Is Women’s Reproductive Labour a Special Kind of Labour That Should Not Be Treated According to Market Norms?

Abstract

This paper addresses the argument that women’s reproductive labour should not be treated according to market norms. Such arguments are motivated by the asymmetry thesis, which argues that there is something special about surrogacy which distinguishes it from other forms of labour. Notably, such an argument is brought forward by Elizabeth Anderson, who claims that there is something essentially different about surrogacy that renders it distinct from other forms of labour. I argue that Anderson is wrong, considering Fabre’s defence that there is nothing inherently objectionable about surrogacy. Yet, I affirm that there is something intuitively objectionable about surrogacy as a form of labour, and explain this by defending the asymmetry thesis on the grounds that surrogacy should be treated differently due to its existence in a patriarchal society; commercial surrogacy risks contributing to the preexisting essentialist stereotypes which in turn affect women. I motivate this argument by reference to Satz. I conclude that while there is nothing inherently wrong with commercial surrogacy itself, it should not be treated according to market norms in the context of our society, due to risking amplifying the notion that women exist for reproduction, and that their bodies are available to be used by others.