Conflict Absorption and the Paradox of State Power in Syria

Abstract

The study of post-colonial Syrian statehood has been interested in the relational power of institutions and varied social forces in shaping state power. In this paper, I ask how the conflict represents a distinct period of state formation in which state power was oriented around conflict management. I make two interrelated arguments that address this question. First, the normalization and bureaucratization of the logic of war reveal patterns of conflict absorption that orient state power around protracted conflict and the punishment of state enemies. Conflict absorption created the conditions for the recruitment of new elite networks, reconfigurations of local power centers, and the institutionalization of enmity against state enemies. Second, the tension between regime claims of victory and Syria’s continued territorial fragmentation highlight the paradox of state power. The regime was simultaneously strong enough to control most of Syria’s territory but too weak to reincorporate larger areas that remained outside of its control. The regime’s collapse in December 2024 reveals both the limits of conflict management strategies and the myriad challenges future political authorities have in reconstituting state capacity.