Saving Armchair Metaphysics from A Posteriori Problems

Abstract

In this paper I will claim that conceptual analysis can plausibly be held to play an essential role in “serious metaphysics” in spite of skeptical arguments concerning our epistemic access to A‐ intensions. Before arguing for this claim, I will present Frank Jackson’s conception of “serious metaphysics” and show why Jackson thinks that doing conceptual analysis is a necessary part of doing “serious metaphysics”. Furthermore, I will canvass Jackson’s distinction between A‐ intensions and C intensions, show the role this distinction plays in Jackson’s account of conceptual ‐ analysis and explain why the thesis that we have a priori access to A intensions is crucial to ‐ Jackson’s program. Once this has been covered, I will present an argument against our a priori access to A intensions and then show that this argument is too strong by providing two thought ‐ experiments. Next, I will suggest another argument against our a priori access to A intensions from ‐ the a posteriori nature of our theories. However, I will show that this argument need not pose a problem for Jackson provided that Jackson’s A intensions consist of the right kind of description. In ‐ this way, because Jackson can evade the skeptical arguments, Jackson can still claim that we have a priori access to A intensions and, therefore, that conceptual analysis can still be considered a ‐ necessary condition of “serious metaphysics”.