values and the practices they underpin for failing to live up to their own claims and their own promise to assure a meaningful and successful rational ordering of life.[63]

Let us consider a few examples of the positive aspect lurking behind the Cynic negative critique of ideology. Antisthenes, a bastard (*nothos*), repeatedly criticizes the Athenians for their traditional conception of citizenship founded on a 'pure' Attic bloodline. Antisthenes rejects racial purity as criterion for citizenship by refusing to be reproached for being a 'half-breed' (*nothos*). He notes that 'The mother of the gods is Phrygian' (D.L. VI.1). Antisthenes' critique of traditional citizenship and the conferral of status via birth is reiterated in his joke that the Athenians' claim to be born of the earth makes them no less distinguished in their birth than insects (D.L. VI.1) and is sharpened in his response to someone who reproached him for not having two Athenian citizens for parents: 'Nor were they both wrestlers…but yet I am a wrestler' (D.L. VI.4). We can glean from this last response that what qualifies someone as a 'citizen' in Antisthenes' eyes is what they can *do*, not who their parents *were*. Cynic cosmopolitan citizenship is concerned with activity, not passively inherited markers such as birth. It thus rejects a fundamental traditional belief: that the virtues or excellences of parents are

transmitted to their offspring, who passively receive them and carry them on. For Antisthenes, each generation is capable of something *new*. This already foreshadows something that deserves further consideration, a crucial contrast with Aristotle's ontology: essence for the Cynic is not 'what it was to be' (*to ti ēn einai*) but something more like 'what it is and can be'. If Antisthenes defined *logos*, the statement of essence, as 'the making clear of what a thing was or is (*ho to ti ēn ē esti*)' (D.L. VI.*3*) then we should see that for him just as a child is not doomed to be merely an exact replica of its parents, so too what a thing 'is' is not merely a matter of the repetition of what engendered it; rather, the Cynic conception of essence involves self-invention and dynamic alteration beyond its precedence and provenance. It is no wonder, then, that the *logos* adequate to such essence is an endlessly inventive and improvisational one, attuned to the radically singularity of each new moment.

Antisthenes' humorous recommendation that the Athenians vote that horses are asses (D.L. VI.8), since they already do much the same thing in electing generals without training or experience, is not a condemnation of democracy or voting as such as it is a criticism of the belief that voting in and of itself sanctions a result as legitimate, as intelligent, confers a 'real' status upon something. Mere voting cannot and does not do this. Antisthenes is thus critical of the prevailing ignorance of the citizenry that would allow them to vote badly rather than critical of democratic institutions as such. Aristotle's mention, in the *Politics*, of Antisthenes' fable is perhaps also worth considering in the present context:

> Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with such men as those described [i.e., one or several exceptionally distinguished in virtue], for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions said when the hares made speeches in the assembly and

> demanded that all should have equality. Pol. III.8, 1284a15 (trans. by Jeffrey Henderson)

As in Aesop's fable, Antisthenes was reputed to have had the lions ask the hares, 'Where are your claws and teeth?' For Aristotle, it serves as a humorous illustration of the difference between genuine aristocrats and ordinary human beings, and between that 'one or few' of superlative virtue who are incommensurate with the political give and take of a polis and suited only to rule. Antisthenes' joke as deployed by Aristotle is a humorous reminder of the very real difference between the reason and virtue of human beings: some human beings, a few, are supposedly like lions while most are like hares, and there is a real and essential difference between them. As we have already noted, in such a case the essence and definition of 'the' human being threatens to come undone, to bifurcate. But what might the fable mean *for Antisthenes*, what might its intent be and who its target audience? It was perhaps a bit of political realism intended for the underclasses. If the hares want to be equal with the lions they must grow claws and teeth. Human beings, unlike hares and lions, are *one* species. And human beings can supplement or transform their nature by training and art. The lower classes, those presently excluded from politics or marginalized, are advised by Antisthenes to make themselves strong enough that they can wrest equality by force from those already forcefully subjugating them, so that they do not simply remain prey. To this one can also add Antisthenes' remark that 'We should pray that our enemies be provided with all good things, except courage; for thus these good things will belong, not to their owners, but to those that conquer them' (Plutarch, *On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander*, II.3, 336a). Those presently and conventionally wealthy and powerful are to have everything good except courage, they will be 'cowardly lions', as it were, which will leave everything good for those with courage since the latter will prevail over the former in struggle. Antisthenes, on this interpretation, is a revolutionary agitator.

As William Desmond has argued in great detail, there was a traditional Greek 'praise of poverty' and critique of wealth running from Hesiod through Aristophanes and Socrates and on to the Cynics.

Yet, if such a critique was prevalent, it became all the more intensified in the Cynics to the degree that they were responding to the ostentatious display of luxury and opulence in an increasingly economically stratified 4th century world of city-states on the verge of irrelevancy in the face of Macedonian ascendancy.[64] For his part, Aristotle considers three prominent ways of life in his day: the life of pleasure, that of honor (which is really a pursuit of virtue, being worthy of honor), and the contemplative life. After dismissing the first, qualifying the second, and postponing discussion of the third he offers a brusque dismissal of a hitherto unacknowledged fourth way of life, that of money-making. Such a way of life cannot be the way to achieve happiness, since the latter is a complete end, something worthwhile for its own sake, and yet money is only ever valuable as a means. The pursuit of something only good as a means in the belief that it is an end worthwhile for its own sake is, Aristotle points out, 'constrained' (*biaios*, NE I.5, 1096a6), which is another way of saying that it is 'contrary to nature' (*para physin*).

The Cynics share this view, as can be illustrated from several anecdotes: '[Diogenes], after seeing an avaricious man being carried out for burial, said 'This man, after living an unlivable life [*bion*], left life behind for others'' (Cod. Pal. Gr. 297 n. 71 f.118). We should note here that *bios* means 'life', 'way of life', and 'means for living' or 'livelihood'. All of these senses are in play at once in this fragment. Of Diogenes' most famous student we learn that: 'Crates let go of his possessions so that his possessions would not rule him' (*Kratēs apoluei ta Kratētos, hina mē ta Kratētos kratēsē ton Kratēta*) (Apostol. X 5). Crates sets free what is 'of Crates' so that it does not 'rule' (*kratein*) Crates. In other words, Crates makes his life livable again by letting go of (or in Hill's contemporary cosmopolitan framework 'forgetting') his previous unlivable life, his reified life, in which the ruler was ruled by that which was supposed to be evidence of his rule, his property.

Diogenes and Crates both reject the pursuit of wealth as the 'end' of life, and thus agree with Aristotle's critique of such a life as 'constrained' (*biaios*) or contrary to nature. If, for the Cynic as for Ruskin 'there is no wealth but life [well lived]' then the problem with

avaricious pursuit of wealth is that it inverts the natural order according to which wealth only has value in service to a good life shared with others. The view of the avaricious seems to be that 'There is no life but wealth'. Such a life is, according to the Cynics, a living death. The Cynics do not simply reject wealth or its pursuit, however. They recognize its pursuit as of a very limited validity, but before considering that we should first grasp their transvaluation of wealth. Antisthenes (in Xenoph. Symp. 3.8) claims that wealth for the Cynic is *not* money but rather is 'in the soul' (4.34). The 'worthiest possession' of Antisthenes' 'wealth' (4.40) is his openness to any labor that will meet his needs, his refusal to view work (here *ergon* and not *ponos*) as 'base' (*phaulos*). This is of course quite opposed to Aristotle's view of unskilled and even skilled labor as if not *phaulos* then at least incompatible with leisure, happiness, and obviously 'wealth' as well. Antisthenes goes on to say that his 'most luxurious' (*abrotaton*) possession is leisure, which might be thought to contradict the previous point about being willing to work to meet his simple needs, but in fact does not if we remember that, given the importance of 'elegant simplicity' (*euteleia*, mentioned at 4.42), one never has to work for very long to meet one's minimal needs and thus leisure can remain a 'most luxurious' possession.

Against the Cyrenaic hedonist who views *ponos* as simply 'pain' to be avoided, Antisthenes, in his interpretation of the myth of Heracles, transvaluates *ponos* from pain to be avoided into good to be willingly endured and even sought after. Karl Joël directs our attention to the denial of the importance of consent or lack of consent for the estimation of the value of suffering by Aristippus, who asks Socrates what the difference is between those practicing voluntarily a 'kingly art' that includes enduring much toil, pain and suffering and those who experience such suffering involuntarily. As Aristippus puts it,

> 'For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering.' *Mem.* 2.1.17

To suffer is evil, whether we will it or not, according to Aristippus. It might even be worse if we accede to it, since then we add our own folly to our suffering. In contrast, the important difference between voluntary *ponos* and involuntary pain is defended by the Cynic, and in fact voluntary pain is elaborated in contrast to involuntary pain. Karl Joël argues that 'The whole point and purpose of Antisthenes' reworking of the myth of Heracles' was to '…celebrate pain, which had hitherto only been lamented as *kakon*, *lupēron*, as involuntary suffering, to celebrate it as an *agathon*, too, i.e., as a voluntarily undertaken performance.'[65] Socrates argues (proto-Cynically) that the person voluntarily undergoing *ponos* is importantly different than the one involuntarily suffering it: the former can decide when to satisfy needs, while the latter has no choice but to experience *ponos* as pain, to wish it was over and one could have one's desires satisfied. Also, the one undergoing pain voluntarily actually enjoys it because he or she is animated by the hope of a successful conclusion (a work accomplished, victory, a product) while the one undergoing it involuntarily has no such hope. As will be discussed shortly, Antisthenes argues that pleasures are better after *ponos* than before them and for that reason alone pain is valuable: it makes pleasures superior.

Joël goes on to argue that the Cynic transvaluation of pain is closely connected with the socio-economic question of voluntary versus involuntary undergoing of difficult and painful work: 'With *ponos,* the Cynic has ennobled labor and has made a matter of the *doulos* as *akōn* into a matter of the *eleutheros* as *hekōn.*'[66] The 'dirty work' done by slaves, necessary but supposedly incompatible with freedom, is deemed worthy of a free person, if it is voluntarily undergone and affirmed. Joël points to a passage in Xenophon's *Cyrus* (VIII.1.4) for support, where the same point is made. The unpleasant 'toil' of hunting is adduced as exemplary: just as hunters rise early and undergo pain in the course of hunt, yet do so voluntarily and with pleasure, animated by the hope of trophy or game, so too the Cynic undergoes *ponos* in the hope of the freedom acquired thereby from subjection to the demands for immediate sensual gratification. Another passage from Xenphon's *Cyrus* is then mentioned, and in both the pattern (*Muster*) is the same: '…the

eschewal of instant gratification so that through *ponos* an even greater gain will be achieved later.'[67]

It is precisely the inability or unwillingness to ever defer gratification for a greater good that distinguishes Aristippus from the Cynic, Joël argues (citing D.L. II.66 for support). What is also evident from this passage is that the Cyrenaic hedonist 'adapts' (*harmosasthai*) to circumstances for the sake of ephemeral pleasures while the Cynic (D.L. VI.22) 'finds a way through adversity' (*poron exeure tēs peristaseōs*), which involves a process of mutual mediation, in which circumstances are changed in addition to one's own 'adapting' to circumstances, and where the emphasis is on changing circumstances, changing the supposedly 'objective' terms of events that are 'not up to us', so that a positive outcome is won back from adversity. This difference is occluded in the Loeb translation (R.D. Hicks) of these two passages where both Aristippus and Diogenes simply 'adapt' to circumstances. Antisthenes' remarks on pleasure and labor: 'One should pursue the pleasures that accompany labors, and not the ones that are enjoyed instead of labors' (Stob. III.29.65) and Joël's basic point about the Cynic psychology of pleasure, that 'the *hēdonai* are at work in advance as hopes and hence already co-operative in the *ponoi*'[68] ought to be fruitfully analyzed from a Blochian utopian perspective: in an unjust social life one often defers one's pleasures, sublimates them into hopes that animate one's labor, so that one can bring about a better condition in which those pleasures can then be realized in a full and genuine sense.[69]

One final aspect of the Cynic transvaluation of the traditional notion of wealth is its equation with not material goods or currency but rather that which gives wealth itself its value, self-sufficiency: 'Diogenes having been asked who among human beings he called rich replied, 'The person who is self-sufficient'' (Stob. III.10.62). Wealth is only valuable insofar as it frees one to live well, and to do the latter not in vulgar or conventional ways (to be esteemed for wealth, to live for reputation and honor, to dominate others, to maximize sensual pleasures) but rather to be freed *from* the compulsion of physical need and free *for*, creative, rational activity, for what, as we saw above, Kant

would call *Mündigkeit* or 'maturity', autonomy, to cease being a domesticated animal whose rational activity is controlled by and deformed in the *Gängelwagen* of traditional, conventional submission to established authorities who are 'kind' enough to do that work for everyone else. Thus conventional 'wealth' should be kept to a minimum, since its purpose is not to provide the 'good things in life' but rather to provide what is absolutely materially necessary so that one may then act and live well. Happiness, again, for the Cynics as for Aristotle is activity and not possession nor consumption nor a passive state of being. However, the Cynics are not absolutely opposed to traditional wealth:

> Diogenes used to liken most of the rich to the trees and vines growing in impassable and precipitous places. For, human beings cannot take hold of their fruit, but crows and other such scavengers consume it. And they do not set aside wealth for suitable purposes but fund flatterers and prostitutes for both shameful pleasures and utterly vain opinions.' (Stob. IV.31.48)

Here the Cynic critique of wealth is directed at the economic structure, at private property and economic stratification. From a passage like this one can see that the Cynics are not absolutely opposed to wealth, do not believe that it is 'simply' or utterly evil, but rather are opposed to its accumulation and irrationality in a traditional stratified economy. The interpretation that the Cynics view wealth as completely evil and to be dispensed with, along with my reading here that it has value for them but only if used correctly, are already reflected in the two different versions of the fate of Crates' wealth: on the one hand, he throws it into the sea, while on the other hand he redistributes it to others. While acknowledging the tension I find it more likely that redistribution and economic reorganization were the ultimate Cynic position, with the strict rejection of wealth only a reaction to the given, fundamentally exclusionary and unjust social and economic order. In such a wrong life throwing money away is better than trying to use it for consoling and consuming pleasures that use one up.

Cynic Cosmopolitics and the 'Republic' of Diogenes: Towards a Positive Conception of Cynic Political Philosophy

The Cynics are typically taken to have a merely negative conception of politics and a merely negative conception of freedom. On such a view, they criticize conventional politics and advocate a return to nature in the sense of a return to a primitive and animalistic pre-political life. They see the polis not very much unlike some of the sophists did, as an institution whose laws and customs hinder the nature of human beings and facilitate their domination rather than happiness. Thus, the best thing for a human being to do is to live outside the law and outside of the polis, and if one dwells within it to subject its repressive features to withering critique and condemnation on behalf of nature and a freer life. In response to Aristotle's pointed dismissal of one who would live outside the polis, as being either beast or god, the Cynics could be read as responding that life inside the polis renders one all too human, in the sense of an errant creature whose nature at times seems to be its deviation from nature and the spending of its life in thrall to false idols. And yet, as has already been argued, to view the Cynics as merely negative critics misses the positive moments of redemption within their critique. Furthermore, as will be seen in what follows, such a view misses the positive articulation of Cynic cosmopolitanism and overlooks their positive political proposals, which however radical are nonetheless an attempt to think a new politics and a new political community in which peace, leisure, freedom and a flourishing life of virtuous activity are shared by all, regardless of gender, ethnicity or social class.

Cynic cosmopolitanism is most often read as merely negative. According to one representative exponent of this view, 'When Diogenes called himself a 'citizen of the cosmos', a 'cosmopolitan', he was denying membership of any particular existing city, not imagining a world-state'.[70] Yet, as J.L. Moles has argued, such a traditional reading overlooks a number of important points that suggest, to the contrary, that Cynic cosmopolitanism is in fact a positive conception of a universally inclusive political community rather than a mere figure of speech expressing the rejection of any existing political community.

Moles offers five 'proofs' for a positive conception of Cynic cosmopolitanism: (1) Diogenes' own statements of his cosmopolitanism are positive (at D.L. VI.63 and VI.72), not negative; (2) Diogenes' cosmopolitanism emerges from a tradition of thinking a positive, broader political community than individual *poleis*—since his precedents are positive he, too, should be read positively; (3) Diogenes is opposed to Aristippus and since the latter is a negative cosmopolitan therefore the former is a positive cosmopolitan; (4) Diogenes' mission is to 'deface the currency' by means of paradox, and so his cosmopolitanism is deliberately paradoxical: a polis, necessarily a local community bordered by other *poleis*, which is supposedly as vast as the cosmos, which encompasses everything—to read this as merely a claim to have no polis is 'intolerably banal'; (5) the paradoxes that emerge from Cynic cosmopolitanism—the political outsider as advocate of politics, the mocker of astronomy as a citizen of the cosmos, require 'substantive answers' that must be formulated positively.[71] The fact that Diogenes explicitly presents his conception of citizenship in positive terms rather than rejecting citizenship as such, in the manner of Aristippus, should be taken seriously, not ignored.

Furthermore, the fact that Diogenes' cosmopolitanism has precedence in the utopian thought of his contemporaries and antecedents, in Plato and comic poets such as Aristophanes and Crates, for instance, all of whom offer positive articulations of a more inclusive politics, is also to be heeded. The fundamental opposition between the Cynics and Cyrenaics, the fact that they seem to exist by virtue of a constitutive contrariness to each other entails that if Aristippus is an utterly negative cosmopolitan, a stranger wherever he goes, Diogenes should be read as a positive cosmopolitan, at home wherever he is. The reduction of Cynic cosmopolitanism to the negative rejection of all existing *poleis* loses sight of the essential paradox at the heart of the Cynic conception, which asks us to think a political community traditionally founded on exclusion (at the most basic level a geographical occupation of a certain territory that excludes everything outside of its border as alien and other) instead in terms of that which is most inclusive of all, the cosmos, in which everything that exists,

including all human beings, have their proper place. Reading the Cynic cosmopolis as equivalent to *ou-polis* (an *ou-topia*, 'no-where', as in William Morris' *News from Nowhere)* ignores the significance of *cosmos*, whose 'good order' implies *eu-polis* (an *eu-topia*, or properly flourishing political community) though it is no easy task to grasp its significance given the apparent Cynic rejection of astronomy. One thing that is clear, though, is that grasping the significance of cosmic citizenship requires a positive articulation of politics that rejection of any local citizenship fails to provide,[72] particularly when such rejection is supposedly offered by someone who nonetheless spends the whole of his life neither in the clouds nor in the stars,[73] nor in contemplation of them, but rather lives much like Socrates, engaged in constant interaction with fellow human beings in the midst of the most refined and sophisticated cities in the world.

From Philodemus' polemical account we learn that Diogenes in his *Politeia* envisioned the following conditions for the Cynic cosmopolis: dice for currency (*astragalois nomiteusthai*), the uselessness of weapons, their being rendered superfluous (*achrēstias tōn hoplōn*). Mention is made of cannibalism, sexual liberation that is depicted as wanton profligacy including allowance for rape and incest, equality of women with men, raising of children in common, and, finally, patricide as well. Of course, Diogenes advocates neither cannibalism nor patricide, neither rape nor incest, as a general policy for an ideal Cynic political community. These remarks, whose context is difficult to reconstruct from the fragmentary and polemical context of Philodemus, would probably have been made in a typical Cynic appropriation of sophistic eristic aiming to deliberately scandalize common sense and customary beliefs by showing how even the seemingly most firm and unshakable social conventions were in fact tenuous and dubious when subjected to subtle human reasoning and observation of nature.

The upshot of such paradoxes was not actually to advocate for cannibalism, incest, rape and patricide, but to show that as things stood at present, human beings were but a finger's breadth from madness[74] and already guilty of devouring, violating, and murdering each other in ways not much distinct from that of the monsters generally taken to be

so exceptional—the cannibal, the rapist, the committer of incest and the parricide. The traditional customs that kept human consumption of animal flesh restricted to certain kinds but not others, the sexual laws that prohibited certain forms of conduct while allowing others or sanctioned transgression under a variety of circumstances (festivals, rituals, etc.), the drawing of certain lines around unspeakable conduct that simultaneously allows unspeakable violation to occur every day so long as it remains confined within traditional boundaries, all were subjected to a thoroughgoing investigation and critique by the Cynic, who was unafraid to discuss the most sacred taboos with utter fearlessness and even nonchalance.

In each case, we must remember the purpose of Cynic hyperbolicism: not to actually lead others toward an almost absurd extremism but rather to loosen and liberate the iron grip of irrational beliefs, in this case concerning the purity of both food and sexual relations and the avoidance of blood-pollution.[75] If, as in Anaxagoras, 'everything is in everything' (*en panti panta*), then the crust of bread and olives contain remnants of human flesh, one's wife or enemy remnants of one's ancestors, and so forth. In other words, the Cynic argues against purity and sharp boundaries in order to advocate not for filth and license but rather for awareness of the messiness and interconnection of things, their universal imbrication rather than relegation to exclusive spheres that can be neatly managed to allow for one to murder and eat the flesh of one animal (a pig) while scrupulously avoiding murdering and eating the flesh of another (a human being), to sleep with one partner (a spouse) while avoiding sleeping with another (a parent), to not rape one person (a fellow member of one's community) while raping many others (those of the enemy's village after its conquest), to not murder one (a father) while murdering others (the fathers in a neighboring community).

To reduce the Cynic point to a rather banal one: either eat all meat or none at all, have sexual relations without discrimination or else simply based on the consent of those involved, rape indiscriminately or not all, murder one's parents or cease murdering altogether, but do not try to have it both ways and then sanction the hypocrisy with the cloak

of convention. The deliberate inhabitation of paradox and pushing ordinary thought to extraordinary extremes is the Cynic exposure of the folly already hiding in plain sight, in everyday rituals of purity and the simultaneous establishment of rules and exceptions to those rules on an arbitrary basis.

From Philodemus we also learn, as noted above, that: 'Diogenes in his *Politeia* ordains by law that knuckle-bones [i.e., dice] be used for currency' (Athen. IV 159 C). First we should recall that, as one scholar puts it, 'knucklebones were apparently not associated with gambling for money; instead they seem to have been identified with sacrifice, with the gods and fate, with the dead, and with the innocent game[s] of children.'[76] However, Cynic agnosticism and religious irreverence preclude interpreting the Cynics as advocating the use of knucklebones for traditional forms of divination or for religious ritual, as does the fact that we are trying to puzzle through what it might mean to use knucklebones as setting values, in either a narrowly monetary sense or a more general sense of convention, 'values' as indicators of ethical life. It is more likely that Cynic usage of knucklebones was akin to the 'games of children', though with a serious purpose, however difficult to reconstruct.

Bekircan Tahberer cites a passage in Pausanias in which a cultic use of knucklebones for the reception of prophesy is described—a shrine dedicated to Heracles, no less, who was something akin to the 'patron saint' of the ancient Cynics. It is difficult to surmise what the connection might be here between a traditional religious usage of knucklebones and the Cynic appropriation in this political, and yet playful, context. One possibility, which I merely suggest speculatively, is that the Cynics do hold onto something of the kind of ritual Pausanias describes but detach it from its sacred context and submission to religious experts—presumably the one who interpreted the meaning of the knucklebones' fall was a 'professional' exegete, a religious official in the traditional version—and instead take over for themselves the use of knucklebones not to help figure out what the future *might* hold but to assist in actively constituting what the future *will* hold.

If the future is determined by fortune, which approximates to an endless series of rolls of the dice determining how any one moment turns out, then the Cynic would correspond to this state of affairs by carrying his or her own dice, which are rolled to see how one should 'value' something, and which function as a kind of cunning counterpunch to the blows of fortune, a way of transforming the turns of fortune into the turns of a game. Two questions that are central for interpreting the passage in question are: Should we read *nomiteusthai* (to establish as *nomisma*) here in the two-fold way as with the oracle? And what does it mean to think dice as currency?[77] One place to look for answers is D.L. VI.35, where we read that 'Very valuable things, said he, were exchanged ⌜*pipraskesthai*⌝ for things of no value, and *vice versa*. At all events a statue fetches three thousand drachmas, while a quart of barley-flour is sold for two copper coins.'[78] On the one hand, Diogenes thinks that the given values for goods are already so absurd that to use dice would actually be *more* rational. On the other hand, he thinks that the irrationality of the current respective values of such goods as statues and barley is *already* about as rational *as* a throw of the dice.[79]

Finally, the values of goods, at least at present, under conditions of prevalent irrationality, are to be seen as merely the expressions of fortune, to be met with elegant simplicity and maneuverability such that a throw of the dice is the only way to keep an ideal marketplace interesting, through constant 'shuffling' of values. Aleatory determination of value can be read as a parodic critique of the irrationality of uncritically accepted given values; it can be read as a perhaps exaggerated caricature of that irrationality, or it can even be affirmed as a positive principle of an economics of experimentalism for a liberated society in which no one goes without and yet the prices fluctuate wildly like odds or stakes in an ever-shifting contest or game of chance. This last possibility, on my reading, is the positive import of Diogenes' recommendation that dice be used as currency in the cosmopolis. Economic transactions would become a game when they take on a purely symbolic and playful aspect after the realm of necessity

has been subdued and basic needs are secured for all members of the community.

The uselessness of weapons for the Cynic cosmopolis reflects their irrelevance in a community where there is no longer motive for violence nor need for defense since on the one hand everything necessary is provided, while on the other hand nothing superfluous and luxurious, nothing traditionally 'valuable', needs to be secured from theft or the pillaging of an invading force. The motives for violence, sexual frustration or avarice, are overcome in a community that has achieved sexual liberation and the satisfaction of basic needs for all. Thus, with everything one needs in easy reach and with nothing luxurious or ornate by which one might distinguish oneself from others (at least nothing in terms of possessions, with one's action and life being the only field for happiness and distinction), there no longer is need for weapons to protect the borders of 'mine' from 'thine'. Social provision of basic necessities (simple food, clothing, modest housing, basic medicine) and their abundant availability free human beings from need, and the absence of ornamental and luxury goods as status markers for the conspicuous consumption of an elite remove in advance a violent contest for such baubles.[80]

Two more features of the Cynic cosmopolis worth considering are the equality of women and the communal raising of children. Diogenes' stipulation in the *Politeia* that 'Men and women are to wear the same attire and participate in the same pursuits' (Philodem. *Peri tōn Stōikōn* [V.H. VIII, papyr. N. 339] coll. XI-X) of course echoes Plato's *Republic* but should also be related to Antisthenes' claim that 'virtue is the same for men and women' (*Andros kai gynaikos hē autē aretē*) (D.L. VI.12), as well as to the exchange between Hipparchia and Theodorus, where the Cynic replies to the atheist fellow-traveler that a women's place is no longer in the home.[81] From the three passages one can confidently read the Cynics as committed to equality of men and women not merely in the abstract, nor merely in formal political terms, but also in the concrete, in everyday life and one's regular activities. Women were not merely the equal of men and to be treated the same in political decision-making and under the law, but were considered equally capable in a

broad sense, as human beings, and were to frequent all the places men did, from horse-races and gymnasia to symposia.

Communal raising of children is another utopian feature that Diogenes' *Politeia* shares with Plato's, and the extension of the family is to be thought here rather than its elimination. A community as wide as the universe is supposed to be a place where one can feel at home wherever one is; thus humanity is imagined as one family and all children as essentially siblings and cousins. In fact, it is just such a universalization of the family that might best explain the supposed Cynic 'endorsement' of incest.

Conclusion

I have attempted to outline the positive features of the Cynic cosmopolis, and argued against reading the Cynics as merely critics of the chauvinist and exclusive political communities of their time. However, beyond this I have also attempted to connect them to the cosmopolitan lineage of which they are the founders, and thus to restore to them their rightful place as starting point for thinking the philosophical significance of cosmopolitanism.

The three features of Hill's contemporary cosmopolitanism discussed at the outset of this essay can now be seen to parallel the three moments of Cynic transvaluative critique of uncritically accepted social conventions and traditional ideological beliefs: 'Moral forgetting' is the first stage, where traditional values are 'taken out of circulation'. This is the entirely negative moment when values are obliterated, when the memory even of the violation that damaging values have had upon one is worked through and left behind, so that the second moment, 'moral maturity', can become operative. Only when one has forgotten what one has been made into by such conventions and ideologies can one begin to take responsibility for what one is and will be moving forward. And only then can one realize the 'creative agency' of the third stage, which is where the traditional values that were obliterated are then re-cast and reformulated into the deliberate products of morally mature ethical and political subjects.

In the life of Diogenes, for instance, one can trace this trajectory even in the general terms of the course of his career. This begins with the negative moment of 'moral forgetting', where he must leave behind his conventional status as banker's son and citizen of Sinope and go into exile, to the middle moment of 'moral maturity'. Next, on the basis of accomplishing self-sufficiency, via the ascetic arts of maneuverability and elegant simplicity, Diogenes is able to think on his own terms and offer a compelling critique of conventional political life. Finally, comes the moment most relevant for the present essay, that of 'creative agency' where Diogenes is no longer merely satisfied to condemn existing political communities for their hypocrisies, irrationalities, and injustices but also ingeniously contrives a positive vision of a better socioeconomic order. Diogenes' cosmopolis, under this framework, is the creative act of a morally mature agent who, because he no longer has anything left to 'un-learn', has successfully carried out moral forgetting.

The social, political, and economic crisis of the 4th century polis led not merely to the disintegration of its legitimacy but also to Cynicism as the counter-force to ideologies of domination that would preserve slavery and privilege amidst widespread poverty and exclusion. The Cynics thus appear as agitators for a revolutionary transformation of society that would abolish class privilege, gender privilege, ethnic privilege and replace them with a universal human community that does not merely speak of equality but attempts to realize it in practice: albeit through an unconventional practice akin to the Socratic 'true political art', by inviting human beings to become fellow-members of a para-political cosmopolis.

Immanuel Kant has claimed that '…if we consider the free exercise of the human will broadly, we can ultimately discern a regular progression in its appearances. History further lets us hope that, in this way, that which seems confused and irregular when considering particular individuals can nonetheless be recognized as a steadily progressing, albeit slow development of the original capacities of the entire species.'[82] The original endowment, reason, evolves on the whole regardless of individual quirks. Cynic cosmopolitanism should be

interpreted as an attempt to make good on the promise of reason for the political animal, a shared life of flourishing together with others. While the individual Cynic's actions may seem 'chaotic' they are animated by this world-historical task of rationalizing human social life so that it fulfills its natural end (human flourishing).

What they are attempting to do is to bring back into consideration elements of political life that more established traditional theories—such as Plato's or Aristotle's ideal cities—leave out: the flourishing of all those elements of society that are relegated to a supporting role and excluded from a truly human life, i.e., women, slaves and the working poor, resident aliens and barbarians, perhaps even children and animals. Kant goes on to argue that

> …nothing entirely straight can be fashioned from the crooked wood of which humankind is made. Nature has charged us only with approximating this idea. That this task is also the last to be carried out also follows from the fact that such a constitution requires the right conception of its nature, a great store of experience practiced in many affairs of the world, and, above all of this, a good will that is prepared to accept such a constitution. The combination of all these three elements is very difficult, however, and can occur only late, after many futile attempts.'[83]

It is certainly arguable as to whether Diogenes has a 'correct conception of a possible constitution'. It is unlikely one can conclusively decide for or against such a claim, given the paucity of sources and their polemical presentation of source material now lost to us. Few could argue that we would find anyone with greater experience who wandered through more paths of life than he did, from wealthy citizen to destitute exile, from the envy of Alexander to the object of insults and beatings. He is in dialogue with Plato and Aristotle—and with statues that cannot hear his plea for alms. He wanders from Sinope to Athens to Corinth, making trips to various Panhellenic games. Sold into slavery he becomes his master's teacher, advising him as an expert in the art

of living well and even issuing commands as though a doctor or pilot.

To close with Kant's metaphor: the Cynic cosmopolitan project is a shrewd attempt to build something straight from crooked timber. When human nature becomes warped it is possible to straighten it out by a measured counter-warping, hence the absurd exaggerations of Cynic hyperbolic discourse. Cynic cosmopolitanism was the first and perhaps most acute 'futile attempt' at a cosmopolitan constitution.

Footnotes

[1] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan: What It Means to be a Human Being in the New Millenium* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 163.
[2] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 166.
[3] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 167.
[4] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 163.
[5] For Socrates as *atopos* see Plato, Symp. 215a and Gorg. 494d, inter alia.
[6] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 163.
[7] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 5.
[8] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 169.
[9] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, xix.
[10] *Becoming a Cosmopolitan*, 21.
[11] Cercidas' *Second Meliamb* is a critique of the concentration of wealth in fewer hands and a plea for economic redistribution so that the wealth currently hoarded is set free to play its proper role of modestly enabling shared human flourishing, which would be its just usage. Teles is already hard to distinguish from a Stoic: his *On Circumstances* already reinterprets what I have elsewhere characterized as Cynic maneuverability (what Diogenes learns from the mouse, a way of getting through difficult situations), which responds to 'circumstances' by creatively redefining what is possible, and is a kind of philosophical *mētis* (cunning intelligence) into mere adaptation, conformity-to, though of course only a superficial going-along-with akin to the actor's playing of a part.
[12] *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, ed. by R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 4.
[13] *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1988).
[14] *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, ed. by R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
[15] *The Cynics*, 7.
[16] *The Cynics*, 14.
[17] *The Cynics*, 14.
[18] *The Cynics*, 16.
[19] The larger project is entitled 'From Tragic Reversal to Revolution: The Ethical and Political Significance of Turns of Fortune and Twists of Fate,' an extension of my dissertation, 'Aristotle and the Cynics on Happiness and Misfortune.' It is presently underway, with articles drawn from it on Sartre, Adorno, and Aristotle having already been published in various places or else forthcoming.
[20] *The Cynics*, 333.
[21] *Bann* in the Adornian sense is ultimately untranslatable: it means much more than 'spell'. As I argue elsewhere, 'With the concept *Bann* Adorno means a dialectical process that begins with an authoritative pronouncement that in some sense draws a boundary within which something is driven out, forbidden, declared taboo, and outside of which whatever does not conform to the edict is expelled and left exposed in an oblivion. This act of drawing a boundary, of determining what belongs and what is to be excluded, impoverishes and mutilates experience and unwittingly leads to the very opposite of what it intends. The most crucial aspect of *Bann* for Adorno may be just this moment of reversal, in which the one who 'casts' the 'spell' falls victim

to it, the authority who makes the pronouncement is compelled to suffer the sentence that has been imposed. To 'break the spell', something Adorno occasionally discusses, means finding a way to reconcile these two moments, to heal the damage that has been done within and without.' See my 'Under Adorno's Spell: *Bann* as Central Concept rather than Mere Metaphor,' forthcoming in *New German Critique*, 2017.

[22] Malcolm Schofield, *Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms*, (Routledge, London: 1999), 110.

[23] *The Cynics*, 329.

[24] One thinks here of the pseudo-Cynic epistles, for example (see Abraham Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* [Missoula: Scholar's Press, 1977], but also of a number of conflicting anecdotes, according to which Diogenes, for example, dies this way or that way, lives here or there, is exiled from Sinope for his own crime or for that of his father, has the very story told of him that is also told of Antisthenes or even Aristippus, etc.

[25] *The Cynics*, 330.

[26] *The Cynics*, 331.

[27] Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace *and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. by Pauline Kleingeld, trans. by David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 8.

[28] See D.L. VI.70 in particular: '…training was of two kinds, mental and bodily: the latter being that whereby with constant exercise, perceptions are formed such as secure freedom of movement for virtuous deeds (*ginomenai phantasiai eulysian pros ta tēs aretēs erga parechontai*).' In other words, physical training (*askēsis*) is what secures the physical freedom of movement *for* the virtuous deeds that constitute human happiness. Without such training the human being is ill-equipped to actually carry out the activities of human happiness: various excellent manifestations of human rationality that actualize truth and beauty.

[29] I have in mind two passages in particular. The claim that the *human being* is a political animal (italics mine, Pol. I.1, 1253a3) rather than a more restrictive claim such as 'the leisured Greek male is the political animal' and the claim that the best political order is the one 'according to which anyone at all could do best and live supremely happy' (Pol. VII.2, 1324a23-25). Such claims are in tension with the various exclusions introduced into Aristotle's ideal political community, as I have argued elsewhere, and Aristotle nowhere offers convincing support for the thesis that nature itself as a principle can explain why most human beings are simply not capable of mature political activity.

[30] D.L. VI.64.

[31] I should note that while readings of Cynic philosophy as proto-Marxist are rare, and while readings of the Cynics that claim they have a positive conception of cosmopolitanism are rare, they are by no means non-existent, even if they have been largely absent from Anglo-American scholarship. Rather than completely contradicting all previous classicist, philological and historical scholarship on Cynic philosophy, I am building off of a number of earlier works that have been given short shrift when they are discussed at all (C.W. Goettling's 'Diogenes der Cyniker oder die Philosophie des griechischen Proletariats' [Halle, 1851], T. Gomperz [see note 68], I. Nakhov's 'Der Mensch in der Philosophie der Kyniker,' in: *Der Mensch als Mass der Dinge. Studien zum griechischen Menschenbild in der Zeit der Blüte and Krise der Polis*, ed. by R. Müller [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976] , and H. Schulz-Falkenthal's essays [see below]) and attempting to further develop, albeit in ways its original author likely did not intend, J. Moles' suggestive claims for a positive conception of Cynic cosmopolitanism.

[32] Gorg. 521d.

[33] Gorg. 462b-463d.
[34] Apol. 29d-30a.
[35] Foucault has an excellent discussion of the various valences of *parrhēsia*: aristocratic, democratic, Socratic-Cynic, and later therapeutic. I here read the Socratic-Cynic form of *parrhēsia* as emerging from its two antecedents and forming a curious hybrid of the two. Like aristocratic *parrhēsia* the Socratic-Cynic version often takes the form of a private conversation between equals, and yet like democratic version it is at the same time a public act, it blurs the line between the private and the public, and is fundamentally spoken 'from the bottom upwards' and against injustice. As Foucault notes in his analysis of *parrhēsia* in Greek tragedy (the cultural analogue to its political manifestation in Athenian civic practice), 'This ritual act, this ritual speech act of the weak person who tells the truth of the injustice of the strong person, this ritual act of the weak who, in the name of his own justice, remonstrates against the strong who committed this injustice, is linked to other, not necessarily verbal rituals….It involves a sort of agonistic discourse. For someone who is both the victim of an injustice and completely weak, the only means of combat is a discourse which is agonistic but constructed around this unequal status' (*The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the College de France, 1982-1983* [London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010], 133). Socrates' curse in the *Apology*, discussed below, can be read as *parrhēsia* carried to its verbal extreme. Foucault goes on to analyze the significance of *parrhēsia* in both the *Apology* (*The Government of Self and Others*, 326-327) and the *Laches* (*The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the College de France, 1983-1984* [London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011], 128ff.) before turning to its centrality for the Cynics. My reading owes a debt to his insights.
[36] Apol. 31b. Trans. by West modified. See also 36c and 38a for similar characterizations.
[37] The scholarly consensus, following Donald Dudley (*A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* [London: Methuen & Co., 1937], 1-16), today appears to be that this was a historical fabrication, probably on the part of later Stoics looking to connect the founder of their school, Zeno of Citium, back to Socrates through a line of succession. Such a lineage required postulating that Diogenes was a student of Antisthenes in order to secure a Socratic pedigree for the *kynes* ('dogs'), and by extension, their Stoic successors. Dudley does not rule out the traditional succession but rather merely claims that it is 'unlikely' given a survey of early evidence and is only supported by later sources post-dating the emergence of Stoicism. Whether or not Antisthenes was the founder of Cynicism or merely an influence on Diogenes is a historical question with little bearing on the philosophical substance of Cynicism, something the historicizing and psychologizing approach of Dudley is ill-equipped to appreciate, as one can clearly see from a remark such as the following: 'There is little point in retailing any of the stories from Diogenes Laertius; they belong rather to an anthology of Greek humour than a discussion of philosophy' (29). One supposes it was a pity that Dudley was not around in antiquity to let Diogenes Laertius and the other ancient biographers whose work formed the basis for *The Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers* know this.
[38] D.L. VI.9-10.
[39] See S.C. Humphreys, 'The Nothoi of Kynosarges,' in: *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 94 (1974), 88-95, for a discussion of the Kynosarges and the bastards who congregated there for exercise and association. Humphreys shows that Antisthenes and his following emerged from out of an already existing, disaffected group of upper-class bastards who defiantly adopted the appellation of *nothoi* and who established cult-worship of 'Heracles the bastard', prefiguring Antisthenes' own reinterpretation of Heracles as proto-Cynic.
[40] NE II.6, 1107a8 and 1107a23.

[41] NE I.3, 1094b14-19.
[42] D.L. VI.23.
[43] D.L. VI.37.
[44] D.L. VI.23.
[45] D.L. VI.64.
[46] *A History of Ancient Greece in Its Mediterranean Context* (Cornwall-on-Hudson, NY: Sloan, 2006), 297.
[47] *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 295. Ste. Croix goes on to more specifically claim that 'Rich and poor would regard each other with bitter hatred, and when a revolution succeeded there would be wholesale executions and banishments, and confiscation of the property of at least the leaders of the opposite party. The programme of Greek revolutionaries seems largely to have centred in two demands: redistribution of land, cancellation of debts (*gēs anadasmos, chreōn apokopē*)' (298).
[48] Doyne Dawson surveys the trajectory of proto-communist utopian thought in ancient Greece in his *Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Of course, Greek comedy is another source for the utopian imaginary. Aside from obvious examples such as Aristophanes' *Birds*, one also thinks here of a work like Crates' *Thēria* (see David Konstan's 'A World without Slaves: Crates' *Theria*,' in: *No Laughing Matter: Studies in Athenian Comedy*, eds. C.W. Marshall and George Kovacs [London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012]).
[49] 'Der Mensch in der Philosophie der Kyniker,' 386. All translations from the German are my own unless otherwise noted.
[50] 'Der Mensch in der Philosophie der Kyniker,' 385.
[51] *Der Kynismus des Diogenes*, 43ff.
[52] *The Cynics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 243.
[53] Stated succinctly and eloquently by A.A. Long in 'The Socratic Tradition: Diogenes, Crates, and Hellenistic Ethics.' In: *The Cynics*, 28-46. See p. 35 in particular, where Long notes that '[Diogenes] appears to have regarded much conduct that was conventionally unjust as *naturally* so.' On Desmond's reading, this would not be possible and we instead would have the Cynic taking 'conventional' values out of circulation in order to replace them with 'natural' ones. Such a view is based on a static binary opposition of nature and convention that ignores their dynamic interplay and entwinement, that ignores convention's claim to be a second and better nature, and nature's claim to the be a critical touchstone for the rationality and suitability of conventions.
[54] I treat this topic further in my essay, 'Cynic Philosophical Humor as Exposure of Incongruity,' as yet unpublished.
[55] *Der Kynismus des Diogenes*, 131.
[56] See in particular Thuc. 2.65.8-12. Josiah Ober analyzes the decline of Athenian democracy related in Thucydides, in which paradoxically it is the very deterioration of political power exercised by one preeminent person, Pericles, into that exercised by a series of inferior successors and ultimately into the 'false unity' of a united demos that tolerates no dissent from its rulings that leads to democracy's fall. As Ober puts it, 'The demos, freed from the braking tendency of sociopolitical friction, driven by desire, impatient with delay, is angered by any hint that contradictions or impediments remain. This unity is of course false. But *it is highly dangerous to oppose the consensus in public, and so all critics of unanimity are gagged; political dissent loses its voice when faced by the hegemonic will of the mass of citizens*' (italics mine) (in: *Political*

Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998], 117).

[57] *Der Kynismus des Diogenes*, 131. Only the final section of Niehues-Pröbsting's opus is available in English, in *The Cynics*. Here and elsewhere where I refer to the German original I provide my own translations.

[58] Ober's analysis of Isocrates' *Ad Timotheum* is an incisive exposition of precisely this failure of Athenian democracy, in particular, section B.5, 'The Corruption of Language' (*Political Dissent in Democratic Athens*, 273-277). Language in public settings such as the assembly was so corrupted that, according to Isocrates, it was his sacred mission to restore proper *logos* to the democracy via education. Only a rhetorician can save the democracy.

[59] *Die Lebensauffassung der griechischen Philosophen und das Ideal der inneren Freiheit* (Jena and Leipzig: Eugen Diederichs, 1904), 122.

[60] See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* II, XXI 130.7 and Theodoret. *Grace. Affect. cur.* XI 8.

[61] *Die Lebensauffassung der griechischen Philosophen*, 122-123.

[62] *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2003), 17. The German reads: '*die Gegenstände in ihrem Begriff nicht aufgehen.*'

[63] As Desmond and Heinz Schulz-Falkenthal have called attention to, the Cynics often condemn a present social injustice by referring to a past value that has since been rendered obsolete in order to re-purpose it for the accomplishment of justice in a future, more rational social order. According to the latter, the Cynics were making a 'valuable attempt to better the lot of working and poor human beings by means of an alternative to existing society. In the course of this they found the new, progress, in the transfiguration of the old and, in order to have arguments for the present, they derived social demands for the future from the past' ('Zum Arbeitsethos der Kyniker,'in: Margarethe Billerbeck (ed.), *Die Kyniker in der modernen Forschung* [Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1991], 301).

[64] Desmond, *The Greek Praise of Poverty: Origins of Ancient Cynicism* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2006), 63-65, and J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 206-208.

[65] *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates* (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1893-1901), 96.

[66] *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, 96.

[67] *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, 97.

[68] *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*, 98.

[69] See Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, Volume One (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 189-194.

[70] H.C. Baldry, *Ancient Utopias* (Southampton, University of Southampton Press, 1956), 19. See also Giovanni Reale, *The Systems of the Hellenistic Age* [Albany: SUNY Press, 1985], 31, who agrees that Cynic cosmopolitanism is negative, claiming that 'Cynics…must also be stateless.' Others who agree with this position include Dudley 1937: 35, W.W. Tarn 1932 (in Dudley, op. cit.), and E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* [London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1877], 324-325.

[71] 'Cynic Cosmopolitanism,' in: *The Cynics*, 109-110.

[72] In what follows, I develop the insights of T. Gomperz, who more than a century ago argued that Cynic negativism was intended merely provisionally and that the real goal was establishment of a better social life (*Greek Thinkers*, Volume 2 [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905], 160).

[73] At D.L. VI.39, we learn that 'When some one was discoursing on celestial phenomena, 'How many days', asked Diogenes, 'were you in coming from the sky?"

[74] D.L. VI.35 reads 'Most people, he would say, are so nearly mad that a finger makes all the difference. For, if you go along with your middle finger stretched out, some one will think you mad, but, if it's the little finger, he will not think so.' Trans. by Hicks.
[75] Dudley rightly notes the hostile polemical context of the sources here (such as Philodemus) and also properly places the Cynic paradoxes within their sophistic context: '…these statements cannot be taken at their face value to imply that Diogenes recommended incest and cannibalism….The *anaideia* of Diogenes was therefore didactic; undertaken to expose the artificiality of convention' (*A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* [London: Methuen & Co., 1937], 30-31).
[76] Bekircan Tahberer, 'Astragaloi on Ancient Coins: Game Pieces or Agents of Prophecy?' In: *The Celator* 26.4 (2012), 10.
[77] T. Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, 161) interprets Diogenes' recommendation to use knucklebones for currency as indicating the purely conventional value of money, and even as prefiguring the later usage of paper currency. He argues that this was motivated by the desire to 'prevent the accumulation of movable wealth' (ibid) but it is unclear how carrying dice around is supposed to be analogous to the Spartan use of lead weights for currency (unless we imagine *very heavy* dice).
[78] Trans. by Hicks modified.
[79] Another way that the Cynics interpret the irrationality of money and exchange value is, in proto-Marxist fashion, as a magical fetish. In Lucian's *Demonax* we learn that, 'When a fellow claimed to be a sorcerer and to have spells so potent that by their agency he could prevail on everybody to give him whatever he wanted, Demonax said: 'Nothing strange in that! I am in the same business: follow me to the breadwoman's, if you like, and you shall see me persuade her to give me bread with a single spell and a tiny charm', implying that a coin is as good as a spell' (23, trans. by A.M. Harmon). The lesson here is not all that different from what a recent Marxist critic of capital points out as an example of fetishism: 'The supermarket is riddled with fetishistic signs and disguises. The lettuce costs half as much as half a pound of tomatoes. But where did the lettuce and the tomatoes come from and who was it that worked to produce them and who brought them to the supermarket? And why does one item cost so much more than another? Moreover, who has the right to attach some kabbalistic sign like $ or € or £ over the items for sale and who puts a number on them, like $1 a pound or €2 a kilo? Commodities magically appear in the supermarkets with a price tag attached such that customers with money can satisfy their wants and needs depending upon how much money they have in their pockets. We get used to all this, but we don't notice that we have no idea where most of the items come from, how they were produced, by whom and under what conditions, or why, exactly, they exchange in the ratios they do and what the money we use is really all about…' (David Harvey, *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 5-6).
[80] As T. Gomperz puts it, 'If, then, no one is allowed to own more than is required for the satisfaction of his most elementary needs, if all possession beyond this is to be regarded as hurtful to the possessor, there is an end of every occasion and every motive for plundering, enslaving, or oppressing others' (*Greek Thinkers*, 163).
[81] D.L. VI.98: 'And when he [i.e., Theodorus] said to her [i.e., Hipparchia]: 'Is this she / Who quitting woof and warp and comb and loom?' she replied, 'It is I, Theodorus, – but do you suppose that I have been ill advised about myself, if instead of wasting further time upon the loom I spent it in education?"
[82] Toward Perpetual Peace *and Other Writings*, 3.
[83] Toward Perpetual Peace *and Other Writings*, 9.