UNCLOS as Customary Law: Legal Constraint and Strategic Instrument in U.S. Maritime Policy

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Fabian Shelton

Abstract

It is imperative to ensure stability and security within maritime matters. Further, it is imperative that the 
United States embrace the tenets of UNCLOS. Although it has not ratified it, the United States of America has 
observed UNCLOS’ legal framework, relying on its principles to ensure its Indo-Pacific alliance network (i.e., the 
QUAD and AUKUS agreements) and to conduct FONOPs, such as the annual military exercise Talisman Sabre. 
This essay argues that the United States treats the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as binding 
customary law: a benchmark to legally structure FONOPs and alliance-based maritime security. The adherence to UNCLOS illustrates international law to be a strategic instrument and a constraining framework in the United 
States’ deterrence strategy, such as with U.S.-China great-power competition. In doing so, the United States would 
be a stronger ally in the Indo-Pacific, assuaging the fears of allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 
Furthermore, UNCLOS represents a key component of American deterrence: by upholding freedom of navigation 
and sovereignty, China would be deterred from becoming more aggressive towards Taiwan, preventing a potential 
military invasion or blockade. 

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