Is intuition best treated as a sui generis mental state, or as a belief?

Abstract

It is common in philosophy for philosophers to consult their intuitions regarding philosophical issues, and then use those intuitions as evidence for their arguments.  For instance, an incompatibilist about moral responsibility might argue that her position is correct because it is intuitive that, given a deterministic world, people cannot be morally responsible.  One might ask whether or not the philosopher is justified in using intuitions in her argument, but it seems that in order to answer this, we require an understanding of what intuitions are.  One characterisation of intuitions is that they are either ordinary beliefs, beliefs with particular aetiologies, or inclinations to believe.  An alternative view is that intuitions are unique, sui generis mental states, unique in the sense that they cannot be fully understood in terms of other mental states.  In this essay, I defend the belief view of intuitions.  I argue that intuitions are inclinations to believe, which are derived from unconscious reasoning processes which take our background beliefs and theories as input.  I defend this view against Elijah Chudnoff’s claim that intuitions are sui generis mental states akin to perceptual experiences.  I suggest that the analogy Chudnoff draws between perceptions and intuitions does not hold, because perceptions are belief independent, while intuitions are not.  I then respond to Chudnoff’s counter-example to the belief view, which is that it is possible to have an intuition but no corresponding belief or inclination to believe.  I formulate an error theory which demonstrates that it is possible to confuse the rejection of an intuition as part of our consciously derived beliefs, with the elimination of an intuition as part of our unconsciously derived beliefs.  Such confusion, I suggest, leads to Chudnoff’s putative counter-example that it is possible to have an intuition and yet no inclination to believe in it.