The Strategy & Goals of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Revolution

Abstract

Since the Hama events of 1982 that led to the Muslim Brotherhood’s forced exile from Syria, the group’s aim has been the return to Syria. To achieve their goals, they have made use of different negotiation channels with the Assad regime during the past three decades. However, at one point, those channels were cut, and, being ostracized not only by the Syrian authorities, but also by many in the political opposition to the regime, the Brotherhood has crossed the threshold of relative and discontinuous passivity to full-blown oppositional activity. This paper examines the different strategies they have followed, such as political activity, provision of humanitarian aid, the exertion of influence on armed groups combating the regime, and the benefitting from the ideological similarities they bear with the newly elected regimes as well as the Turkish ruling party. Building on the information we examine, it is our hypothesis that the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to be the best-organized and coherent oppositional group might not necessarily lead them to power, especially when more radical groups with a jihadist strategy have taken the lead of the Islamist field and the situation remains extremely complex.