What Motivated Epicurus to Say that Atoms Swerve?

Abstract

The swerve is the most radical departure from Democritean philosophy that Epicurus makes. The different stance is emphasized by the fact that in their physics they are generally very similar. The most obvious account for this difference is that Epicurus saw significant problems with Democritean atomism that had to be solved. O'Keefe comments, Since the swerve appears nowhere in Epicurus' extant writings, any suggestions about why he introduced the swerve are necessarily speculative. This paper will attempt to examine Epicurus' reasons for his claim that atoms swerve.

In Lucretius' account of Epicurus' philosophy the swerve, broadly speaking, has both a cosmological and a psychological function.2 Whilst there is some debate as to the precise role the swerve plays, this essay will rstly outline O'Keefe's interpretation of the cosmological role of the swerve. O'Keefe argues that Democritus' account of atomic motion based solely upon collisions is inadequate. He argues that Epicurus had to introduce weight to account for atomic motion and the swerve to account for collisions within this account of motion. The psychological3 role of the swerve is even more contested. This essay shall outline Russell's account of the swerve: that it makes dialectical space within atomism for freedom in what would otherwise have been a Laplacean determined world. It will be argued that these two accounts of the roles of the swerve are the truest to the evidence, and thus the roles that Epicurus wanted the atomic swerve to play. From this, it can be concluded that the lack of a full account of atomic motion, and the failure to account for free will, or responsibility for actions, within Democritus' physics motivated Epicurus to say that atoms swerve.