Is Global Truth-Relativism Self-Refuting?

Abstract

This paper argues that Global Truth-Relativism (GTR) is not self-refuting. To arrive at this conclusion, I will begin by providing an account of GTR using MacFarlane's semantic framework for Truth-Relativism. After formulating GTR, three distinct variations of the self-refutation charge (SR) will be examined. Thefirst, due to Mackie and Siegel will be shown to be question begging as a result of it being shown that GTR is an intelligible position, deserving of the truth predicate. Next, Hales strengthened SR will be shown to rest on a faulty principle, while further appeals to make a strengthened SR that rely on trans-perspectival truth will be shown to be question begging as well. Finally, Cappelen and Lepore's challenge to the proponent of GTR will be met by showing that the challenge relies on a principle of tolerance that can consistently be rejected by the proponent of GTR. In this way, it will be shown that the proponent of GTR can avoid SR.